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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #82, 98-07-07

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


980

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Tuesday, July 7, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

STATEMENTS
1		Belarus: Further Violations of Vienna Convention

BELARUS 1-4 U.S. Reaction to Further Violations of Vienna Convention 2-3 Motive for Actions/Est. of U.S. Embassy/U.S. Employees 1-3 Possible U.S. Response to Violations

PEACE PROCESS 4-5 UN General Assembly Decision to Upgrade Status of PLO 5,6 Lack of Support for U.S. Position/Russian Support of UN Action 6 U.S. policy Re. Palestinian Statehood 5,6-8 Status of Peace Process/Effect of UN decision on Peace Process/ U.S. contact with parties

NO. IRELAND 8 U.S. View on Parades

BURMA 8-9 Troop Deployments/Restriction of Freedom of Movement

INDIA/PAKISTAN 9-10 Discrepancies in Chaudry's Story/Status of Asylum Request 10 Update on Talbott-Kahn meetings/Talbott Itinerary 10-11 Regional Nonproliferation

BAHAMAS 11 Helicopter Crash

SERBIA (KOSOVO) 11 Creation of Observer Mission 12 Hill & Holbrooke Contacts/Objectives of Talks 12,14 Planning for the Use of Force 12-13 Identification/Purpose/Selection of Independent Observers 13,14-15 KLA

INDONESIA 15 Violence Against Protesters in Irian Jaya

CHINA 15-16 Meeting under Military Maritime Consultative Agreement


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #82

TUESDAY, JULY 7, 1998, 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today is Tuesday, that would make tomorrow Wednesday.

Let me start - we have one statement today. The Government of Belarus has again demonstrated its contempt for international law and international relations. Today our Charge d'Affaires in Minsk and the Charges from all other embassies having residence in the Drozdy neighborhood were given an ultimatum by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to notify the Government of Belarus by 11:00 tomorrow of our intention to remove all the furnishings from our residences. That is, they're asking the American and other embassy officials to notify their intention to remove furnishings.

The ultimatum goes on to state, if that response is not provided by 11:00 a.m., the Government of Belarus intends to enter the residences, remove the furnishings and take control of the buildings. This provocation by the government is another in a series of violations of the Vienna Convention.

We call on Belarus to stop this self-destructive course of action and honor its obligations under the Vienna Convention. We repeat our view, as stated yesterday, a residence of a chief of mission is inviolable. It is unequivocally protected by the Vienna Convention. We expect the Government of Belarus to rescind its demand, and we require the government to replace the fences that have been removed from our property, remove representatives from our property and permit us to post our own guards and return to a position where they are no longer in violation of the Vienna Convention.

QUESTION: What happens if they don't back off?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we have options. We are not yet prepared to describe what our intentions are. But clearly, at a minimum, what Belarus is doing here is further isolating itself from the world. This is not just the United States we're talking about; we're talking about a whole series of countries. We're talking about an apparent decision on the part of the government there, that is not new - which is to isolate itself from the rest of the world; to take decisions that are, in a series, a pattern of disrespect for the rule of law and disrespect for the obvious need of the citizens of Belarus to integrate themselves greater into Europe and the world.

With each passing day and each time the Belarus authorities escalate the situation and act in further violation of the Vienna Convention, they are making that harder. With respect to any specific response that we may have, let me just say that we are going to respect the basic principles of the Vienna Convention; but we will certainly exercise our rights under the convention and international law, which include the right to respond as appropriate to violations of that convention.

QUESTION: Jamie, could you just remind me again about what the excuse is the Government of Belarus is using for these extreme measures?

MR. RUBIN: Well, they've made a series of excuses, none of them, in our view, having any justification. Presumably, they want to use this property for some other purpose. But regardless of their reason, we have valid leases and we have the Vienna Convention behind us. What they are doing is violating not only the lease that we have, but also a basic principle of international behavior.

Essentially, this is the ultimate act of rudeness. We are guests there in the sense that we are - they wanted to have relations with other countries. The Vienna Convention codifies what is essentially the oldest tradition in history between nations and peoples; and that is, when you have a guest, that you don't snub that guest and act in a rude way. This has been codified in very practical terms to create an inviolability of an ambassador's residence. But this is not only a violation of the Vienna Convention, but is fundamentally rude.

