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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #37, 98-03-26

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


934

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Thursday, March 26, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

LAOS
1		Statement Released on Freedom of Worship in Laos

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 1 Special Representative Gelbard's Travel/Meetings 1 Situation in Kosovo/Actions of Police 1-2 Russian Position on Imposition of Arms Embargo 2-3 UN Security Council Resolution re Arms Embargo 3 President Milosevic's Compliance with Contact Group Demands 3-4 Status of Pending Arms Deal Between Russia and the FRY 4 Comparisons with US Train and Equip in Bosnia 4 Congressional Delegation Recommendations/Milosevic as War Criminal

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 4-6 Israeli Offer for Troop Withdrawal from Lebanon 5 Secretary Albright To Meet with Israeli Defense Minister 6 Ambassador Ross' Travel to the Region 6-9 Israeli Proposal re Withdrawal from the West Bank 9 European Role in the Peace Process

GREECE 9-11 Foreign Minister's Visit to US

TURKEY 10 Reported PKK Training Camps In Greece

CYPRUS 10-11 S-300 Missiles 11 Proposal for "No Fly Zone" for Cyprus

IRAQ 11 Inspection of President Site Scheduled for Today

IRAN 11-13 US Policy Toward Iran 12 Development of "Radio Free Iran"

MEXICO 13-14 Anti-Narcotics Effort and Military Corruption

COLOMBIA 14-15 Possible Kidnapping of Americans

LATIVA 15 Former Lativan-SS Troops Participate in March in Riga

ARMENIA 15 Reported Russian Sale of S-300 Missiles to Armenia


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #37

THURSDAY, MARCH 26, 1998, 12:40 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing. It's good to see that at least some of you who traveled with the Secretary managed to make it here today - at least some of you did.

We have a statement on Laos, on the freedom of worship issue, that will be posted after the briefing. Which of the two AP reporters should get the first question is up to them.

QUESTION: Well, can I pick up on a little something left over from yesterday? There was some question whether Gelbard would be able to go on to Belgrade. Do you have any further information?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. I spoke to Ambassador Gelbard about an hour ago. He was, at the last minute, provided flight clearance. He met with Mr. Milutinovic in Belgrade. He also met with Ibrahim Rugova in Pristina and a group of student leaders there. He is emphasizing the importance of dialogue and that on the Serb side, that they comply with the four conditions the Contact Group laid out; that they understand that the message coming out of Bonn was a message that pressure is going to continue on Serbia-Montenegro unless and until they get the message and begin to focus on dialogue rather than crackdowns as a means of resolving this problem.

The situation in Kosovo, as far as Ambassador Gelbard was concerned, is calm. However, we do believe that the special police are digging in; that there is no indication that they're leaving; and that their activities are therefore ominous. What we're facing if they don't get the message the Contact Group tried to send to them is a situation where the violence will increase and where the Contact Group and the international community will proceed to even harsher measures if the Serbian authorities don't get the message.

QUESTION: Is it your understanding that the Russian agreement to the arms embargo will block this alleged Russian arms deal with Belgrade, which has been written about?

MR. RUBIN: Well, Secretary Albright did receive assurances from Foreign Minister Primakov, as indicated by the Contact Group statement. Foreign Minister Primakov told the Secretary that they are going to go forward and implement the decisions to impose an arms embargo. A deadline of March 31 was set - an objective, rather - to pass the resolution. The discussions are now ongoing in New York, and our diplomats there report that the discussions are taking place constructively. We have every reason to think that an arms embargo will be put in place in time. And if not, that would be troubling.

But assuming that it does go ahead, normally an arms embargo would prohibit the transfer of military equipment from the time the arms embargo went into effect. There was some suggestion that perhaps this arms embargo should be of a limited time frame. That was rejected by the Contact Group; so it is going to be an unconditional, unlimited arms embargo that will only be lifted when Belgrade complies with the requirements of the Contact Group. Every arms embargo resolution I've ever seen -- and I haven't actually looked at this text - would, from the time of enactment, prohibit the transfer of weaponry.

