Cyprus PIO: Public Lecture By FM on Cyprus Accession to the EU, 96-10-30
From: The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office Server at <http://www.pio.gov.cy/>
Public Lecture
by H.E. Mr Alecos P. Michaelides,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Cyprus
"CYPRUS ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: A VISION AND A
CHALLENGE FOR TODAY"
at the London School of Economics and Political Science 30 October, 1996
(On the occasion of the Conference "Cyprus in the European Union", organised
by the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political
Science and the Hellenic Centre)
Honourable Members of Parliament and the European Parliament Ladies and
Gentlemen
It is with particular pleasure that I find myself among you today. It is a
great honour to be invited to address an audience such as is gathered here, on
this occasion. I would like to congratulate the organizers of the Conference
for their initiative and of course for extending to me their kind invitation
for this public Lecture.
I stand here before you with a deep sense of responsibility, both because the
London School of Economics and Political Science has the finest tradition in
lively and informed debates, but also, because I have assumed the great
responsibility of presenting the dream and vision of every Cypriot, a goal
supported by all political parties in Cyprus, namely, the accession of Cyprus
to the European Union, our vision and our challenge for today.
Putting the discussion in the right perspective, it is important to recognize
that we live in a new and rapidly changing world. We are at the dawn of a new
era whose characteristics are constantly and relentlessly changing.
The end of the cold war shifted our per-occupation away from the focus on the
great dangers of massive destruction, to the new challenges and new
opportunities. From the fear to the optimism about the future.
When the iron curtain came down, the people that lived under oppression and
isolation have discovered the rest of Europe and they re-discovered the
freedom they were denied for so many years. From that moment on, the people
turned to pluralistic democracies, free market economies, legal systems to
become guardians of human rights and the rule of law.
Promoting this great change became a real challenge for the European Union. It
is a truly commendable achievement, that while the European Union was moving
fast in the direction of furthering the integration process, it was realized,
that Europe could not be limited to the borders of the European Union and that
in the longer run, it would not be wise to ignore the reality that beyond the
borders of the Union. The process chosen was to extend an invitation for
integration. Thus, the invitation extended to the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe as prospective candidates for becoming members of the Union,
became a vehicle for helping them in their efforts to build new institutions,
develop their economies and their legal and social structures.
The European Union took another historic step forward in the direction of the
south, specifically focusing on the Mediterranean region. An area of
increasing tension and conflicts which together with lack of economic
development, could turn into one of the potentially most explosive regions in
the world.
So in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held at Barcelona last November, we
adopted a Declaration by which programmes of political, economic and cultural
cooperation, were launched, aiming at establishing peace, stability and
prosperity around the Mediterranean.
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is now a reality. And it must be a
commitment of all of us who participated in it; to pledge to promote the
accepted international principles, outlined in this Declaration as defining
the shared vision of a peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean and which can
serve as the basis for a new Charter for the Mediterranean.
Cyprus supported the whole idea from the very outset and is fully committed to
not only respecting the above principles but, more so, promoting their
implementation throughout the Mediterranean region.
We believe that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership can become a great
Institution and we have done everything possible to make our contribution. We
offered Cyprus as a venue because of its geographic position, for a number of
activities and meetings.
It is truly remarkable how much was achieved in Europe in the last few
years. No doubt other institutions made their contribution too, in particular
the O.S.C.E. and the Council of Europe. But admittedly the European Union has
and will continue being the prime mover and the leading force in meeting the
great challenge: the building of the Europe of tomorrow.
Within this context, the challenge of enlargement, namely the invitation to 12
countries for future accession to the European Union, is a loud signal that we
should never return to the past. Our minds, our thoughts, our plans, should be
for the world of tomorrow, for the future.
Cyprus shares this vision and welcomes the fact that the European Union, is
perceiving its role as the architect of the Europe of tomorrow, assuming the
leading role in the European world.
In this frame of mind, I would like now to turn to the issue of the accession
of Cyprus to the European Union.
Let me start by presenting a brief overview of the history of the relations
between Cyprus and the European Community.
With the accession of Britain to the European Union, the Commonwealth
preferential tariffs were dismantled and Cyprus faced the challenge of seeking
trade arrangements that would facilitate its exports, since Britain was the
main export market for our agricultural goods.
Thus, Cyprus turned to the European Community, seeking institutionalized trade
arrangements.