QUESTION: Jamie, have they said that the mission can reopen once they've done their repairs?

MR. RUBIN: I think their position is we could reopen somewhere else.

QUESTION: Oh, they not only ask you to leave during an interim period while they say --

MR. RUBIN: It's pretty clear to us they're trying to retake the property.

QUESTION: To take it away?

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: And that would involve, I guess, the seizure of American taxpayers' assets; is that not right?

MR. RUBIN: Well, it depends on whether the furnishings - I mean, we're getting down to a level of specificity I wouldn't be able to answer. It would depend on whether the furnishings in the residence - it's a residence, it's not the embassy - belong to the ambassador or whether they belong to the government. I am sure there are materials, in the sense of phones or furniture or other provisions that are provided to an ambassador, that would fall under the rubric of national goods. But I'm sure there are also some personal effects.

QUESTION: Certainly the money used to pay the lease is --

MR. RUBIN: Absolutely, yes.

QUESTION: You said earlier that any response you might have, the options you're considering would come under the Vienna Convention. How does the Vienna Convention - if it does - how does it address this issue? I mean, for example, if you're not going to violate the Vienna Convention, does that mean you cannot take steps against the Belarus diplomats here?

MR. RUBIN: Without falling into the usual refuge of a spokesman, which is that it's up to the lawyers to interpret the Vienna Convention, let me say it is my understanding that when there is a violation of this kind, it is customary, under international law, for the country that is the other party - in this case, us - to take an appropriate and proportionate response to a violation. So we would be legally within our rights internationally - under customary international law - to take an appropriate and proportionate response.

As you know, we have already, for this very reason - because of their attempt to take over their embassy - told their ambassador not to bother coming back to the United States. We have recalled our ambassador from Belarus. And whether we decide to take other appropriate and proportional responses is something that remains to be determined. Obviously, we hope they don't go forward and invade the premises of an ambassador - the residence of an ambassador and remove the furnishings and continue down this path of lawlessness.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - no intention of meeting the 11:00 a.m. deadline to file a statement --

MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard anybody suggest that.

QUESTION: Jamie, how long have we had an embassy in Belarus, and how large is it?

MR. RUBIN: I believe we have about 10 or 11 people there of different types. Presumably at some point after the break-up of the Soviet Union, it was established. I wouldn't know the date of its establishment, but it was soon after the break-up in '91. I suspect it took some time to create a separate residence and embassy there, but it's roughly a dozen people.

QUESTION: Why do you think they're doing this?

MR. RUBIN: Again, they seem to have some view that they would like to use the land for some other purpose. As I indicated in response to an earlier question, they may have some loopy notion that this is part of the desire to expand this desirable property for their leadership. But there is no justifiable reason, and, therefore, I don't particularly care to articulate their reason in any effective way, because there is no justification. There's a lease that we have, there's the Vienna Convention. This is an act of lawlessness that people can't remember having taken place in peace time in a normal diplomatic relationship ever.

QUESTION: Jamie, what message does the United States take from President Lukashenko's handling of this situation? What message in his posture towards the United States and towards the West and towards the aid and so forth?

MR. RUBIN: Well, this is the latest in a pattern of lawlessness and disrespect for the rule of law pursued by this government, led by Lukashenko. We've seen him try to kick out people who are doing basic observation of human rights and other democratic practices. We've seen him terminate a parliament and pack it with his own people. We've seen him commit a series of acts in contravention of the rule of law. The message we take from this is that their leadership doesn't care about the rule of law, doesn't care about the opportunity to bring their people into a Europe in which they can prosper and advance their interests, and is acting like an authoritarian dictator who is unable to understand the basic difference between right and wrong.

QUESTION: Acting as an authoritarian dictator or he is an authoritarian dictator?

MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly, it's a government that's led by one man and he rules by decree, so however you want to define that. But I think I added on to authoritarian dictator, who does not know the difference between right and wrong.