As far as what we do and don't know about what may be going on, all I can say is that we are aware of the possibility of military to military cooperation between Russia and Belgrade. That is a matter that would, in our view, if it involved military equipment, be prohibited by an arms embargo resolution. That's precisely the reason why this resolution will be important.

QUESTION: Was this particular deal or issue discussed in Bonn with the Russians by you?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not in a position to describe every aspect of the discussions between the two ministers; other than to say that we have no reason to believe that Russia doesn't understand that an arms embargo is an arms embargo -- and that means that there will be no transfers of military equipment if that embargo is enacted.

QUESTION: If this is so clear what are the discussions in New York about?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I've indicated to many of you on many occasions, when you write the sentence "arms embargo" in your stories, then it's over. You said they will impose an arms embargo. But when the diplomats who have to actually conduct the work, prepare a resolution -- and for those of you who have worked in New York or read the elaborate texts that are resolutions -- they are very carefully drafted documents that require a lot of careful preparation prior to enacting a resolution that would impose such a severe sanction.

So they are now working on the text of a resolution and that takes a number of days; and it is a perfectly normal procedure for that work to take some time so that when and if it's passed and imposed and can't be lifted until Serbia complies, that all the i's are dotted and the t's are crossed before the resolution is passed, not afterwards.

QUESTION: This would include watching border crossing points and monitoring at airports, say, to make sure --

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, I'm not going to go into all the details of what's in such a resolution and whether there would be that kind of enforcement. Normally the way in which these resolutions get enforced are the commitments by the governments that would not want to be in violation of a Security Council resolution who will halt such transfers. No embargo, in my memory, has ever been perfect, and there is always the possibility of leakage.

Whether this would involve elaborate border monitoring for the embargo's purposes is not my understanding at this time. I don't believe that was the case even during the war in Yugoslavia that there were border monitoring posts for the arms embargo. There was a monitoring procedure for the economic sanctions, which is a much more complicated exercise. This embargo will work if the governments in the region and around the world follow the demands of the Security Council; and by and large, such embargoes can work if they're passed by the Security Council.

QUESTION: Jamie, you said it's unlimited, open-ended, whatever; then, of course, you also said it'll stay in place until Milosevic complies. How many of the various demands must he comply with or is it all that non- scientific at this point?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think the clear conditions that were laid out in the London document were four. They were that Serbia-Montenegro, Belgrade would withdraw the special police units that were involved in the crackdown; that they would ensure that access was provided to international organizations - humanitarian organizations - as well as diplomats from the Contact Group to go in there and monitor the situation. They included - and this was spelled out in great detail in the Bonn communiqu&eacute; - a public commitment by President Milosevic to begin a process of dialogue, unconditionally, with the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community; and finally, a general cooperation with the efforts of the Contact Group.

So this is not a simple check the box, check the box, check the box. We will have a process whereby the three chairmen - the past chairman, the current chairman and the future chairman - of the OSCE will be monitoring this. Generally speaking, if Belgrade were to pursue these points, we think we'd know it when we saw it.

QUESTION: Can you confirm that there is actually a pending arms deal between Moscow and Belgrade?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I have many times said to you that we understand and have indications that there is a consideration of military cooperation. As far as a pending arms deal, I'm not in a position to get to that level of detail; other than to say that we do believe the possibility exists for cooperation of that kind between Russia and Serbia-Montenegro, and that would be prohibited by this kind of an arms embargo.

In December 1997, Russia and the FRY did sign a military technical cooperation agreement. To the best of our knowledge, that agreement has not been implemented. It is pending before the Serbian parliament.

So clearly, there is a potential for a relationship that could include military cooperation of the kind that we would want to not see happen if this arms embargo is passed. As far as any particular news accounts of particular arms deals with particular types of weaponry, I wouldn't be in a position to confirm that.

