RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 60, 00-03-24

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From: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty <http://www.rferl.org>

RFE/RL NEWSLINE

Vol. 4, No. 60, 24 March 2000

CONTENTS

[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

[01] ARMENIAN PRESIDENT, PREMIER VISIT WOUNDED KARABAKH LEADER

[02] FORMER AZERBAIJANI GENERALS CALL FOR NEW WAR OVER KARABAKH

[03] AZERBAIJAN QUERIES LEGALITY OF OIL TARIFF CONCESSION...

[04] ...AND OPPOSITION SLAMS IT...

[05] ...AS GEORGIA CALCULATES PROFITS

[06] AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA SIGN FURTHER COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

[07] GEORGIAN MILITARY CLARIFIES RETURN HOME OF KFOR CONTINGENT

[08] LAST GEORGIAN DESERTERS SURRENDER

[09] SUSPECT ARRESTED IN MURDER OF ABKHAZ VICE PREMIER

[10] KYRGYZ DEMAND ARRESTED OPPOSITION LEADER'S RELEASE...

[11] ...AS PROTESTS OVER POLL OUTCOME CONTINUE

[12] TAJIKISTAN ELECTS UPPER CHAMBER OF PARLIAMENT

[13] UZBEKISTAN TO LIBERALIZE BANKING SYSTEM

[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

[14] ETHNIC ALBANIAN MILITANTS PLEDGE POLITICAL STRUGGLE

[15] NATO LEADERS MARK ANNIVERSARY OF KOSOVA CAMPAIGN

[16] U.S. OPPOSES PARTITION OF MITROVICA

[17] ALBANIA CONDEMNS 'EXTREMIST ACTS

[18] MILOSEVIC HONORS WAR DEAD

[19] EU PLEDGES SUSTANTIAL AID FOR MONTENEGRO...

[20] ...CALLS FOR BETTER COORDINATION IN KOSOVA

[21] HAGUE COURT HIKES BOSNIAN CROAT'S SENTENCE ON APPEAL

[22] CROATIAN OPPOSITION LETS BUDGET PASS

[23] FORMER ROMANIAN PRESIDENT SAYS HOT LINE NEVER PASSED

[24] ROMANIAN LIBERALS TORN BY CONFLICT

[25] ROMA PROTEST RACISM IN ROMANIA

[26] MOLDOVAN PARLIAMENT APPROVES ELECTORAL LAW CHANGES

[27] BULGARIA'S FOREIGN DEBT DECREASES SIGNIFICANTLY

[C] END NOTE

[28] PUTIN'S RISE TO POWER DELAYS CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

[A] TRANSCAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

[01] ARMENIAN PRESIDENT, PREMIER VISIT WOUNDED KARABAKH LEADER

Arkadii Ghukasian, president of the unrecognized Nagorno-

Karabakh Republic, who is recovering in a Yerevan hospital

from gun wounds received during the unsuccessful attack on

his life early on 22 March, Interfax reported. Ghukasian's

brother Areg and one of the surgeons who operated on him both

pronounced his condition satisfactory, RFE/RL's Yerevan

bureau reported. In Stepanakert, police discovered "illegal

weapons and ammunition" in the homes of former Defense

Minister Samvel Babayan and his brother Karen, both of whom

were taken into custody on 22 March on suspicion of

involvement in the bid to assassinate Ghukasian. Karabakh

First Deputy Prosecutor-General Aramais Avagian told Noyan

Tapan on 23 March that no charges have yet been brought

against any of the several dozen detainees. LF

[02] FORMER AZERBAIJANI GENERALS CALL FOR NEW WAR OVER KARABAKH

senior Azerbaijani Defense Ministry officials argued that

since all attempts to resolve the Karabakh conflict

peacefully have failed, a new attempt should be made to win

back control of Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent currently

Armenian-controlled territories by force, Turan reported.

Former Defense Minister Tajaddin Mehtiev argued that it would

be possible to inflict a military defeat on Armenia if the

Azerbaijani leadership and opposition close ranks. LF

[03] AZERBAIJAN QUERIES LEGALITY OF OIL TARIFF CONCESSION...