QUESTION: The decision by the General Assembly to upgrade the status of the PLO?

MR. RUBIN: Let me start by saying that we regret this decision. We think this was a mistake. We think that this decision undermines the chances of bringing peace to the Middle East. It undermines those very people who it was presumably designed to help. And it may be a symbolic victory for some, but it makes it harder to prevent the two sides from not taking unilateral actions that can harm the peace process.

This was an unilateral action that we believe was unnecessary and untimely, not to mention the precedent we think it unfortunately set for those in the observer category at the United Nations.

QUESTION: Why do you say unilateral, when it was taken as a vote by all the nations in the General Assembly?

MR. RUBIN: Well, our basic view of this is, there are two parties in the peace process - the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority. And when one of those takes an action affecting a final status issue, that's a unilateral act. This was an idea pushed by the Palestinian Authority

and was, therefore, a unilateral act.

QUESTION: And this comes despite assurances to the Secretary, directly from Arafat, that he would not do this.

MR. RUBIN: Are you asserting something or asking me a question?

QUESTION: I'm asking a question.

MR. RUBIN: Okay. That is not what Arafat told the Secretary. He offered to delay it in the hopes of seeing whether it would dissipate; but he did not offer to not do it. He never said he would not do it; he did not say that. He agreed to delay it for many days at her request, and did so for over a week.

QUESTION: We were told that she expressed her views about the action, and he --

MR. RUBIN: Correct. He certainly took the view, despite our public view that this is a unilateral action and our private request of him that he not pursue it, that's a fact. But that we received an assurance that he wouldn't do it is not a fact.

QUESTION: Were you disappointed that only three countries joined the United States in opposition?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, we're disappointed that other countries didn't understand the fact that the way to make peace in the Middle East is to promote dialogue between the two parties and not to pursue symbolic steps that may feel good but do no good. We think this is a step that doesn't advance the serious work of negotiations, that doesn't make it easier for the parties to rebuild the trust and confidence they need to come to yes in this important time period.

We are pushing very hard, we believe there's a sense of urgency in getting closure on how to put the peace process back on track. Therefore, it's no time to be seeking symbolic victories; and that's why we think this was a mistake.

QUESTION: Jamie, some have argued that Israel has, in effect, brought this upon itself by shilly-shallying over the peace process and, in particular, over the American ideas.

MR. RUBIN: And you're asking if we share that view?

QUESTION: Do you share that view?

QUESTION: Are you shillying with them?

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - clearly, the peace process is not in good shape. It has been in bad shape for over a year now. We are working every day as hard as we can to try to put it back on track. We are not interested, at this stage, in apportioning blame for that problem. We're interested in solving the problem, and not interested in name-calling that is often part of this process.

So at this point, the blame for this act goes with those who took it. They made a decision to reject the logic of no unilateral acts and go forward. We regret that, and we think it was a mistake.

QUESTION: You said it was a symbolic step. But I mean, they have been granted now additional rights and privileges. So in that sense, is it not a step toward statehood?

MR. RUBIN: Well, it's symbolic in the sense that it doesn't change their basic international - it doesn't make them a state, for example.

QUESTION: No, but it's closer to that, is it not?

MR. RUBIN: Well, it's sort of like - I was going to make an analogy that I think would have gotten me in trouble. But you're either a state or you're not a state; you're not closer to a state.

Can you imagine what my analogy was?

QUESTION: The current US policy toward Palestinian statehood - if it should be unilaterally declared?

MR. RUBIN: We do not believe in unilateral actions in the area of issues that are reserved for final status. That means Jerusalem, it means water, it means refugees, it means the boundaries of the territory borders. It also, therefore, means this very question. So we do not believe that it is a good idea to take steps to try to prejudge those issues. For those very reasons, we do not believe it would be wise for us to state our view of this issue. This is something that is to be determined in the final status, permanent status talks that we are working hard to create.

Rather than prejudging those by an American view, we believe that should be left to the parties to talk about, if we can ever get to permanent status talks.

QUESTION: And just to follow up, is that at all a change in American position?