QUESTION: What about other countries?

QUESTION: If the Russians were to say to you, well, you're arming the Bosnians; why shouldn't we arm the Serbs, what would be your response?

MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, there's a big difference; and the difference here is that the war in Bosnia, in our view, one of the causes of the war in Bosnia was the fact that the Serbs vastly outnumbered a virtually non-existent Bosnian army that was slaughtered by the Serbian forces in Bosnia. One of our objectives, as set forth in the Dayton accords, is to establish a balance between the forces of the Bosnians and the Serbs and the Federation forces so that there is underlying stability so that when - and I emphasize the word "when" - the international force departs, that a military imbalance is not the reason why war resumes.

In this case, it's quite clear that the Serbian authorities have modern, heavy armament that they are bringing to bear in Kosovo. We think a signal to them of our abhorrence of using modern military equipment to crack down on virtually unarmed civilians who are trying to express their legitimate political rights - and a way to express our abhorrence is to make sure that they are limited in the amount of such equipment that they can get.

QUESTION: Are you aware of any other countries - like NATO countries, like Greece, perhaps - arming or continuing to arm Yugoslavia?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have any further information on that.

QUESTION: On Kosovo, a congressional delegation - or a delegation led by three members of Congress - returned to this country yesterday. They were unable to go to Kosovo. Among other things, in their recommendations, they asked for the United States to push for the indictment of Milosevic before the War Crimes Tribunal. Does the United States take any view about his recent actions? Do those make him more eligible for indictment than previously?

MR. RUBIN: I think last week or the week before, we had an extended discussion of this issue in this briefing room about our views of the importance of the International Tribunal investigating what's gone on there, and leaving it to the Tribunal to make the judgment as to who is responsible in a legal sense.

I certainly indicated at the time that politically, President Milosevic is the president of the country; and if it were determined that there were war crimes, obviously, there is a level of political responsibility. To what extent that responsibility would be legal and subject of indictments is up to the War Crimes Tribunal.

QUESTION: Can we go on to another subject? The Israeli Defense Minister is coming, so it may be appropriate to ask the same question I tried last week, to make sure I know the US policy. How does the US feel about Israel's offer, under certain conditions, to pull its troops out of Southern Lebanon?

MR. RUBIN: We have long said that the - as a general principle, we support the idea of direct negotiations between the two countries to make progress wherever progress is possible. We have long believed in the importance of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which must include - in order to be comprehensive - agreements between Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and Syria.

We did vote for UN Security Council Resolution 425, and continue to support that resolution, which called for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces. That is still our view. At the same time, we believe that negotiations between Israel and Lebanon would provide a way for Israel and Lebanon to resolve all the issues that divide them, and to advance Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. So that is our view.

QUESTION: But in the real world, Lebanon hasn't got a chance in you-know- what to negotiate with Israel without Syria's approval; and the Israeli- Syrian track is not being used right now. So in the real world, do you think it's feasible or possible for Israel to carry - can you take yes for an answer? I mean, you want Israel to pull back, and they say they want to. But how are they going to arrange this if it depends on Syria? Do you see a practical way to do this?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I said, we support Resolution 425, which calls for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of all Israeli forces. So that is our view.

QUESTION: -- nothing else.

MR. RUBIN: That is what Resolution 425 says.

QUESTION: Oh, okay.

MR. RUBIN: In the real world, do we think that this can happen without some discussion? Probably not. And it's up to the parties in the region to decide that it's worth implementing a Security Council resolution, and to try to pursue that process. But as a matter of principle, we have voted for a resolution which calls for the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces.

QUESTION: And will he be seeing Secretary Albright?

MR. RUBIN: He will be tomorrow, yes.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - Prime Minister of Lebanon, Prime Minister Hariri, is reported to have ruled out accepting any sort of peace agreement associated with a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. Can you comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen that report. As I indicated, we would believe that the best way to advance a comprehensive peace process is for there to be direct negotiations between all the parties - that includes Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon. Clearly, in order to achieve the kind of peace that would allow Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity and security of both countries to be established successfully over the long term would require such discussions.

