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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #152, 97-10-22

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


671

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Wednesday, October 22, 1997

Briefer: James P. Rubin

DEPARTMENT
1		Secretary Albright's Activities/Upcoming Speaking
		  Engagements

IRAQ 1-2 UN Security Council Debate on Iraqi Sanctions

CHINA 2-4 Chinese Embassy Spokesman's Comments re Upcoming Visit by President Jiang 2-3 --US Protesters 3,6-7 --Special Coordinator for Tibet 3-4 --Non-Proliferation Issues

JAPAN 4 Status of US-Japan Port Access Talks

GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS 5-6,11 Reported Harassment of Greek Defense Minister's Aircraft by Turkish Aircraft

TURKEY/IRAQ 7 Reported Turkish Military Action in Northern Iraq

SOUTH AFRICA/LIBYA 7-8 President Mandela's Visit to Libya

NORTH KOREA 8-9 Reported Defectors' Testimony re North Korea's Missile Proliferation Activities

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 9-10 Prospects for a Trilateral Meeting in Washington

KENYA 10 Recent Crackdown by Kenyan Police on Political Demonstrations

CUBA 10 Status of US Visa for Mother of Florida Marlins' Pitcher


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #152

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1997 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Secretary Albright will be attending the events this afternoon with President Clinton and Vice President Gore on the issue of climate change. There, obviously, will be more for all of you there.

She will be giving two speeches tomorrow that you should know about. One is on the subject of Fast Track and its importance to American leadership in the world. There will be some more details about where and when provided later this afternoon. She will also be speaking at 3:30 p.m. at the Columbus School of Law at Catholic University.

Barry.

QUESTION: Jamie, revisiting that subject of Iraq sanctions and the US- British effort to get tougher -- again, negative reports coming out from the UN that you haven't been able to line up Egypt or France or Russia - some of the people you need to get travel restrictions imposed. Is it all over, that effort?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't see it that way. The process of obtaining a Security Council resolution is often more open than it is clear. I have observed with Secretary Albright half a dozen of these exercises. What is usually true is that all the Council members are determined that Iraq should comply with the demands of the United Nations; that Iraq must give the UN inspectors unlimited access to their sites so as to confirm the objective, which is the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

There are differences of view, however, and have always been, on the tactics of achieving that joint objective. What you do in negotiating a Security Council resolution is to try to come to a consensus - as much of a consensus as you can. Invariably that involves those who view the need for stronger tactics to come out with the strongest possible proposal and then, during the course of the discussion, come up with a proposal that's as unanimous as possible. That, we believe, has proven over the years to yield a response from the Iraqi Government.

Let's remember what this is about. This is about irresponsible behavior on the part of the Iraqi Government -- a refusal to comply with the international community. And all you're seeing here are some tactical differences. The Council has already agreed that a next step will be to ratchet up the pressure, including the possibility of sanctions - additional sanctions.

The question now is about how you would frame that; how soon that would be; how specific it would be; when it would come into effect; how it would come into effect. These are tactical differences that are normal in a body like the Security Council. So we would hope and expect that at the end of the day, when the resolution is passed -- and we suspect it will be soon -- that you will see a stronger response than previously existed and again, a ratcheting up of the pressure on Iraq, making it clear to them that their refusal to comply with the Security Council only delays the day when their people can see the benefits of the sanctions being lifted.

QUESTION: Can you give us some detail about the Secretary's involvement?

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary, again, as I have indicated, has done a lot of these resolutions and knows quite a bit about the process, from her previous post, in addition to the importance that she attaches to the Iraq issue, as Secretary of State.

The resolution we're now talking about came out of a resolution that was passed in New York at the time of the Denver Summit, in which she and Foreign Minister Primakov and French Foreign Minister Vedrine discussed at great length the best way to ratchet up the pressure. In the last day or so, she has had two telephone conversations with Foreign Minister Vedrine. The first one may have been the day before yesterday, but she has discussed the subject with him twice. She has had a message delivered to Foreign Minister Primakov, a personal message. Other than that, she has been receiving regular reports from Ambassador Richardson.

Again, this is a negotiating effort; it's a tactical effort. Often in that process, it's appropriate to have the foreign ministers make sure they both agree that the objective needs to be met.

QUESTION: Different subject?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: The spokesman at the Chinese Embassy just gave a rather lengthy briefing on the upcoming visit, so if I could just tick off a couple of things that you could respond, please.

MR. RUBIN: With no preparation, but I'll see how I can do it, since we didn't get an account of that yet.