These relations can be divided in three phases: - Phase one is from 1972 to
1987, - Phase two from 1988 to 1992, and - Phase three, from 1993 to around
year 2000 when we expect to enter the last phase namely being a member of the
Union..
Phase one starts with the signing of the Association Agreement in December
1972 that provided for two stages, each, of five years duration. The first
stage involved the mutual and gradual elimination of import duties and
tariffs. The second stage was due to commence on the second half of 1977 and
would essentially be the transitional stage towards Customs Union.
Unfortunately, the Turkish invasion of 1974 and the continued occupation of
37% of our territory, brought a severe economic blow and a great social shock
as we lost 70% of our economic resources that were in the occupied area, plus
we had to provide for 1/3 of our population, i.e. 200,000 refugees, who were
evicted from their homes and their properties.
Beyond the above, the European Community, unfortunately, became reluctant to
sign the second stage and resolved to extending the first stage, year after
year. Thus, Cyprus was in fact penalised for being a victim of aggression.
However with all these frustrations we continued our trade relations with the
European Community until 1987, when we signed the Protocol, leading to Customs
Union by the year 2002.
We thus moved to the second stage where new perspectives were opened in our
exports. Proof of it is that today 59 % of our imports for home consumption
come from the European Union and 59 % of our domestic exports go to
E.U. countries.
But beyond the trading impact the Protocol built confidence in relations with
the European Community, the moreso, because a series of Financial Protocols
made it possible to execute major projects that boosted economic development,
as well as facilitated projects of a bi-communal character such as the Nicosia
Sewerage System.
Within this phase, Cyprus tabled its application for membership on 4th July
1990. Officials of the European Commission were sent to prepare the
Avis. There followed almost 3 years when nothing was moving and even the
Opinion itself was not published.
Here, we enter the third phase, starting from 1993 and that is the time when
we became the Government with the election of President Clerides. Therefore,
this is the period about which I can talk with great confidence and I may say,
feel great pride, because of the results.
When President Clerides addressed the House of Representatives during the
ceremony of his investiture on the 28th February 1993, he presented the
programme that the Government would implement. In his speech President
Clerides among others stated the following:
"We shall give priority to actions which aim at promoting the accession of
Cyprus to the European Union. We shall undertake every effort to persuade the
European Union that progress in Cyprus' s accession assist in the efforts to
solve the Cyprus problem. If Europe wishes to solve the Cyprus problem, it
should help by expressing its readiness to accept us as a member".
Two days later, when I assumed my duties as Foreign Minister I stated the
following:
"The axis of our foreign policy is what we call the European Orientation. By
this we not only mean our application for accession to the European Union and
the harmonization of the structures existing in Cyprus with those of Europe,
in order to become a fully member of the European Union, but also the
activation of the European factor in the efforts to find a solution to the
Cyprus problem".
As most of the Foreign Ministers are travellers, I decided that my first visit
out of Cyprus would be to Brussels, in order to emphasise that truly the focal
point of our foreign policy was promoting our accession to the European Union:
In Brussels I had my first meeting in my capacity as a Foreign Minister with
Commissioner Hans Van den Broek, one that had given me the opportunity to
understand the concerns of the European Union and, I must say, to establish an
excellent communication with an extremely prominent figure of the European
Union, for whom I have the highest regard.
I realised that what stopped the process of issuing the opinion was not the
concern about our economy or institutions or social structures but the
continuation of the Cyprus problem which was leading to a continuous
postponement of the issuing of the Avis.
At that meeting I pointed out, and in fact that became my position expressed
at every meeting with all Foreign Ministers of the European Union, that the
reservation regarding the accession of Cyprus due to the continuation of the
Cyprus problem was a gross misconception:
I highlighted that the Cyprus problem had not been resolved because Turkey
insisted on maintaining the status quo which all declared as
unacceptable. Therefore, it was unreasonable to penalise Cyprus because Turkey
continued its intransigence, as has been testified by the Secretary-General in
his reports to the Security Council.
Any reservations that may appear at the end of the process are no cause for
blocking the opening of the process. On the contrary the opening of the
process could considerably help promoting a solution to the Cyprus problem.
I believe, that the logic of these arguments probably led not only Mr Van den
Broek but also the Foreign Ministers to reconsider.