So we would encourage that. The peace process has been moribund for too long. A year has gone by. It is in dire straits. Ambassador Ross is now in the region, trying to see whether he can convince the leaders of both parties to make some hard decisions, without which we face the real prospect of disillusionment, of an inability ever to restore the peace process if time continues to be lost. There are only a given - I believe 14 months remaining before the established deadline under the Oslo accord for the completion of final status talks. Time is running out for those who care about peace in the Middle East. So all the parties - the Israelis, the Palestinians, the Lebanese, the Syrians - should stop trying to find reasons why things can't happen and look for reasons why things can happen.

QUESTION: I just want to be clear. You're saying that the Administration thinks the way to go now is a comprehensive way. You would not think it's wise for the Israelis to try to pick off Lebanon, so to speak, as they did with the Palestinians and with the Jordanians, and have a separate deal with them - separate without bringing the Syrians in.

MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that. What I'm trying to communicate, however cryptically, is that we believe that for peace to be sustained over a long period of time, it has to be comprehensive; therefore, it needs to include all the parties.

We have always said we support the idea of direct negotiations, and we encourage progress on any track where it is possible. To the extent that becomes more difficult because of problems on the other tracks, we recognize that. But it is our view that wherever progress can be made, discussions should be held and progress should be made.

QUESTION: Jamie, has the Israeli Prime Minister come up with anything which the United States Government understands to be a new proposal on withdrawal from the West Bank?

MR. RUBIN: You know, I'm always amused to read articles which have everything called "a new proposal." It's our view that there is basically one agenda, and it is the agenda agreed to by the Israelis and the Palestinians in New York. It is an agenda that includes the question of further redeployment; it is an agenda that includes the question of a time- out, security steps by the Palestinians and a path to final status.

We have been trying very, very hard to see whether, through extensive diplomatic spadework and protracted behind-the-scenes discussions that have become increasingly hard to justify, that to get a bridge between the views of the Palestinians and the views of the Israelis on what is necessary to meet each of their objectives in those four areas. We have not been successful; 1998 has not been a good year.

We are in the process of finalizing some refinements to our ideas -- that is what Ambassador Ross is doing -- but I can assure you they are minor refinements. Our basic view is that we have to find a way to bridge the gap between the two sides' views of what constitutes a credible redeployment and what constitutes a serious and sustained effort on security and how to put that all together with the peace process. And we are looking at a parallel process involving a further redeployment over a several-month period combined with a security package. That's what we're working on. We've been hearing for many months different variations on different details within the framework of those four pieces and we are discussing that. But as far as I can tell, we are not closer to being able to bridge the gap.

QUESTION: There are reports out of Israel that the prime minister is now talking about quality rather than quantity which, as I understand it, means that some of the land would be contiguous, so the isolated Palestinian pockets would be connected. Is that your understanding of what's being talked about from Israel; and is that acceptable?

MR. RUBIN: I am not going to get into a daily update just because something appears in the newspapers about what is being discussed behind the scenes.

For those of you who have followed this process, you have heard us say that in order to achieve a successful further redeployment, it's got to talk about quantity, quality, timing and security, and that all of those fit together. The better the quality, perhaps less the quantity. The better the security procedures, the quicker it can be implemented. We have long said that those are interrelated. I am not saying that anything has changed. We have always said that quality and quantity and timing and security are an interrelated package because in each case, more on one or less on one will influence the views of the others.

Our role here is not to declare for one side or the other what is right. Our role is to help them bridge the gaps. They are unable to bridge those gaps themselves. They often talk about their ability to discuss this themselves. We have seen nothing come of that, and so we are trying to figure out a way to bridge the gap. That's what we're trying to do, and obviously all of the factors that go into a further redeployment would be important.

QUESTION: One aspect of quality might be, would it not, that the lands be contiguous?