MR. RUBIN: No. I know there are some people who are using their microscopes to try to change a word here or change a word there. But certainly since I've taken my practice course in what to say on this question, it's always been the same; and that was some time ago.

QUESTION: Wouldn't you have expected the co-sponsor of the peace process, the Russians, would have supported you in this?

MR. RUBIN: They're entitled to make their own decisions. We think that their decision was the wrong one.

QUESTION: The Secretary yesterday, when she was asked about the peace process, she indicated we were getting closer to, I guess, an agreement. Can you elaborate on that? How are you getting closer?

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary, I think, spoke over three or four times - probably three or four times over the weekend with Prime Minister Netanyahu. There have been some reports out of Israel that they are looking to try to move on this in a matter of days.

It's our view that there is a sense of urgency here. We think that the sooner we can get an agreement and the sooner we can get Israel to agree to the US ideas, the better it will be for the people of Israel, the people of the Palestinian Authority, the people of the Middle East and the people of the world. So we are working very hard. I can't even begin to enumerate the number of phone calls, the number of discussions, the amount of time that we have devoted to try to bridge the remaining gaps. We are continuing to do that.

What the Secretary was indicating was, we are making progress; we have narrowed gaps; we are getting closer. If we were not getting closer in these efforts, we would stop them and make it clear that there was no point in continuing. So as long as we think we're making progress and we're getting closer to the goal, we are going to continue to make them. So we have been making progress across the board, but we, as I've said before, in this area, an inch is as good as a mile in terms of not being able to close completely.

So we have not been able to close. We have made progress across the board steadily for many weeks now. But unless we're able to close soon, we are not going to be able to achieve the objective, and we will say so.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - concur with these Israeli reports that it's a matter of days?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I understood the reporting, it is that they would like - they're suggesting that the Israeli Government decide whether it wants to finish yes or no in a number of days; not that we're going to get to yes in a number of days.

QUESTION: Are these media reports?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, media reports.

QUESTION: Jamie, where was the progress made?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I said, across the board. There are a number of issues that we've been talking about, primarily in the area of how to get reciprocal actions by the Palestinians in the areas of fighting terrorism, getting an infrastructure to fight terrorism and making sure that infrastructure is front-loaded in a parallel process by which the Israelis would redeploy territory pursuant to Oslo, as the Palestinians implemented the necessary infrastructure to fight terrorism pursuant to Oslo. So those two areas are the primary areas where there has been significant progress.

But again, in this business, significant progress could end up not leading to a result because it's often in the final stretch when the parties are unwilling to make the necessary decisions.

QUESTION: So what did the Palestinians agree to do?

MR. RUBIN: We're not going to get into any specifics, other than to give you the categories; and I've tried to do that as specifically as I can.

QUESTION: On Northern Ireland, I was wondering if you had any contacts with any of the parties concerning the situation with the Orangemen procession?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know what specific contact has been made, but I can say we understand the deep emotions evoked by the commemorative marches in Northern Ireland, and the difficult choices that the appointed parades commissions must make. Public safety and the rights of both communities must be taken into consideration. We urge responsible leaders in both communities to abide by the parade commission's decisions, and to work to diffuse the current impasse. That is our view; and to the extent that we have communicated with anyone, I'm sure that is what we said in general terms.

QUESTION: Do you have George Mitchell on this?

MR. RUBIN: I assume that George Mitchell's views are sought; but whether he's actively involved in the day-to-day process, I just don't know.

QUESTION: There are reports from Burma that there are unusual troop deployments in Rangoon. July 7th is the anniversary of one of the student demonstrations, and this entire month is a month that the SLORC is touchy about because there have been many demonstrations this month. Do you have any confirmed reports about --

MR. RUBIN: I don't have any information about the deployment of troops. I am aware that at about 1700 hours July 7th in Rangoon, a senior NLD official informed the US Embassy that the Party General Secretary, Aung San Sui Kyi, and chairman were stopped - sometimes they abbreviate these things, to my torture - were stopped by police while traveling north of Rangoon on the way to visit a member of parliament-elect of the NLD. At the time of this report, it appeared that police have ordered the party leaders to return to Rangoon. However, Aung San Sui Kyi and the party chairman have insisted on their right to continue on their way for the purpose of visiting this member of parliament.