President Heidar Aliev's statement in Tbilisi on 22 March

that Azerbaijan has agreed to use its profits to augment the

tariff that Georgia will receive from the transit of Caspian

oil, Turan reported on 23 March. The agency quoted

unidentified experts as suggesting that the legal owner of

the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline would pay a certain amount (for

example, 12 cents) to Georgia and Azerbaijan per barrel of

oil carried via these countries. A concession by Azerbaijan

to Georgia such as Aliev hinted at would mean that Azerbaijan

would be paid not 12, but 8 cents, while Georgia would

receive not 12, but 16 cents. LF

[04] ...AND OPPOSITION SLAMS IT...

criticized Aliev's announcement, Turan reported on 23 March.

National Independence Party Chairman Etibar Mamedov pointed

out that "the fees for oil, the oil pipeline, and oil

transportation are not Heidar Aliev's property that he can

present to his friend.... This is a strategic issue and it

cannot be resolved in a hurry." Musavat Party Chairman Isa

Gambar similarly argued that "infringing upon one's own

interests in favor of the other side is an incorrect decision

from both the political and economic viewpoints." Both Gambar

and Azerbaijan Popular Front Party first deputy chairman Ali

Kerimov termed Aliev's decision as yet another example of his

placing personal interests above those of the state. LF

[05] ...AS GEORGIA CALCULATES PROFITS

of the Georgian International Oil Corporation, told a news

conference in Tbilisi on 23 March that the transit of the

"main" Caspian oil via Georgia will bring in transit fees of

$52.5 million annually, which will be equal to 10 percent of

the state budget, Caucasus Press reported. He said that at

the initial stage (2004-2008) Georgia will receive 12 cents

for 1 barrel or 89 cents for 1 ton of oil; at the second

stage, (2009-2018) it will get 14 cents for 1 barrel or 1.4

dollars for 1 ton and at the third stage (2019-2043) 17 cents

and more for 1 barrel or1.26 dollars for 1 ton. An

Azerbaijani official representing the Azerbaijan

International Operating Company, the only Western consortium

currently exporting Azerbaijani oil, said President Aliev's

concession was motivated by the desire to expedite the start

of construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. LF

[06] AZERBAIJAN, GEORGIA SIGN FURTHER COOPERATION AGREEMENTS

Aliev characterized relations between his country and Georgia

as "a strategic partnership" and "really friendly and

mutually beneficial," ITAR-TASS reported. Several bilateral

agreements were signed during Aliev's two-day state visit to

Tbilisi, including on the exchange of information and on

cooperation in the social protection of the population and

between the two countries' Justice Ministries. LF

[07] GEORGIAN MILITARY CLARIFIES RETURN HOME OF KFOR CONTINGENT

KFOR in Kosova were sent back to Tbilisi for insubordination

before their eight-month tour of duty was complete,

"Segodnya" reported on 22 March. The newspaper claimed that

the Georgian troops had refused to accept orders from the

Turkish officers under whom they served and had locked

themselves in their barracks and declared a hunger-strike.

Georgian military officials admitted that the Georgian

Defense Ministry has failed to pay on time the $600 per month

to which the men were entitled. A Georgian Defense Ministry

spokesman denied last week that Georgian peacekeepers have

returned home because of friction with the Turkish contingent

(see "RFE/RL Newsline," 20 March 2000). LF

[08] LAST GEORGIAN DESERTERS SURRENDER

servicemen who deserted from their unit at the Kodjori

training camp earlier this month have now returned, Caucasus

Press reported on 24 March, citing "Rezonansi" (see "RFE/RL

Newsline," 15 March 200). LF

[09] SUSPECT ARRESTED IN MURDER OF ABKHAZ VICE PREMIER

and Abkhaz police recently arrested a man on suspicion of

involvement in the September 1995 assassination of Abkhaz

Deputy Prime Minister Yurii Voronov, "Kommersant-Daily"

reported on 23 March (see "OMRI Daily Digest," 13 September

1995). The suspect, named as Albert Tarba, is believed to

have acted on instructions from Georgian intelligence with

the aim of destabilizing the internal situation in Abkhazia.