MR. RUBIN: Absolutely.

QUESTION: You say having a mediator tell Israel how many more percentage - how much more of a larger percentage of the West Bank it should give up is a refinement, or would you consider that a proposal or a plan or even pressure?

MR. RUBIN: We have not told the Israeli Government -- and I think you know this, Barry -- what is required or not required for their security. What we have done in these negotiations is try to give them our best estimate, based on us having direct contact with the Palestinians that they apparently do not have, as to what would be necessary to break the impasse.

As far as what our refinements would consist of, they are called refinements because they are not changes of a magnitude that would justify calling them something more significant than that. A refinement is not a massive change, it's not a big change. A refinement is, perhaps, adjusting the timing or other details like that, adjusting the interrelationship between those four issues.

QUESTION: What about the amount of land?

MR. RUBIN: I am not going to get into a discussion of what we're doing behind the scenes.

QUESTION: You just gave us two examples; what about a third example? How about an adjustment, look - we can't have this discussion if we're going to rule out, which you can if you like, percentages that Israel is willing to give up and percentages that Dennis Ross is trying to apply to them. But if the Prime Minister of Israel says a 1 percent difference is a big deal, and you're pushing a 4 percent difference, how can you minimize that by calling it a refinement?

MR. RUBIN: You're using numbers that we have not used, so I'm not in a position to answer your question.

QUESTION: Well, then you have to approach it some other way, without using numbers. Then leave out the numbers. Telling Israel how much land - how much more land it should give up than the Prime Minister has told the President it is prepared to give up, would you consider that simply a refinement?

MR. RUBIN: No one has told Israel what to give up.

QUESTION: No one has told Israel what it ought to give up if it wants to make nice to the Palestinians?

MR. RUBIN: Told them? No.

QUESTION: Have you suggested to Israel --

MR. RUBIN: No, and we've never -- I don't believe in all the discussions I've ever been in, the Secretary of State has ever used the phrase, "make nice to the Palestinians."

QUESTION: Well, I'm talking about Ross, not so much the Secretary of State.

MR. RUBIN: What we are trying to do here - or Ambassador Ross - those are words that I couldn't imagine coming out of his mouth. These are very serious diplomats. We're working very, very hard to try to bridge the gaps that the two parties have been unable to bridge themselves. When we have ideas, those are ideas based on our best judgment of what can be done to bridge the gaps.

We don't tell each party what to do. We don't tell each party to make nice with the other party. We do provide ideas for what we think are the plausible, realistic ways in which the gaps can be bridged.

QUESTION: Are your ideas expressed in percentage terms?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going - certainly they have been, yes. Our ideas have included percentages.

QUESTION: And they still do?

MR. RUBIN: Absolutely.

QUESTION: And if the Prime Minister of Israel says 1 percent is substantive and important - and, in fact, he says it's important to Israel's security - what is your response? What is the US' response to that - that's his opinion?

MR. RUBIN: We're not going to get in a process of negotiating this in the briefing room.

QUESTION: Jamie, is the State Department uneasy about the way Israel has begun consulting in a parallel way with the French on the peace process -- even to the point of stopping off in Paris before they come to Washington?

MR. RUBIN: Wow, boy am I tempted.

(Laughter.)

The Secretary is very comfortable with the role the Europeans have played in the peace process in recent weeks, and we certainly hope that the trip of Foreign Minister Cook - the intentions behind his trip - would make a difference in the efforts that the leaders will make to answer the hard questions and make the hard decisions.

We don't have any sense that there is any other country in the world that can play the role the United States can play in trying to bridge these gaps. On the other hand, we recognize that we haven't succeeded yet in so doing. But I think it was clear in recent weeks that it is only the United States that has the confidence of the two parties sufficient to try to make progress, to put ideas forward that can bridge the gaps.