QUESTION: Fairly softball kind of stuff. One of the things he did was to call on US security forces to crack down on demonstrations here. He referred to protesters as "so-called dissidents" and said that they would disrupt the visit of President Jiang. Could you - is that something the US is prepared to do?

MR. RUBIN: Again, I haven't seen his specific remarks, but I can say that America's a democracy, and there is a right in the United States to express one's view, and there are rules and regulations by which that happens in different municipalities. I'm not going to purport to get into the details of how that would be done at every particular site. That's much more for the local jurisdictions to discuss.

But in principle, America is a democracy, and we are not seeking to infringe in any way on the rights of Americans to have their voice be heard in whatever way is permitted by a local jurisdiction. And the fact that the Chinese President is here doesn't change that principle upon which this nation was based.

QUESTION: Also, he revealed that China had formally protested the naming of a coordinator, I think is the word, for Tibetan policy. He said it was a big problem, and that the US should not interfere on that subject.

MR. RUBIN: I do believe that the Secretary and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen did discuss this issue in New York. The Foreign Minister knew then that we intended to follow through with our commitment to the Congress. But let's bear in mind what this is about.

This is about a special coordinator, not an ambassador. An ambassador-rank job could purport to suggest that Tibet is not part of China. We believe that Tibet is part of China. What this job would entail is sensitizing all concerned about the issues of the people of Tibet and, if possible, promoting dialogue between the people of Tibet and the authorities in Beijing. That is very different than the ambassadorial-rank job that was originally proposed that could have implied some greater recognition of Tibet than we have -- then or now.

Our impression was that, having heard the explanation, that the concerns were somewhat eased. I don't dispute that the Chinese spokesman is indicating that China would wish that this post did not exist at all. But what I would suggest is that it's not a surprise to them, and that Secretary Albright does intend to follow through on her commitment and name a special coordinator on Tibet by the stated time frame.

QUESTION: In the interest of diplomatic sensibilities, will she hold off until the President has - I know she has until November 1st, but will she hold off until he's at least out of Washington, or wait until he's out of the country altogether?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know that she's made that decision. We still haven't decided on a person. You need to figure out who the person is before you can figure out when you'll announce it. So she is actively discussing this issue with her counterpart, Sandy Berger; with people in the Department; and consulting with others before she selects a person. At that point, the timing would become possible to discuss. But again, all I can really say at this point is that she intends to meet the commitments she made.

QUESTION: You referred to President Clinton's notification of Congress on civilian nuclear cooperation as a mere "formality." He said the United States - he said all their nuclear orders, in fact, were filled until the turn of the century; that the United States is missing out - they should go ahead with this formality. Can you comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: I wonder if he would agree on your characterization of all his comments, but I will find out later when I get a chance to look at it. But again, based on your account, the President has made no decision, as far as I know. The Secretary has not indicated that to me or, I believe, neither has she stated her position on this subject internally, on whether this is going to go forward.

What I can tell you is that there were some further discussions in Beijing that the United States is committed to achieving the highest possible standards of nonproliferation. This is a matter of great concern to the United States - the highest possible priority. And we've made substantial progress with the Chinese over the years. I think those of you who are going to be asked to write a lot about this issue in the coming week, I'd ask you only -- since there has been a long time since there's been a summit or a meeting of this type -- to go back to the kind of practices that we were concerned about in the late '80s by China and compare them to what's going on now.

I think what you'll find is a dramatically improved record on nonproliferation, one which puts China very much in the fold of the international community on the subject of the Nonproliferation Treaty; on the subject of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; on the subject of the Chemical Weapons Convention; on the subject of accepting, at least bilaterally, missile technology control regime guidelines; stating to us bilaterally that they wouldn't provide assistance to unsafeguarded reactors; and all the policy and practice changes that have gone with that. What you'll see is a dramatic shift.

As I understand it, Mr. Einhorn and his team have finished the bulk of their work. They have made additional progress in this area, and they will be coming back to report to Secretary Albright and, through Mr. Berger, to the President. At that point, it will be possible to make a decision. We don't regard the certification that would be required by the President for this peaceful nuclear energy agreement to go forward as a formality. This is a very difficult decision. It will be based on whether we believe we have the clear and unequivocal assurances that we've asked for.

QUESTION: In recent days when you characterized progress or lack thereof in these talks, you'd say something like, we've made substantial progress, but gaps remain, or something like that. I notice you don't say that this time. Is that intentional?