LF

[10] KYRGYZ DEMAND ARRESTED OPPOSITION LEADER'S RELEASE...

250 people demonstrated on 23 March outside the Kyrgyz

Security Ministry to demand the release of opposition Ar-

Namys Party Chairman Feliks Kulov, RFE/RL's Bishkek bureau

reported. Kulov was arrested the previous day on suspicion of

participating in illegal activities by members of the Kalkhan

anti-terror squad while he headed the Security Ministry in

1997-1998 (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 28 April 1999 and 23 March

2000), according to Reuters. Speaking at a press conference

in Bishkek on 23 March, Security Ministry department head

Ikramadin Aitkulov said that Kulov has been charged with

abuse of power while he served as security minister and

deputy premier and with violating the rights and interests of

the state and individual citizens. He said that Kulov is also

suspected of misappropriating some $22,000 that the Security

Ministry had received from unnamed commercial firms. LF

[11] ...AS PROTESTS OVER POLL OUTCOME CONTINUE

in Bishkek issued a press release on 23 March stressing its

concern over the situation that has arisen in Kyrgyzstan

since the two rounds of voting for a new parliament on 20

February and 12 March as well as over the violations

committed before and during the vote, Interfax and ITAR-TASS

reported. Also on 23 March, some 300 people continued their

protest in the town of Kara-Buura to demand the annulment of

the 12 March parliamentary runoff in that constituency, in

which Kulov was defeated. LF

[12] TAJIKISTAN ELECTS UPPER CHAMBER OF PARLIAMENT

assemblies in Tajikistan's five electoral districts on 23

March elected five deputies each to the upper house of the

new parliament, Reuters and Asia-Plus Blitz reported. They

include the mayor of Dushanbe, the prosecutor-general, and

the heads of the writers' union and Academy of Sciences. The

remaining eight members of the upper house were named by

President Imomali Rakhmonov last week. LF

[13] UZBEKISTAN TO LIBERALIZE BANKING SYSTEM

Karimov has issued a decree intended to increase the

independence of commercial banks and make it easier for them

to issue low-interest loans to farmers and small and medium-

sized businesses, Interfax reported on 23 March. Banks are to

set up a special fund to issue such loans, and the proceeds

from doing so will be tax exempt for five years, provided

they are reinvested in the fund. LF

[B] SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

[14] ETHNIC ALBANIAN MILITANTS PLEDGE POLITICAL STRUGGLE

political representatives of the Liberation Army of Presevo,

Medvedja, and Bujanovac said in a formal statement on 24

March that they "are committed to a political solution [to

the problems of southwest Serbia's Albanian minority] in

cooperation with the international community," AP reported.

The statement did not include a pledge of a unilateral cease-

fire or an offer to disarm as some Western diplomats had

hoped. But in Washington the previous day, State Department

spokesman James Rubin said that "it's an important statement

in moving the problem there from the military to political

sphere." In Gjilan, Januz Musliu of the Political Council for

Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac told Reuters after nine

hours of meetings with U.S. and Kosovar Albanian officials:

"Our stance and our engagement will be in accord with our own

national and international interests, especially with those

of the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance." PM

[15] NATO LEADERS MARK ANNIVERSARY OF KOSOVA CAMPAIGN

Secretary-General Lord Robertson and Supreme Commander Europe

General Wesley Clark are slated to visit Kosova on 24 March.

They will mark the first anniversary of NATO's bombing

campaign that forced the Serbian leadership to end Operation

Horseshoe, which was the code-name for a campaign launched in

early 1999 to expel the ethnic Albanians who make up some 90

percent of Kosova's population. Robertson and Clark were

originally scheduled to arrive at 9:00 a.m. local time, but

the trip was delayed for what an unnamed NATO official called

"operational reasons." When Reuters asked if that meant

because of security concerns, the official replied: "I won't

go into that." Later, KFOR spokesman Major Nick Naudin said

that the planned trip by the two leaders to the divided city

of Mitrovica has been canceled. Reuters suggested that it

would be an embarrassment for NATO if it could not guarantee

the two men's security there. PM

[16] U.S. OPPOSES PARTITION OF MITROVICA

March put up signs in parts of the Serb-held area of northern

Mitrovica indicating that those areas are a "confidence zone"

in which all people may move about freely. The zone now

stretches from northern Mitrovica across the bridge over the

Ibar River and into mainly Albanian southern Mitrovica. Local

Serbs told AP, however, that KFOR "will make a terrible

mistake if they tried to enforce the zone. We know their are

doing all this to enable the Albanians to take everything."