QUESTION: Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos, was in Washington, as you know, this week. In various public speeches he made clear that the Greek national interests and American interests were diametrically opposed. Let me just mention a few issues. On Israeli-Turkish cooperation, the United States is very happy about it; Pangalos said he was against it. (Inaudible) oil pipeline is something the US has been supporting since '95; Pangalos was against it. Turkey's EU membership, the US is supporting consistently; Mr. Pangalos could not repeat enough how Turkey should not belong to Europe. The S-300 missiles, the US repeatedly told Greece not to place them on the island; Mr. Pangalos is for it. And on flight moratoriums proposed by the United States, again this was not an idea preferred by Mr. Pangalos.

So the list goes on and on. The question is, how happy is the United States with Greek foreign policy under the leadership of Mr. Pangalos?

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary of State had a very good meeting with Foreign Minister Pangalos.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: The international issue of Time magazine, published a report about the PKK safe haven and training camps nearby Athens in Greece. Do you have any comment on it?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. The United States has formally designated the PKK a foreign terrorist organization, and we oppose activities, such as fundraising, which supports this terrorist group. We are aware that legal structures in some countries in Europe do not treat this sort of activity with the stringency of US law. The United States cooperates closely with Greece in combating both domestic and international terrorism. The nature of PKK activity in Greece, including the presence of a political office in Athens, has often been a subject for discussion between our two governments. All reports of terrorist activity are taken seriously and assessed by the competent US agencies.

QUESTION: In all due respect, do you disagree that in all the issues I have raised --

MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to respond to a speech given in the briefing room. If you have question, I'd be delighted to answer.

QUESTION: Let me repeat the question again.

MR. RUBIN: That was a speech; that wasn't a question.

QUESTION: Greek and US national interests, as Mr. Pangalos made very clear, are opposed in long list of issues. So I asked how comfortable is the United States Government with the current Greek foreign policy? It was not a speech, it was a direct question with details.

MR. RUBIN: We had a good meeting with Foreign Minister Pangalos. As far as the US position on the S-300 missiles on Cyprus is concerned, our view has not changed. Although we do not question Cyprus' right to make decisions about its defense, we believe the S-300 missile deal increases the danger of conflict on the island and is a serious obstacle to our efforts to reach a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. We continue to urge the Government of Cyprus to cancel the deal.

We have also urged Turkey to address the S-300 issue through diplomatic means and to refrain from threats to take the missiles out militarily. With regard to the idea of a no-fly zone that Foreign Minister Pangalos raised in his meetings with Secretary Albright and Under Secretary Pickering, we certainly would welcome the establishment of a permanent moratorium of all combat aircraft over-flights over Cyprus by Greece and Turkey as a serious effort to reduce tensions and build confidence. We do not agree, however, that a no-fly enforcement regime that could potentially pit one NATO ally against the other, is the best way to accomplish this objective.

QUESTION: In a different area, do you have any comment on the inspection of presidential sites getting underway?

MR. RUBIN: We understand that this morning, Baghdad time, UNSCOM began inspecting a presidential site located in Baghdad. Apparently, the inspection is proceeding quietly and without incident.

Obviously, very shortly Chairman Butler will be in a position to report on this inspection process; but what's important to us is that the Iraqis provide the cooperation that this new regime needs, and so far it appears to be going quite well. Some of the fears of those that the diplomats would interfere in the process have not borne out. They have made clear that they are there to observe, not to inspect; and the initial reports are that the mechanism is working.

Whether the Iraqis provide the information necessary -- the baseline information, the written information, the overall cooperation -- that will yield a more favorable report by Chairman Butler, is obviously very much in doubt. But as far as them permitting the inspections in these new sites, they appear to have gone well, which, in our view, vindicates the idea that working diplomatically and backing that diplomacy by force was the way to get new access for UNSCOM to places in Iraq it never had before. And so far, so good.

QUESTION: There was a piece in the Times this morning which made some interesting observations, one of which was that there may be some Iranian pull-back vis-&agrave;-vis terrorism. There's also a reconsideration of Radio Free Iran here. And also, on the negative side, I suppose, the Iranian weapons programs are continuing as before.