Based on this information, we condemn the apparent abridgment of Aung San Sui Kyi's right to freedom of movement and her right to visit whomever she chooses. All Burmese should enjoy these fundamental rights. The restrictions imposed are illegal under Burmese law, in our view, and in any case are clearly infringements of the basic rights of freedom of movement.

We've sought clarification from the government there, and expressed our grave concern to government authorities. We reaffirm the strong US position that the freedom of movement should be accorded to members of the opposition, including Aung San Sui Kyi and the party chairman, who are right now apparently being denied the access of this fundamental right. That is the latest report we have out of Burma. I don't have any information on troop movements.

QUESTION: When you say you sought clarification from the government, are you expecting some kind of response from them?

MR. RUBIN: Well, normally that's what we expect, yes, is some response to our seeking clarification. But I don't have that response yet.

QUESTION: How would that happen through the embassy?

MR. RUBIN: We have a charge there.

QUESTION: Right, so that's how it would --

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: So who has the issue been raised with? Is it - (inaudible) --

MR. RUBIN: We've raised it with the government. I don't understand your question.

QUESTION: I mean in what form? Was there a phone call made to somebody; was there a letter sent? I mean, how --

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure he either phoned -- called them or visited them or talked to them. I doubt it was done in a letter; this is a real-time issue.

QUESTION: Did you see the story about the Pakistani deserter this morning - additional doubt was cast about his story? Are you prepared to call him a fraud?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I certainly hope he'll get the same attention that he got before, as people are raising increasing doubts about him. But that's not for me to judge, other than to express my opinion.

We have stated before that we note significant discrepancies in his story as reported in the press. After his arrival here, US officials interviewed him and reviewed his story. Apparently others have come to the same or similar conclusions as we have.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - asylum request?

MR. RUBIN: Well, that's really up to INS officials to make a judgment on what basis to allow him in. I'm just saying that based on our interviews and our knowledge, we noted significant discrepancies in his story and we noted that we had no information to support it; and apparently, others have reached similar conclusions.

QUESTION: Would you say that if he wasn't in danger before, if he went back, he certainly has achieved his goal of --

MR. RUBIN: Well, it's up to the INS to make a judgment of what the relevant immigration regulations would provide in different circumstances. I suspect he would be in danger, in his view, in either way. So it's not a question of how he defines that danger; it's a question of what the regulations are.

QUESTION: I'm interested in the discussion that was taking place between Secretary Talbott and Mr. Kahn from Pakistan yesterday.

MR. RUBIN: Well, they did have extensive meetings. They discussed the situation in South Asia, following India and Pakistan's nuclear tests. They had positive and constructive meetings and set the stage for further talks with the Pakistanis. They discussed non-proliferation, obviously, and exchanged views on how best to ease tensions in the region. We intend to continue our senior-level dialogues with Pakistan and India to meet our non- proliferation objectives.

As you know, the Deputy Secretary will meet Mr. Jaswant Singh in Frankfurt on July 9, and we intend to continue to take advantage of appropriate opportunities in this area.

With regard to reports about what Indian officials are suggesting their intentions are, we strongly believe - this is with respect to minimum deterrent and other matters that I think you asked me about - we strongly believe that the deployment of nuclear weapons in South Asia would be a dangerous development - one that would seriously undermine the security of both India and Pakistan.

Many multilateral bodies and individual countries have called upon India and Pakistan to take clear and meaningful steps in non-proliferation, including refraining from nuclear tests; refraining from deployment of nuclear weapons; refraining from deployment of ballistic missiles; and signing the Comprehensive Test Ban immediately and without conditions; and finally, refraining from further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. So obviously, all that is inconsistent with some desire to maintain some minimum nuclear deterrent posture, which we think would be a grave mistake.

We also want to see both parties seriously engage in negotiations on a fissile material cut-off. We want to work with both India and Pakistan to bring them into compliance with these international norms. That is one of the goals of Deputy Secretary Talbott's discussions and the continuing goal of the Administration.

QUESTION: Did he indicate or show some willingness to sign the CTBT?