We then entered a period of a series of milestone decisions by the appropriate
bodies of the European Union, that brought Cyprus where it is now, that is, on
a clear accession path:
The opinion of the European Commission on the application of Cyprus was
issued on June 30
1993.
According to the Commission: "Cyprus's geographical position, the deep-lying
bonds which, for two thousand years, have located the island at the very fount
of European culture and civilisation, the intensity of the European influence
apparent in the values shared by the people of Cyprus and in the conduct of
the cultural, political, economic and social life of its citizens, the wealth
of its contacts of every kind with the Community, all these confer on Cyprus,
beyond all doubt, its European identity and character and confirm its vocation
to belong to the Community".
The Commission's Opinion clearly and unequivocally concluded that Cyprus was
eligible to join the European Union.
The next important decision was by the General Affairs Council, on the 4th
October 1993, when it endorsed the Commission's Opinion. It also asked the
Commission to embark on substantive talks with the Cyprus Government in order
to help it prepare for the accession negotiations. It also decided that the
application of Cyprus would be reviewed at the beginning of 1995 in the light
of developments concerning the promotion of a solution of the Cyprus problem.
Some may say this reference was an expression of reservation. On the contrary
we welcome this reference because it was a first step for the European Union
to look closer to the problem and not from a distance. Proof of this is was
the decision taken in December 1993 for the appointment of the European
Observer in the person of Mr Serge Abou, who was asked to submit a report to
the Council regarding developments related to the Cyprus problem.
Needless to say, the Turkish side, despite all the keen interest, professional
commitment and impartiality that Mr Abou has displayed, refused to see him,
because in fact they did not want the European Union to be involved in the
efforts in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. Their policy was always
to veto the decision for our future accession to the Union.
The next milestone decision was that of the European Council in Corfu in June
1994, reconfirmed in Essen in December 1994 stating that Cyprus and Malta
would be involved in the next enlargement of the European Union. The final
report of the European Observer was submitted in the beginning of 1995, and it
clearly stated that the Turkish side was solely responsible for the lack of
progress towards a solution of the Cyprus problem. This opened the
reexamination of Cyprus's application which resulted in another milestone
decision: The decision of the General Affairs Council of March 6 1995, which
stated that:
First: accession negotiations with Cyprus will commence six months after the
and of the Inter-Governmental Conference.
Second: the Ministers regretted the lack of progress in the intercommunal
talks and called for increased efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement
in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions.
Third: the Ministers considered "Cyprus accession to the European Union should
bring increased security and prosperity on the island".
Finally, the Ministers called on the Commission to organise in consultation
with the Cyprus Government the requisite contacts with the Turkish Cypriot
Community for the purpose of making it perceive more clearly the advantages of
European Union accession.
The next three European Councils, at Cannes in June 1995, at Madrid in
December 1995 and at Florence in June 1996, each confirmed the decision of the
European Union to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus and Malta. In fact,
the last European Council used this time setting to also establish the timing
of the beginning of the negotiations with countries of Central and Eastern
Europe.
From then on, we were given the opportunity at the level of the President as
well as the level of Foreign Minister to participate in political dialogue
with the Heads of Government and the Foreign Ministers at the European
Councils.
One can confidently say that with these decisions, demonstrated the vision of
the European Union, through enlargement to work for pursuing peace, stability,
and prosperity in a broader European landscape. This incorporated the vision
of the people of Cyprus for a European future free from conflict and
uncertainty. The challenge ahead of us today is to make the vision a reality.
Facing this great challenge, has two components: On the one hand to move ahead
speedily with the harmonisation with the Union's acquis so that accession
negotiations would be smoother and shorter.
On the other hand to seize the opportunity of the prospect of accession, in
order to expedite a viable solution of the Cyprus problem.
Let us now focus on the first component, namely the harmonisation process.
We worked tirelessly to get the green light on embarking on the accession
process. At this point let me stress that we have never looked at this
prospect, as being a free ticket to enter the Union. On the contrary we looked
at it as an invitation to meet a challenge. The challenge to become an equal
partner in the Union. And for this reason the harmonisation with the acquis
communautaire became an urgent mission.
When one refers to harmonisation the first thought is the state of our
Economy.
Our economy had suffered all the devastating results of the invasion of 1974,
as I described earlier. I am proud to say that we faced the blow
successfully.