The previous day in Geneva, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine

Albright stressed Washington's opposition to the partition of

the northern Kosova city. PM

[17] ALBANIA CONDEMNS 'EXTREMIST ACTS

said in a statement on 24 March that there has been a

"tangible improvement" in the situation of Kosova's ethnic

Albanians since NATO forces occupied the province in June

1999. The government added, however, that "the latest

incidents in Kosova...clearly show that there are still many

difficulties ahead," dpa reported from Tirana. In an apparent

reference to southwestern Serbia, "the Albanian government

declares that it condemns any extremist act by any side.

Albania is ready to contribute to the prevention of such acts

that might plunge Kosova into a new crisis." Yugoslav

President Slobodan "Milosevic and his clique are persistently

trying to destabilize the situation, undermine stabilization

processes, and edge Kosova towards a new chaos," the

government noted. PM

[18] MILOSEVIC HONORS WAR DEAD

Milosevic placed a wreath near the tomb of the unknown

soldier in the Avala region of Belgrade on 23 March. He wrote

in the guest book: "May there be eternal glory to the heroes

of the fatherland who fell in defense of the freedom and

dignity of their people and [in defense] of their state from

the [threat posed by the] new fascism," "Vesti" reported. The

next day, officially sponsored "anti-NATO rallies" took place

in several municipalities in different parts of Serbia.

Reuters reported from Belgrade, however, that many Serbs

question why the government is using their money to

"celebrate a defeat." Such individuals also called for a

"more dignified" commemoration of the war dead. PM

[19] EU PLEDGES SUSTANTIAL AID FOR MONTENEGRO...

EU member states said in a draft communique on 24 March that

Montenegro must receive considerable economic assistance if

its democratic reforms are to succeed, dpa reported from

Lisbon. "The European Council underlines the urgent need for

substantial assistance to Montenegro in order to ensure the

survival of democratic government and to avoid another crisis

in the region," the statement added. The leaders did not

specify an amount of money but called on relevant EU bodies

to act quickly to find the necessary funds. Elsewhere in the

communique, they leaders said that a "democratic, cooperative

Serbia, living at peace with its neighbors, will be welcome

to join the European family." In the meantime, however,

sanctions will remain in place as a "pressure for democratic

change," the communique added. PM

[20] ...CALLS FOR BETTER COORDINATION IN KOSOVA

communique of 24 March, the EU leaders added that "the

international community needs a more coherent and action-

oriented strategy for providing economic and political

support to [Kosova] and the region. To this end, [the EU

recognizes] the need to provide support in a much more

coordinated, coherent fashion and to ensure that the efforts

of the Union and its member states receive appropriate

recognition," the statement added. NATO and the UN civilian

administration currently play the key roles in Kosova. PM

[21] HAGUE COURT HIKES BOSNIAN CROAT'S SENTENCE ON APPEAL

Hague-based war crimes tribunal on 24 March extended the

prison sentence for Zlatko Aleksovski from two and one-half

to seven years. The tribunal ruled that the initial sentence

reflected neither the fact that he was commander of a prison

camp in 1993 nor the severity of crimes committed there

against Muslim inmates. He is charged with displaying

exceptional cruelty toward prisoners and with using those

inmates as human shields. PM

[22] CROATIAN OPPOSITION LETS BUDGET PASS

belonging to the Croatian Democratic Community of the late

President Franjo Tudjman and to the far-right Croatian Party

of [Historic] Rights have abstained from an upper-house vote

on the government's budget, RFE/RL's South Slavic Service

reported on 23 March. The two parties have a majority in the

upper house and could have obstructed passage. The budget now

goes to the lower house for consideration. Meanwhile at

Velika Kopanica on the main Zagreb-Lipovac highway, several

hundred refugees and returnees from Slavonia blocked traffic

to protest what they called insufficient budget funding to

enable refugees to return home and rebuild their communities.