MR. RUBIN: What I said was that in the past, there had been substantial progress and we still needed work to do. What I'm saying today is there had been substantial progress prior to Mr. Einhorn's visit. He appears to have made additional progress and, based on his report, we will know whether there are gaps remaining.

QUESTION: Jamie, do you have anything on the port access talks with the Japanese?

MR. RUBIN: Nothing new on that. They are still trying to finalize the agreement, finalize the details of it, and we understand that they are working quite hard.

QUESTION: I want to revisit the issue with the plane of the Greek Defense Minister over the Aegean, if you have any further --

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I'd like to revisit that, as well. The public accounts we have seen of this incident - and I guess there were two incidents - are, indeed, disturbing. I must say, looking at it, it's clear that flying provocatively close to the Green Defense Minister's aircraft would not be consistent with Turkey's stated desire to reduce tension with Greece.

In the last 24 hours, very senior American officials have raised these events with the Turkish Government. We have made clear to our Turkish allies the seriousness with which we view the information we have received, and they need to ensure that any future Turkish activities do not contribute to an atmosphere of tension between Turkey and its neighbors. We believe it is important that Turkey and Greece both ensure that the Turkish military exercise scheduled for early November not occasion any new confrontation. We continue to urge a return to a moratorium on over-flights of Cyprus by combat aircraft. That is what I intended to say on Monday, but obviously didn't do my job as well as I should.

The dangers inherent in the cycle of exercise and reaction should be apparent to all. It is now time to focus on the future. The United States remains committed to working with Athens and Ankara to improve relations.

So we did indicate our views directly to the Turkish Government. We do find that kind of flying close to the airplane of the Greek Defense Minister disturbing.

QUESTION: Jamie, what's your understanding of the location of this incident? You seemed to be saying on Monday that you thought it was over Cyprus, although Greece says it was over the Aegean, in Greek airspace.

MR. RUBIN: I would hope that in this discussion you wouldn't quote what I was saying on Monday, and leave it as follows. We believe that, based on the public accounts, there's compelling evidence that it occurred precisely where it was indicated publicly that it occurred. We have no reason to dispute that.

QUESTION: I have a question. Do you know if the Greek Defense Minister is flying with the military aircraft or the civilian aircraft?

MR. RUBIN: As I understand it from the public accounts, this was clearly not a combat aircraft.

QUESTION: So you don't have any problems with the Greek Defense Minister paying a visit to Cyprus?

MR. RUBIN: No, not that I'm aware of. That happens regularly.

QUESTION: Actually, I just have a follow-up question on the Tibetan coordinator. It was at the end of July that Secretary Albright actually committed to naming this coordinator. I believe it was the intention of the members in Congress who requested this - or their hope - that the individual would have been named in time for this summit, to actually participate in the talks. It's a fairly small universe of Tibetan experts that would be acceptable to both the State Department and members on the Hill. Can you address the delay or the length of time?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I don't think that I'd have to, to answer it directly. I'd have to disagree with a couple of the premises. And the first one is that there's a small universe. This is a unique job, and it's going to be a new job. So one wants to get it right the first time. It's not obvious the particular qualities you want - there are different views on that; to what extent you want it to be an Asia expert; to what extent you want it to be someone who has skill in working the human rights problem; to what extent you want it to be both; how the office will be structured; where it will be structured; where it will be located. These are questions that the Secretary is wrestling with.

The point is that she made a new decision, and that was a decision that we believe was well received on Capitol Hill at the time she made it, and that was to create this office. Now, there are always going to be a few experts here and a few experts there who disagree on who should get a job. Washington is a city that everybody wants to get good jobs, and sometimes they want their friends to get them, and sometimes they don't even want their friends to get them because it makes them jealous.

So you're going to hear different people express different views about who this person should be and what their title should be -- I hope the title isn't any longer in dispute - where they should be located; what their skills should be. And it's a tricky issue, and you want to get it right because this is creating a post in the Department of State on an issue related to a country that we have an extremely important relationship with - - a relationship that will yield a summit meeting in the United States in a matter of days.

I can't speak to what was in the minds of the members at the time this post was created. I can speak to what the letter and the specific representation was, and that was November 1. Now, whether that's because somebody thought the summit was going to be well before that, or whether it's because somebody hoped that the decision would be made before the deadline - I mean, as you know, in making decisions, deadlines usually become decision-forcing events, and I wouldn't be surprised if it was close to the deadline that this decision is made.