MR. RUBIN: With regard to the US policy towards Iran, we do seek to encourage change in Iranian policies and actions, and we have noted in the past positive changes in rhetoric. We have responded to President Khatemi's call for civilizational -- that is, people-to-people --dialogue. We've seen people-to-people exchanges, which have included academics and athletes, have gone well and we expect more such exchanges to occur. American visitors have been treated with warmth and courtesy by ordinary Iranians and officials alike.

As we have also said, however, those events are valuable; but what would be more valuable, and what would be the best way to solve the policy issues that divide us, would be for there to be a direct dialogue between the United States and Iran. It has been too long since such a dialogue has happened. We would raise issues of concern of ours in such a dialogue; we would expect them to do the same. And we believe that through direct dialogue we can overcome these problems.

With respect to Iranian actions, let me say this -- we're not going to be able to provide a snapshot. The concerns we've had have developed over time, and we will need time to make considered, prudent judgments about whether changes have occurred. But we have said that we are facilitating people-to- people exchanges by working with private American organizations who wish to host Iranian visitors or send groups to Iran. In that context, we review on a case-by-case basis and as expeditiously as possible, Iranian visa applications. Recently, for example, we have also given permission for the Iranian UN permanent representative to travel outside New York City to deliver a speech to a private American group in Los Angeles. We have also allowed President Khatemi's women's affairs advisor to travel from Iran to address a private think tank.

We do favor increased Farsi language radio broadcasts by the US Government, and are working closely with Congress on how best to accomplish that goal. So we're going to continue to work on that.

With respect to the oil issue that was mentioned, I think we've said many times from this podium that there has been a reduction in the oil that may have been leaking through the Iraqi embargo in that region. While we can't be sure exactly why that is, we are certainly encouraged that it has happened. So that is our view on that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) permission given to an Iranian diplomat to leave the New York City metropolitan area?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check that, but it's certainly not common.

QUESTION: Something you just said and then another question - you said you favor increased Farsi language broadcasts. Is that something different from Radio Free Iran?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, we're going to work with Congress on how best to accomplish the intended goals of a program like Radio Free Iran, which is to bring news to the people in the region. But we want to do it in the best possible way, and we've been working closely with Congress on what's the best way to do that.

QUESTION: Also, the article George refers to says that the Secretary is the strongest and perhaps one of the loneliest voices urging no re-thinking in this policy, I believe the term "gratuitous insult" was used in that story in reference --

MR. RUBIN: I read the article.

QUESTION: Can you comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: That part of it struck me as more fictional that fact. The Secretary of State is obviously the official in this government who's responsible for formulating and implementing our policy on Iran. None of the steps that I just indicated to you that have taken place, and none of the steps that we would hope could take place would be happening unless that was directed by the Secretary of State.

Secretary Albright, when apprised of this particular quote, giggled and said, you know, if everywhere in the world I were to listen to what people thought my views were, I wouldn't remember what my views are.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Rubin.

MR. RUBIN: Is it on this subject?

QUESTION: Another subject.

MR. RUBIN: Oh, George, go ahead.

QUESTION: There are a couple of paragraphs on terrorism and on the Iranian weapons program. Do you have anything on either of those?

MR. RUBIN: Again, here all I can say is that there are obviously areas of concern to us and in order to judge whether there has been a change there, it will take time; because the concerns that we have, and have had, developed over time. So we want to wait until we're in a position to make prudent judgments, well-considered judgments on matters this important.

QUESTION: Mexico.

MR. RUBIN: You can just refer to the article, instead of summarizing it.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Okay. Let's refer to Ken Golden's article in The New York Times, which basically says the Mexican military is more involved with the trafficking than they've admitted, and says that traffickers and high military officials are meeting regularly. Has this report come to State; and does State concur with this particular --

MR. RUBIN: Again, I think you know that I won't comment on any specific report.