PM

[23] FORMER ROMANIAN PRESIDENT SAYS HOT LINE NEVER PASSED

In an interview with Mediafax on 23

March, former President Ion Iliescu said talks with Russia on

setting up a hot line were initiated by the Kremlin, were

"exploratory," and were conducted at "expert, not negotiator,

level." He added that the Supreme Council of National

Defense, which he headed, never discussed or approved the

line, and he described the debate over the line as "clear

electoral diversion whose obvious purpose is to deflect the

attention of people from the country's real problems."

Earlier on 23 March, retired General Vasile Ionel, who was

Iliescu's counselor on defense matters, said that after

"discussions at expert level," Iliescu concluded that the

time for concluding an accord was "not ripe, as long as we

still do not have a [basic] treaty with Russia." MS

[24] ROMANIAN LIBERALS TORN BY CONFLICT

(PNL) Chairman Mircea Ionescu-Quintus said on 23 March that a

decision taken by the party's Standing Central Bureau in his

absence from the country last week had infringed on his

powers as PNL chairman. The bureau had designated First

Deputy Chairman Valeriu Stoica as "negotiator with all

[other] parties." Ionescu-Quintus said he may call an

extraordinary PNL congress and announce he will run for

another term. Earlier, he had said he will step down in 2001.

Ionescu-Quintus also said some members of the bureau had

joined the PNL after quitting other parties but had done

little for the PNL, "being concerned only about their

positions." Also on 23 March, the bureau revised its decision

on Stoica to name him as negotiator with only those parties

that are members of the Democratic Convention of Romania,

RFE/RL's Bucharest bureau reported. MS

[25] ROMA PROTEST RACISM IN ROMANIA

through downtown Bucharest on 23 March to protest against

racism, AP reported. VG

[26] MOLDOVAN PARLIAMENT APPROVES ELECTORAL LAW CHANGES

Moldovan legislature on 23 March passed a series of

amendments to the country's Electoral Code, Basa-Press

reported. Under the amendments, the minimum threshold for

political factions to gain representation in the parliament

has been increased from 4 percent to 6 percent, while the

threshold for independent candidates has been lowered from 4

percent to 3 percent. The amendments also bar "foreign or

rebroadcast television and radio stations, as well as foreign

publications and their satellite newspapers" from running

electoral campaign advertisements. Any candidates who violate

the law will be disqualified. The changes also call for state

television to offer two hours of commercial time to each

candidate "but not more than two minutes a day." VG

[27] BULGARIA'S FOREIGN DEBT DECREASES SIGNIFICANTLY

foreign debt has dropped by almost $1 billion since the end

of last year, AP reported, quoting Bulgarian Finance Minister

Muravei Radev. The minister said the country's foreign debt

now totals $9.07 billion; in December it stood at $9.984

billion. The latest figure is equal to about 78 percent of

the country's GDP. He said the government is drafting a law

on containing debt growth for the next three to five years

and reducing it thereafter. In other news, the Bulgarian

cabinet approved four defense cooperation accords with

Romania on 23 March, BTA reported. VG

[C] END NOTE

[28] PUTIN'S RISE TO POWER DELAYS CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Vladimir Putin's coming to power has sidelined proposals

to reduce the constitutional powers of the Russian

presidency. In fact, an elected Putin administration would be

more likely to deepen the crisis of government by amending

the constitution to further strengthen presidential power.

The Russian Constitution, ratified in December 1993,

provides for an extraordinarily strong chief executive and a

weak legislature and judiciary. Popular support for that

document stemmed from the desire to be permanently rid of the

stalemate between the executive and legislative branches that

had paralyzed the national government for the previous two

years. The strong presidency was tailored for Boris Yeltsin,

who many liberals and Western governments believed to be the

best guarantor of reform. It also reflected both Yeltsin's

desire to maximize his own political power and Russia's

historical and cultural preference for a strong leader.