QUESTION: Could it go over the deadline?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, she intends to meet her commitment. I'm not going to rule out for all time that it won't be at 12:01 a.m. on November 2 or November 1, but her intention is to meet the commitment.

QUESTION: Philosophically speaking, is the Secretary's inclination for this person to be an advocate of Tibetan rights, or more someone who gathers information and keeps policy-makers informed?

MR. RUBIN: Again, the specific goals have been stated, and they are number one, to put a focus on issues of human rights in Tibet; number two, to promote a dialogue between the authorities in Beijing and the people of Tibet, designed to improve that situation that we've laid out often in our human rights reports. I listed them as one and two, not to say that one is more important than the other, but merely because you have to say something first. So those are our objectives, and what we will do is pick someone who we think can meet those objectives.

QUESTION: Bill Welch.

MR. RUBIN: And I suspect it won't be that person you mentioned.

QUESTION: Also on Turkey. Turkey's military has begun occupation of a buffer zone in Northern Iraq. Reports say that is has United States and Israeli support, and that it's using surveillance equipment purchased from the United States and Israel. Can you comment on what role Turkish troops will have in the zone and how long they are planning on staying?

MR. RUBIN: First of all, I have no information about that, other than hearing that there are press reports which you have now read to me. I can say what our standard position is on this subject -- is that in the past when Turkey has acted in Northern Iraq in pursuit of what they say are legitimate operations against terrorists, we have said we understand that issue and would want to see any action be limited in duration and scope and with due regard for human rights concerns.

That view of ours hasn't changed. But I cannot comment specifically on what you've suggested, because all I've heard is that there is a press report to that effect. I'm merely repeating what our normal policy is on this issue that occurred as recently as a few weeks ago.

QUESTION: And if Turkey was planning to set up a permanent security zone - -

MR. RUBIN: Right. That would be a hypothetical question that I wouldn't answer until I had received some information about their intentions and their statements and we had talked about it internally. All that happened is that I heard about the press report on my way in the door. I think this is pretty real-time stuff here.

QUESTION: Can we do Mandela in Libya? Mandela has had some pretty strong words criticizing directly or indirectly the United States for being the sheriff of the world, or whatever his words were. He is criticizing people who were opposed to his visit. Can you comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I did comment extensively on Monday about this issue. I guess I don't really have much to add. We made clear our views, and have made clear to all governments in the world our views on the subject of how to best ensure the isolation of the Qadhafi regime that's under sanctions.

I understand that President Mandela is now in Libya, and we would certainly hope that while there, he would be raising the issue that has put Libya beyond the pale of the international community -- and that is their refusal to turn over the suspects responsible for the murder of an enormous number of American and British citizens over international - well, I don't know exactly - I guess it was over Scotland, but an international act of terrorism.

It was not over that other place.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: On testimony about North Korea yesterday in the Senate, Jamie, defectors Colonel Joo-hwai and Mr. Ko, former officers in the North Korean Government, both testified that the United States was the primary target -- United States forces in South Korea and in Japan will be primary targets of North Korean missile attacks should war break out. And secondly, they testified that about $1 billion a year in missile sales were coming out of North Korea and going into the Middle East, primarily. How does the Department react to that testimony?

MR. RUBIN: Without getting into the specifics of some of those issues, which are obviously interesting, I can say this. North Korea's missile proliferation activities are of serious concern to the United States and have been addressed at the US-North Korea missile talks. That's why we are trying to get these talks back on track and to have these discussions both for limiting the capabilities of the North Koreans themselves and, importantly, to limit the prospect of any transfer of those capabilities.

For the past decade, North Korea has produced and deployed Scud B and C missile systems with the ability to reach targets deep in South Korea. North Korea also is in the advanced stage of developing the No Dong missile, with a 1,000-kilometer range, capable of reaching Japan. It is in the early stages of developing even longer-range missiles, including the Taepo Dong I and II. We do not know the exact range of the Taepo Dong I and II. As best as we can tell, they have not been flight tested.

But the important point here is not to miss what the objective is. The objective in the nuclear case several years ago was to convince North Korea that they had more to gain by giving up their nuclear capability and engaging in a dialogue with the outside world that has led to this watershed nuclear agreement with the North Koreans. We are now engaged in a similar exercise to try to convince them of the wisdom, for their own interests, of discussing with us limitations on medium- and longer-range missile systems. Hopefully, some day soon, we will get those talks back on track and be able to have as much success in the missile area as we had in the nuclear area.