But on the substance of the issue of Mexican drug corruption and their law enforcement and military, we have said, and let me repeat, there is no doubt that all Mexican law enforcement institutions are under attack from drug traffickers, and we are working with Mexico to confront this threat as vigorously as possible. We're not going to speculate about the extent of drug penetration of the Mexican military or any other Mexican institution, except to note that the Mexican Attorney General has himself stated publicly that entrenched criminal elements are a major problem for Mexico's police forces. So this is not news.

We don't agree that our efforts have been futile; they have not been futile. President Zedillo has indicated that he is committed to tackling corruption and rule of law issues head on. He announced a new nationwide program against crime and corruption, and this is going to be a long term challenge. The Mexican military itself is investigating on its own and arresting and prosecuting those involved with drug traffickers. Five general officers are now under arrest and in jail as a result of this effort.

Our assessment is that the Mexican military is carrying out its anti-drug mission in a responsible manner. We need to bear in mind that the expanded use of the Mexican military in counter-narcotics operations was conceived by the Zedillo Administration as a temporary measure. It's impossible to imagine that the Mexican military, like other Mexican institutions, will not be challenged to some extent by drug corruption. I can't comment on any intelligence document, but I can say that the particular allegations have been carefully considered by all relevant US agencies. The charges of this particular gentleman, who, as I understand it, is a self-confessed narco-trafficker, are self-serving, contain significant gaps and are therefore, in many respects, suspect.

We believe the Mexican military is vigorously investigating prosecuting and punishing corruption. Therefore, the overall government view, having reviewed all available data, has concluded that it does not support these specific accusations by Mr. Rebollo. Speculation is always possible, and many scenarios can be constructed from the same set of facts. But the considered judgment of the US officials and the United States Government as opposed to the purported judgment of a few people is the one that I suggested.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on a story that came over the wires late this morning of some Americans being taken hostage in Colombia - four bird watchers?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. The US Embassy in Bogota is seeking confirmation that four visiting Americans are being held by guerrillas who staged a violent roadblock in Colombia over the weekend. We are in the process of notifying next of kin about the situation and therefore cannot identify the Americans.

The Americans who were visiting Colombia to bird-watch were in a rental car in a long line of traffic impeded by a roadblock some 75 miles from Bogota. The barricade, which began around 2:00 p.m., was not lifted until about 10:00 p.m. after the Colombian army intervened. The Americans' rental car was discovered near the scene of the clash. Our Embassy in Bogota is maintaining close contact with Colombian authorities who are pursuing this matter through their contacts with the guerrillas, known as the FARC. Our Embassy is also in the process of notifying next of kin.

This group has taken US hostages in the past and, as I will provide to you afterwards, we have some significant travel warnings in effect for Colombia, and we may be considering upgrading that warning in light of this event.

QUESTION: Do you know if there have been any requests for ransom, or if there's been any contact?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be able to give you any more information than I just did but we can try to check on that for you.

QUESTION: I have a question on the Baltics. This morning in Moscow, German Chancellor Schmidt and French President Jacques Chirac condemned the march of former Latvian SS troops in Riga on March 16. As you know, this march was joined by Latvian officials, and these former SS troopers are responsible for the killings of thousands of Jews during the Second World War. As far as I know there has not been any official reaction yet from the US to this manifestation and to the position of Latvian official authorities. How would you reconcile this position with the aspirations of Latvia to join NATO and European Union?

MR. RUBIN: That is a good question. We will get you a considered and carefully formulated answer if you speak to Mr. Foley after the briefing.

QUESTION: Mr. Rubin, Russian S-300 missiles sale to Armenia, which they based also a violation of the several arms agreement. Do you have any concern about this sale?

MR. RUBIN: We always have concern about arms sales, in particular. I would have to get you an answer for the record as to what we know about this reported sale. But in general practice, this is not a part of the world that would benefit from more arms.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)


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