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Thursday, 15 August 2024
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U.S. Department of State 96/01/30 Daily Press BriefingFrom: hristu@arcadia.harvard.edu (Dimitrios Hristu)U.S. State Department Directory
Office of the Spokesman
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATEDAILY PRESS BRIEFINGI N D E XTuesday, January 30, 1996Briefer: Glyn DaviesDEPARTMENTStatement re: Members of Bosnia-Herzegovina ProvisionalElection Commission .......................................1Secretary Christopher's Trip to Wye Conference Center .....1[...]FORMER YUGOSLAVIAPresence/Threat of Foreign Forces .........................2-4Prisoner of War Releases ..................................4Demonstration by Women of Srebrenica Group/IFOR Role ......4-5[...]GREECE/TURKEYDispute re: Island of Imia ................................8-9[...]U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATEDAILY PRESS BRIEFINGDPB #14TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1996, 1:28 P. M.(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. DAVIES: Just a couple of things to start off with, and then I'll go to your questions.
First up, we released a statement -- I think I might already have seen it running on the wires -- that notes the fact that today Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti, who is the OSCE Chairman in Office, introduced the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Provisional Election Commission at a Press Conference in Sarajevo. He named the seven person commission, which from our standpoint notably includes as head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia, Ambassador Robert Frowick, who will serve as the Chairman.
The Provisional Election Commission is the organization responsible for insuring that free and fair elections take place, and the selection of its members is another important milestone in civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement.
The only other item I've got for you is that the Secretary -- I think as Nick said -- will be going out this evening or late this afternoon to the Wye River Conference Center to do what he can to assist the parties to make progress. As he'll be in the region next week, he wants to get the parties' very latest thinking so he's as prepared as possible for his trip to the region.
With that, Barry.
Q Wye did resume today, did they?
MR. DAVIES: Yes.
Q Okay. And do you want to give us any appraisal of how they're doing, by any chance?
MR. DAVIES: As far as I know, things are going well. The Secretary will go on out there and take the temperature of what's happening and prepare himself for his trip. It's slated to wrap up tomorrow. I'm not going to go beyond that and give you any characterization of what's happening.
[...]
Q Glyn, the U.S. Commander of NATO, Smith, yesterday at the White House said he did not assess any imminent or really any real threat from the Iranian -- from the foreign mercenaries in Bosnia. It didn't seem to be quite consistent with the message we hear from all the other U.S. officials.
Do they pose a threat, or is it just sort of the U.S. campaign to make everyone believe Iran is a threat?
MR. DAVIES: Two points. First of all, he's the man in charge of the troops on the ground, and, if he says there's no threat, then obviously that's the most significant statement that anybody could make about whether there's a threat or not.
That said, to the extent there remain any foreign forces in Bosnia, of course, the Dayton Agreement calls for their being removed from the country, and we are watching that very closely. I'm happy to renew our call on the parties to follow through and remove all foreign forces from the country.
But he's the one who's watching this day to day, and, if he says there's no threat from foreign forces in Bosnia, then that's good enough for me.
Q Why did the Administration go to such great lengths, I mean including a threat to cut off assistance to the Bosnians, to illustrate how great a threat they thought it was.
MR. DAVIES: I don't think it's fair to say that we threatened to cut off assistance to the Bosnians. We simply pointed out -- the Secretary himself pointed out -- that under the provisions of the Dayton Agreement they were obligated to do this, and that their compliance with Dayton is the main ingredient, obviously, in how we assess their seriousness. It's only if they're serious and comply with Dayton that we would follow through on some of the aspects of Dayton that will occur down the road, to include equipment, training and the rest of it.
Q So it would be fair to say we were more interested in -- the emphasis is on compliance, not on illustrating the threat.
MR. DAVIES: Sure. Our emphasis is always on compliance with Dayton. We look to the parties to comply with Dayton.
Q The threat was never perceived at that --
MR. DAVIES: Again, I just wouldn't characterize it as a threat. I don't think it was a threat.
Q Well, not the threat from the foreign fighters.
MR. DAVIES: You're asking how serious the threat was --
Q I'm asking if the emphasis of the message was on compliance, not on emphasizing that there was a great threat there from the foreign fighters.
MR. DAVIES: I think it's probably fair to say that the Secretary is looking at the big picture here, and alarm bells have never gone off in this government that, oh, my goodness, we have a red letter threat from foreign forces. It's been a concern. It was much more of a concern before some of the forces started to leave the country, but since there's been some progress.
Leighton Smith's remarks, I think, are notable. The threat is greatly diminished. So what the Secretary had to say was looking at the big picture -- all compliance issues -- and he simply wanted to note that getting rid of the foreign forces, having them leave the country, was one of the several important aspects of compliance with Dayton that we were looking at.
Q Do you have any numbers -- changed numbers on your prisoner toll -- prisoners of war?