Twenty two years later our Economy is doing well to the extent that we satisfy
the convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, for the
participation in the Economic and Monetary Union.
- The rate of growth in 1996 is around 2.5% and in 1997 we expect it to rise
to 3.5 - 4 %.
-The inflation rate is 3%
- Unemployment is at 3%.
- The Government budget deficit stood at 2,9% of the gross domestic
product.
- The public debt is at 54% of the gross domestic product.
- The Cyprus pound has shown remarkable stability and has been linked since
1992 without any problems, to the narrow band (2.25%) of the exchange rate
mechanism (ERM).
Let me also say that we have begun the process for reforming our monetary and
credit systems, aimed at the liberalization of rates of interest and capital
movements.
Therefore, the economic indicators show that Cyprus is not only prepared to
join the Union but is also in a position to proceed to the third stage of
economic and monetary union.
Now referring to the question of harmonisation let me say that our aim is to
complete about 70 to 80 per cent of the harmonisation process, by the time
negotiations commence, and most of the remaining during the negotiation
process.
From the moment the Council in October 1993 opened the substantive discussions
with the Commission, we have set up 22 working groups. The task of each group
was to study the acquis, to identify the gap that had to be bridged and to
submit its report to the Ministerial Committee on European Union Affairs. This
has been done. The reports are available for every one who is interested,
whether in the public or the private sector.
We then moved on to the next stage. Each group was asked to submit a programme
including a time-table for implementing the harmonization programme. This
process is concluded and the necessary decisions were taken by the Ministerial
Committee.
Every six months each group will be reporting to the Ministerial Committee as
to the progress in implementing the programme within the time table approved.
Let me point out that, the structured dialogue with the European Union was
also an extremely useful vehicle not only for staying abreast on developments
but also for developing an understanding and opening a communication channel
with all political levels. We have already held sectoral talks at Ministerial
level with the Council and the Commission on matters of justice and home
affairs, the internal market, agriculture, transport and other sectors. Within
the same context we are also participating in dialogue with the fifteen
Foreign Ministers , during General Affairs Councils, on common foreign and
security policy.
We are proud to say that the conclusions drawn by the European Union
Representatives, after each meeting, within the context of structured
dialogue, were very positive. All praised the high level of preparedness both
at the political as well as at the Civil Service level. One of the areas of
harmonisation to which we attach particular importance is that of the common
foreign and security policy of the European Union because it expresses an
advanced level of cooperation within the Union.
Since August 1994 we have declared that we would embark on the mission of
aligning our foreign policy with that of the Union. As part of this process we
regularly associate ourselves with the d marches and declarations of European
Union on international issues.
This is also reflected in our voting record at the United Nations. For example
the percentage of alignment in the voting pattern of our Delegation was as
follows:
During the 48th session of the General Assembly it went up to 66%, in the 49th
Session to 71% and in the 50th Session of the General Assembly it was 89%.
Concerning our external relations and foreign policy, I wish to note that we
have been extremely active in the Middle East maintaining excellent relations
with both Israel as well as with Arab neighbours. We are now a trusted friend
of both. We aspire to establish Cyprus as a bridge between the European Union
and the Middle East region but also we want to make a contribution not merely
to the efforts for bringing an end to the Middle East problem but also for
consolidating peace through building economic development in the region.
As regards to the Union goal of common security, we have had contacts with the
Western European Union. Subsequently, the Ministerial Meeting of the WEU in
May 1995 decided to establish a dialogue with Cyprus and Malta. This dialogue
is held regularly and is developing well.
Let us now turn to our other challenge, namely our efforts to achieve a
lasting solution to the
Cyprus problem.
I want to repeat that our dream is to be a member of the Union. But our
desperate wish and agony is to see an end to the division of our country and
our people. To bring peace, security and prosperity for all the people of
Cyprus in a united Cyprus.
I recall my meeting during the French Presidency, with Mr Alain Juppe, then
Foreign Minister and now Prime Minister of France, when I was anxiously
pressing for a time table for the commencement of the accession
negotiations. He explained to me that it was already decided that no
negotiations would start before the end of the IGC, which would be two to
three years later. I explained then and I repeat now, that we always
considered the prospect of embarking on the accession process as an invitation
to the Turkish Cypriots to join together with us on this great venture. That
it could become a true catalyst for a solution of the Cyprus problem.