Despite formally strong presidential powers, the

weakness of Russia's institutions and the rule of law

contributed to the strong personalization of authority and

the chronic difficulty in implementing government decisions.

Yeltsin ruled largely by decree, signing more than 1,000 a

year, many of which were largely ignored. And on many issues,

he ignored the elected State Duma, whose powers, budget,

experience, and professionalism were limited.

Most important, this imbalance allowed businessmen,

regional leaders, and many others to exert disproportionate

pressure on the presidential apparatus. Key government

programs involving the transfer of state assets worth

billions of dollars, such as privatization and the 1995

loans-for-shares auctions, were decided by presidential

decree with the support of the so-called "oligarchs." For

most of his presidency, Yeltsin tried to govern by balancing

these interests. During his final years in office, however,

an exhausted and infirm president was coopted by some of

them.

Changing the constitution to address these problems

would be one answer. Despite the inherent difficulties of

such an undertaking, there have been many proposals to scale

back the presidency. Some plans have suggested tinkering with

succession procedures or the power to declare and wage war.

Others have called for a parliamentary system in which the

legislature would appoint the prime minister and the cabinet

or in which the Duma would appoint a prime minister who had

enhanced powers and selected the government, while the

presidency would be scaled back. Another blueprint provided

for strong powers for the president, albeit diminished

compared with Yeltsin, the introduction of a vice presidency,

and increased autonomy for the government. According to this

scheme, the Duma would have the right to appoint and remove

the prime minister and his ministers.

There have been three major attempts to go forward with

these changes.

The first was in response to Yeltsin's endorsement of

the 1994 invasion of Chechnya. The proposed amendments,

however, failed to gain the necessary two-thirds support in

the Duma.

The second bid occurred in 1997, in response to

Yeltsin's health problems. A broad coalition of parties,

factions, and regional leaders proposed a wide range of

amendments, including proposals addressing the problem of

presidential disability. Yeltsin resisted those proposals,

arguing that it would be premature to amend the constitution

only a few years after it had been adopted. In the end, the

parliament and the president agreed on an antecedent law,

passed in 1998, on the procedures for constitutional

amendment. The system itself, however, remained unchanged.

The third attempt was triggered by the economic crisis

of August 1998. In an effort to gain the Duma's approval of

Viktor Chernomyrdin as prime minister, Yeltsin signaled his

willingness to consider amendments. A pact was drafted, but

Yeltsin backtracked when Chernomyrdin's candidacy failed to

gain approval a second time and a compromise candidate,

Yevgenii Primakov, was approved instead. Subsequent efforts

by Primakov first to revive the pact and later to draft a new

one convinced Yeltsin that Primakov was too independent, and

the prime minister was removed accordingly. Yeltsin conceded,

however, that the constitution needed revision, but only

after the presidential elections in 2000.

Putin's interim presidency, a product of this system,

has halted the momentum for downsizing the executive branch.

The presidential succession was less a genuine transfer of

power than the final act of a months-long drama in which

political and business interests sought to find a successor

to Yeltsin who would protect their interests. The fact that

Putin was both acting president and prime minister during the

three-month transition has further weakened the other federal

structures.

In recent weeks, moreover, Putin has hinted he may try

to reverse the country's decline by seeking additional

powers. He has supported extending the term of the presidency

from four to seven years. The Kremlin has also revived the

idea of directly appointing Russia's governors--their popular

election, introduced in the mid-1990s, was a major factor in

the ebbing of authority from the federal center.

Stronger presidential powers, however, are unlikely to

solve Russia's political problems. More effective would be to

build effective coalitions with the rest of the federal

government and with the regions to ensure better governance

and more enduring popular support. Power-sharing agreements

that fell short of amending the constitution but were

observed by all parties would also help establish the ground

rules of political behavior. Such steps would require,

however, the avoidance of strong-arm tactics and less

reliance on the oligarchs. During his interim presidency, at

least, Putin has been either unwilling or unable to act in

this direction.

The author is associate director of RFE/RL's Broadcasting

Division.

24-03-00

Reprinted with permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
URL: http://www.rferl.org

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