MR. RUBIN: I think we'd prefer to let the other countries describe their own positions for themselves. What I can tell you is that we don't believe we're on the verge of a major breakthrough in this area. We think that it's up to India and Pakistan to make some important decisions, and we're hopeful that some of the dialogue in India now is a signal that they maybe have realized the wisdom of going forward with the Comprehensive Test Ban. But we are not on the verge of achieving that at this point; we're in the process of discussing it.

QUESTION: Jamie, one newspaper says today that Strobe told them that in addition to meeting Mr. Singh in Frankfurt this week, he's also going to actually go to India later in the month; is that correct?

MR. RUBIN: I think that there is always discussion about possible travel. But for now, the only meetings that are determined are the ones in Frankfurt and here. With respect to the President's trip, that is on hold pending further discussion. So I'm not ruling out a visit of some officials to the region, but the President's trip is on hold, and we have made no decision on further travel at this time.

QUESTION: Do you have any information about a helicopter crash in the Bahamas last night? I understand it was, perhaps, a counter-narcotics effort related incident. But was there any State Department involvement?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, there was a helicopter crash. I'm not aware of any State Department involvement directly; other than to say that it was a crash of the Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Island helicopter, and it is a counter-narcotics program. But the details of this crash really need to be addressed by the Pentagon or the regional unit spokesman in the region.

QUESTION: Tomorrow is going to be the eighth meeting of the Contact Group. Richard Holbrooke is back now from Kosovo. What happened in his meetings there; where do things stand? And what do you expect to come out of tomorrow's meeting of the Contact Group?

MR. RUBIN: Well, first of all, the Contact Group set out as one of the most important conditions is to get international access to the region where this conflict is going on. We have now created the Kosovo Observer Mission, which was launched yesterday. It's a mission to observe and report on the general freedom of movement throughout Kosovo. And it is important not least to improve access by humanitarian relief organizations, but also to report on overall security conditions. It will build, we hope, confidence through an overt international precedence with non-obtrusive observer teams that will observe and report on NGOs, on security conditions and activities in Kosovo, on the situation of internally displaced persons.

Each of the groups will operate under the operational authority of the chief of mission; in our case, Richard Miles. We're trying to establish a center in Pristina to coordinate activities on the ground for all the different embassies participating. Each embassy will control its own people. The observers will not escort relief convoys, but will observe and report on how they're doing. It is a peaceful mission, and we expect and demand full access and freedom of movement as this mission is performed. That was one of the four requirements of the Contact Group -- to make sure that we have independent access, independent information.

With respect to the other elements of the demands of the Contact Group, that the humanitarian organizations get the access that they need; with respect that the forces are withdrawn from Kosovo that were placed there that were involved in the crackdown; and with respect to the negotiations, we have been discussing on many tracks - and this is not a question of Ambassador Holbrooke having a meeting and then there being a break. Frankly, Ambassador Holbrooke was piggybacking on the work that Ambassador Hill has been doing on a daily basis. He has been in daily contact with the Serb side and the Kosovar side in trying to build a negotiated solution.

The negotiated solution has to start from two basic premises: number one, both sides have to realize that the use of force is not going to achieve their objectives for them and is only going to make the situation worse; number two, that there has to be some compromise between the desire of some in the Kosovar Albanian side for independence, which is not going to happen, and the refusal by President Milosevic to give the people there the freedoms and human rights that they deserve. That is what caused the problem - him stripping Kosovar Albanians of their rights and radicalizing the population with the use of force.

So this is the nature of the problem. This is a full court diplomatic press; it's going to go on for some time. One would not expect this to be immediately resolved. This is something that developed over time and grew into this rather - this conflict in which there is radicalization on the part of the Kosovar Albanians. What the Contact Group is going to try to do is come to some agreement on what the objectives ought to be for this negotiated outcome, and talk a little bit about modalities for achieving those objectives. I think they will get a report from Ambassador Hill on what he's been doing with the Kosovar Albanians and what he's been doing with the Serbs, especially President Milosevic; and prepare itself for what might come in the future.