We always considered that the decision for a time-table for the commencement
of accession negotiations would put Turkey before a dilemma: It would have to
chose either to continue its policy of blocking every initiative to solve the
Cyprus problem but at the same time depriving the Turkish Cypriots from
sharing the benefits of accession, or compromise and allow a solution and
consequently all the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
would jointly enter into the accession process and share the benefits.
This is why we were so keen in getting this date for accession negotiations as
soon as possible. We felt that the interim until negotiations started, would
be a unique opportunity for achieving a solution to the Cyprus problem.
Talking about economic benefits from accession, the Turkish Cypriot community
would be the greatest beneficiary, so that we would speedily bridge the
existing economic gap between us. It is well known that we enjoy a GDP per
capita of $14,000 and that they have only $3,500. This element is important
because we strongly believe that stability is based on economic prosperity.
Immediately after the March 6 decision we embarked on a process to encourage
the Americans, the British, all members of the European Union, especially the
leading countries, to be actively engaged in efforts to use the great
opportunity provided, so that we can bring an end to the Cyprus problem.
I emphasised earlier that the time-table for the commencement of accession
negotiations could become a real catalyst. This is why we were requesting
clarity in the decision of the Council.
The reaction by Turkey was so strong and provocative for the reasons I
described earlier: Its first reaction was to try to block it.
This came to no surprise to us. On the contrary it proved that the opening of
the process was becoming a leverage pressing for a solution to the Cyprus
problem.
Either the reaction or the great concern about the end of the process led to
some approaches and to some statements which, I must say, we do not consider
as helpful.
I want to be absolutely clear. We are not attributing dubious considerations
for the above. They all try to seek some way out when they faced the
provocative and totally negative Turkish stance.
Let's be more specific on these matters:
First, the question of informing the Turkish Cypriots about the benefits of
accession. The need for this is fully recognized not merely because of the
provision of the March 6 decision, but also because our wish to see the
invitation to embark into the accession process as an incentive to our Turkish
Cypriot compatriots, who could see the great prospects that lie ahead all of
us and moreso the economic prospects for them.
We supported every initiative which would result in communication with the
Turkish Cypriot people to inform them what life is within the Union and what
benefits they would expect.
We supported and continue to support the idea of open lectures by experts, or
seminars to people of different sectors, business people, farmers,
professionals etc.
We do believe also that exchanges and discussion with political parties is a
useful venue because they will then be able to inform their own members.
A lot of activities have already been done and I hope that more will be done
in the near future.
In stating the above, I underlined two concepts: First the reference to
experts and second, the communication with the people, the Turkish Cypriot
Community, openly or sectorally. This emphasis is not accidental.
The voice of the expert is more convincing because there is no political
consideration in what is said. A good example is the seminar Mr Wright
referred to this morning, where professors, experts in their field, were
invited to speak.
Regarding the other aspect, I underlined the need to approach the Turkish
Cypriot Community sectorally or openly. This was naturally an answer to those
who believe that some formalised contacts should be promoted with Mr Denktash
or organs of his illegal regime. Any move in this direction will be
counterproductive because it would be interpreted by Denktash as an
encouragement to him to pursue his dream for a separate state.
Some tend to make frequent references to the two Communities. The clear
reference of the Union's decision is to Cyprus and the Cyprus
Government. There is a clear reference to the Turkish Cypriot Community
regarding the need to make it perceive the benefits of the accession.
Now let us turn to another issue.
A series of statements were made by officials of Governments of member
states. All focused on the difficulties of accession if the Cyprus problem is
not solved prior to the accession.
We understand and appreciate the concerns. But we feel that the existence of
such concerns should not lead them to publicise their worries but to multiply
their efforts to see an end to the Cyprus problem.
When we hear these statements we are wondering whether they are addressed to
us or to Turkey.
If they are addressed to us, does it mean that we have failed to convince them
that we are not only ready but anxious for a solution?
If we were not anxious why are we trying so hard to get the European Union
involved in the efforts to solve the problem?
Besides, we have never asked any country to commit itself as to how they will
vote, regarding the accession of Cyprus, when we come to the end of the
negotiation process.
So there is no urgency for anyone to tell us how they will stand on the issue
at the end of the negotiations which will be around the year 2000.
I am afraid that such statements may be interpreted by Turkey as signals
addressed to her. Turkey may consider that they are telling he that if the
Cyprus problem is not solved, Cyprus will not enter the Union.