QUESTION: If I could just follow up by asking, these defectors both testified that these missiles - that they may be operational --

MR. RUBIN: I just indicated to you what our best judgment was on the capabilities of those missiles.

QUESTION: On the Middle East --

QUESTION: A follow-up, actually, if that's okay. I just wanted to know if there was any date. You had said that you are still in negotiations with them.

MR. RUBIN: No, I specifically said we were looking and hoping to get it back on track soon, but we don't have a date.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: A quick one on the Middle East. Apparently, Abu Mazen and David Levy will be coming here next week for talks. Do you have a date or time?

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary will - we are expecting the Secretary to host a trilateral meeting here around the end of the month. And I emphasize those words, so that you're all clear on the timing. There are a variety of factors in the timing, but the Secretary is intending to host a meeting of the Foreign Minister of Israel and the Foreign Minister - I'm sorry - and Abu Mazen, a deputy in the Palestinian Authority. And that is scheduled for around the end of the month.

The point here is that Ambassador Ross was able to discuss in great detail a lot of the interim issues. Accelerated work is being undertaken on the interim committees across the board. We did narrow some gaps in the areas of the airport, seaport and safe passage. A push was also given to security cooperation. A very positive meeting was held yesterday between Defense Minister Mordechai and Chairman Arafat, with Ambassador Ross there as well.

But the next step -- and this is what the Secretary wants people in the region to seize the opportunity on and develop a sense of urgency about -- is the group of issues that she has spoken about before: security cooperation, the time-out and further redeployment -- finding a balance, a package of those issues that will allow us to resume the final status talks. In this area, there are significant, real differences that remain to be overcome, and we should have no illusions how difficult that will be.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - finals status talks, or begin?

MR. RUBIN: Right. They've been -- well, they had one meeting about a year and a half ago. So as a technical matter, the term of art provided by our able Bureau of Near East Affairs is "resume," but I think for most of us it would be "start."

QUESTION: The meeting a year and a half ago was --

MR. RUBIN: Was a preliminary procedural meeting. I may be wrong on the year and a half, but there was one meeting some number of months ago that was deemed to be the first formal procedural meeting of that, but it's never really picked up since.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the election campaign in Kenya? There have been reports of beating up of opposition politicians and things like that.

MR. RUBIN: I do. The last one. We deplore the government of Kenya's continuing refusal to respect the right of the people of Kenya to freely assemble. The decisions to break up a democratic reform meeting on October 19 and an opposition rally on October 20 run counter to the very democratic reforms the government has recently embraced. The brutal manner in which the people attending the events were dispersed was deplorable.

The United States deplores the Kenyan government's failure to register all political parties. Among the donor countries represented in Nairobi, we have been a leading proponent of freedom of association for the Kenyan people. The United States government urges the registration of all legitimate political parties and a prompt end to restrictions on the freedoms of assembly and speech.

QUESTION: I think we've been through this before, and I apologize - a couple of days ago, I think. But our folks in Havana have asked me to put the question again about the visa issuance for the mother of the baseball player. Was it, in fact, a tourist visa that she was granted? And is that sort of visa granting a normal thing, or is it sort of a special event because of him and her?

MR. RUBIN: The mother of Marlins' pitcher Livan Hernandez -- that is Miriam Carrera -- received a one-month, one-entry tourist visa at the US Interest Section in Havana on October 17. She applied in person. We understand that Ms. Carrera's exit permission, required by the Cuban Government for all Cuban citizens, is still pending. INS will determine Ms. Carrera's length of stay in the US, as is the case for almost all non- immigrants entering the United States.

As we understand it, she didn't attend the game because - has the game happened? Yes. She didn't attend the game because she didn't receive exit permission from the Cuban Government. So it was a one-month, one-entry tourist visa. Many such visas are provided. We issue visas in Havana; we issue visas every day. This is not a dramatically exceptional case, other than that unfortunately, the Cuban Government didn't give her the exit visa needed to watch the game, which I now see occurred earlier.

Thanks.

QUESTION: I have one more question about --

MR. RUBIN: All right, we'll do one more. I'm sure I won't be able to provide any additional details.

QUESTION: I'm not asking for detail. Your very first statement about the Greek Defense Minister's flight to Cyprus, you described this flight as an over-flight over Cyprus.

MR. RUBIN: Right, and I asked specifically --

QUESTION: Do you withdrawal right now this description?

MR. RUBIN: I specifically asked at the beginning of this discussion for you to minimize the extent to which you quote what I said on Monday.

Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:20 P.M.)


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