MR. DAVIES: Yes. I think according to the Red Cross, which is in the first instance responsible for monitoring this, the report we've got is that an additional thirteen prisoners have been released by the Serbs, which brings the total released to more than 500 so far. We understand that all but approximately 100 -- and I thought I saw a ticker item that put the figure at 112 -- and that may be the case. It's really the Red Cross's business to count them. All but approximately 100 or so of the prisoners registered with the ICRC have been released.
As far as we know, all three sides are still holding some prisoners, and we would reiterate -- make the point again that under the Dayton Accords, all those prisoners have to be released. If any of those prisoners are indicted war criminals, they ought to be turned over to the War Crimes Commission.
Q On the subject of the ICRC in Bosnia, there are reports of rioting in Tuzla, threatening the well-being of the staff and the facilities of the Red Cross there. Do you have any comments on that activity on the part of those wives looking for their husbands? And specifically what is the role of IFOR in the protection of the Red Cross people?
MR. DAVIES: On your first question, there was a demonstration yesterday, organized by a group, which we understand is known as the Women of Srebrenica. This was a crowd numbering in the hundreds who were angry over the fate of the many thousands still unaccounted for after the fall of Srebrenica.
This group, mostly women, did ransack and loot the ICRC Office. The United States is very sympathetic, obviously, to their frustrations. We think it's important, though, that they exercise some restraint, but we would urge the Bosnian Serbs to make an accounting of those people who remain unaccounted for after last summer.
In terms of IFOR and its role in protecting the ICRC or others, I'm not going to get into specifically what call has been made by the commander in that area. We all know what IFOR's role in the Bosnia mission is, and I don't think they have written down anywhere that part of their role is to stand guard outside certain offices. Obviously, they're going to do all they can to preserve freedom of movement and maintain a secure atmosphere.
Q Are you saying, Glyn, that U.S. troops have not been asked to safeguard the Red Cross people in Tuzla, at least as far as you know?
MR. DAVIES: I don't know if they have. I mean, you could ask the Pentagon that question.
[...]
Q On Greece and Turkey. In recent days the international community and, above all, the United States of America are witnessing a very unusual and paradoxical claim and demand. Specifically, the Turkish Government through note verbal and threat of using force demand from the Greek Government to remove from the Greek rocky island Imia -- I-M-I-A -- Greek flags and security Greek forces stationed there, violating, first, the Greek territorial integrity of this Pacific island.
Since those Turkish actions constitute a real threat against Greece over the Aegean in violation of the existing international treaties and Convention, could you please clarify the U.S. position vis-a-vis to this crisis keeping also in consideration that Turkey is not -- I repeat, is not -- a signatory member of the Paris Treaty of 1947 pertaining to the status quo of the Greek island of Imia.
MR. DAVIES: We've had our eye on that situation, which has begun to develop hot and heavy in recent days and hours -- hot and heavy. The situation right now is a little tense.
We've urged and we continue to urge both governments to exercise restraint and to work together to resolve the issue peacefully through negotiation and dialogue. It's important the United States believe for both governments to exercise utmost caution.
The way perhaps to proceed is to think in terms of returning that island, or the sets of islands, to the status quo ante, which was no military forces on them whatsoever. In fact, perhaps no people on them might have been the situation.
We are at high levels making that point to both governments.
Q Since your government is a signatory member of the Paris Treaty of 1947, would you please clarify the U.S. position from the legal point of your vis-a-vis -- to the Greek island of Imia due to the fact, as I told you earlier, that Turkey is not a signatory member as claiming today as a Turkish this specific island.
I would like to know the position of your government regarding the status quo?
MR. DAVIES: I don't think it's a good idea for me to get into a legal analysis to whom the government belonged in the past and so forth. What's important now is that there is some heightened tension, some activity by both governments that is centered and focused on that island or those islands. We don't want it to develop into something dangerous. So the message that we're sending to both governments is to please calm down and to draw back if, in fact, they're contemplating anything and to talk about this instead of to demonstrate militarily about it.
Q If Germany, for example, would ask Poland to grant a portion of its Polish territory violating the treaty of unification, would you have advised the Polish Government to sit down and have a dialogue with Germany?
MR. DAVIES: I'm not going to make an analogy to central Europe. What's important is that right now, today, there is some tension over those islands; and we think it's very important that both parties take a deep breath and talk about it and not engage in military demonstrations or threats or posturing over the islands. It's not worth it.
Q Generally speaking, could you please clarify the U.S. position vis-a-vis to the aggressors to the violations of treaties and conventions, etc. You must have a position?
MR. DAVIES: I'm looking here to see if I've got anything more. The point is, I'm just not going to get into that because it wouldn't be useful. What we've got to deal with is the situation at the moment which is kind of a tense situation. We think both Turkey and Greece should draw back, take a deep breath, and they should sit down and talk about it. We're willing to help in any way we can, but I'm not going to sit here and give you some kind of a legal exegesis on who owned the island when or treaties from the 1940s. I don't think it's useful.
[...]
(The briefing concluded at 1:55 p.m.) END |
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