So in effect, regardless of the motivation, these statements may be construed
by Turkey as giving her yet another reason to block a solution. And I am sure
that nobody wishes to penalize the victim, Cyprus, and in effect reward Turkey
for its intransigence.
Instead of playing with words that indicate either the existence of doubts or
reservations or special interest considerations, I feel that the whole effort
should be placed in the right context, with which I began my lecture.
One of the primary historical reasons for the creation of the EEC was to
secure peace, stability and prosperity in Europe and the motivation for
enlargement was to extend these targets in a broader Union.
We should therefore see the accession of Cyprus politically, not economically,
starting from the observation that Cyprus is a part of Europe, to which
instability is being exported from Turkey: Instability in precisely those
forms which Europe is greatly concerned about:
The export of population, mainland settlers, whose presence is one of the
forces driving away the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population:
Export of extremism, in the form of the Nationalist Hearth Associations, and
terrorism in the form of the Grey Wolves, resulting into the recent brutal
murders.
We do not yet know whether Islamic fundamentalism is being exported to the
occupied part of Cyprus. But the Turkish expansionism is a definite thread for
Cyprus and Greece and severely undermine stability in the region.
Europe cannot ignore these phenomena, but on the contrary should approach them
with an analytical mind. One would then ask whether, by excluding Cyprus from
entry to the EU, the EU would be insulating itself from the problem. The
answer is of course in the negative since Greece, a country immediately
concerned by this instability and Turkish expansionism, is a member of the
Union. So instability in the Eastern Mediterranean is a problem of concern to
the Union, and should be met independently of Cyprus membership.
Well let us examine what preventive diplomacy is as it was successfully
exercised in Central and Eastern Europe: There, the countries which are
intensely interested in joining the EU were asked to solve problems that might
cause friction between them (primarily minority questions) before they would
be seriously considered as candidates. Each country was motivated to
contribute to solutions by the prospect of accession.
Statements casting doubts as to whether Cyprus will join the European Union
without a solution would be relevant only if both sides are equally anxious to
join the Union. in such a case such threats could become a motivation for
solving the problem. In our case, Turkey does not want a solution and does not
want Cyprus accession to the European Union.
I wish to repeat as clearly as I can that the solution of the Cyprus problem
is the number one priority of the Cyprus Government independently of the aim
of accession. In fact, it is the only policy issue having higher priority
than EU entry.
It is Turkey that is blocking a solution of the problem by rejecting the
several U.N. Resolutions.
The Resolutions of the Security Council on Cyprus demand the withdrawal of
foreign troops: Turkey insists on their continued presence in Cyprus.
Resolution 939 of the Security Council reaffirms the position that a Cyprus
settlement must be based on one State, a single sovereignty and international
personality and a single citizenship with its independence and territorial
integrity safeguarded: Turkey in effect demands the establishment of two
states and partition since it insists on two separate sovereignties.
The United Nations Resolutions demand the return of the refugees to their
homes in conditions of safety: Turkey denies all their basic rights.
The United Nations have mounted a major effort to supervise the cease-fire in
Cyprus: The Turkish occupation troops have killed four unarmed Greek Cypriots
since June. It is this Turkish intransigence during the last twenty-two years
that has led to impasse.
Therefore it is Turkey that needs to be motivated towards facilitating a
solution and not us. And this motivation could be generated by speeding the
irreversible course of Cyprus towards accession.
Let me state once again:
Appeasement has never worked, and it will obviously not work now. It is in
Europe's interest, despite objections or even provocations on the part of
Turkey, to move ahead in an irreversible course for the accession of
Cyprus. This is also in the interests of the whole population of Cyprus.
Many wish to see a solution before accession. We go one step further: We
aspire to solve the problem before we start accession negotiations. We
strongly believe that the time available until negotiations start provides a
unique opportunity for bringing an end to the Cyprus problem.
We should all work as hard as we can so that the day we embark on the
accession negotiations, all the people of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots will be marching together for this great venture.
That would mark not only the beginning of the accession process but also the
end of the division of our country and our people and the beginning of
building of Cyprus of tomorrow. A free Cyprus, a peaceful Cyprus, a prosperous
Cyprus, a Cyprus member of the European Union.
This is our vision, this is our goal, this is our dream and we invite you all
to help us making it a reality.
Thank you.
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