Obviously, one of the elements of this is the contingency planning that continues at NATO on an accelerated basis to be able to meet a variety of options tasked by NATO military and political authorities. But in the meantime, we're focused on this negotiated outcome, and it's going to be long, hard slogging.

QUESTION: What would it take for the United States to push NATO to intervene militarily?

MR. RUBIN: Well, you're asking the question, I presume, to be what would it take for us to decide to use military force, let alone decide to push NATO or get an agreement from NATO. We're not going to set out criteria here. We believe that this is a case where planning for the use of force is justified. Whether we decide to implement that planning is a matter for the Commander-in-Chief to decide, and I don't intend to prejudge that.

QUESTION: Could you give us a little more detail on these teams? Will they consist of people from several countries? How large might they be? Would they just be diplomats?

MR. RUBIN: They will be - the teams will be diplomatic. They're called an observer mission, and they're operated under the authority of the chief of mission; therefore, they are diplomatic observers. I think my understanding is the US will eventually have 12 observers making up six two-person teams. The other embassies will have to talk about what they're prepared to provide.

The observers will be in white vehicles, identified by a national flag and signs that indicate "diplomatic observers." In addition, each observer will have an armband with diplomatic observer spelled out in white lettering.

It's a peaceful mission. They don't have a mandate to resolve problems. The mandate is to observe and report so that next time, if there is a problem, we have accurate independent information and that can be the basis for the international community making decisions. Often in these Contact Group meetings or in NATO settings, in the absence of independently confirmed information, those who want to end up on one side or the other of an issue believe what they want to hear and say what they want to believe. In this case, if you have independent observers, you are going to have an independent judgment of what happened if the thing were to deteriorate even further.

Furthermore, the very presence of those independent observers will hopefully deter, in a sense, the kind of knowing that they will be able to report freely and observe and report on what happened, hopefully will deter people from doing what they might otherwise do if they were not going to be observed and reported on.

QUESTION: If they come upon a fire fight that's going on, a battle --

MR. RUBIN: They're not to intervene; they're to observe and report about it.

QUESTION: Are they, in fact, diplomats - foreign service officer type diplomats, or are they military people assigned to the embassy who become diplomatic? What kind of individuals are we talking about?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll have to get you some detail on where these people are all going to come from, wherever they might come from; but they are diplomatic observers.

QUESTION: Do you have any ideas on what the Contact Group could propose to promote some unity in the Kosovar Albanian leadership?

MR. RUBIN: Well, again, there are efforts going on. Ambassador Hill has been working with a number of people in the State Department about different ways in which to try to bridge this important gap in the principle - on the one hand, of independence, on the other hand, of stripped autonomy. So we have to find something in between that is acceptable to both sides at least, perhaps to talk about at first. So that's the challenge of the diplomats, but I wouldn't want to pre-announce any particular conclusion on how you would do that. But the parameter again is, short of independence and far more autonomy and human rights and freedoms than now exist for the Kosovar Albanians.

QUESTION: Let me make sure the number - you said that six out of 12 is going to be from the US side?

MR. RUBIN: Twelve Americans - six teams of two.

QUESTION: You just said that the US Government believes that the military intervention into Kosovo is justified. Can you give us some rationale? What are the reasons; how is it justified?

MR. RUBIN: It's funny you said that, because that isn't what I said. I said that planning for possible military intervention is justified.

QUESTION: How do you justify it?

MR. RUBIN: We believe that there is a threat to international peace and security that has been created by the refugees pouring out of the borders. There are tens of thousands of refugees in neighboring lands. This is not the first time the international community has regarded the destabilization created by refugees as justification if appropriate for the planning for the use of force. So this is not new.

We've made very clear that we think the stability of Europe is a national security interest of the United States. We've made very clear that this situation, depending on how it evolves, affects the national security of the United States because it affects the stability of Europe. The Contact Group itself, in its statement, which you might want to take a look at, made very clear that the situation in Kosovo is posing a threat to the security and stability of Europe; that's the rationale.

QUESTION: New subject - Indonesia - do you have anything --

MR. RUBIN: Do you have more on this?

QUESTION: Yes, one more. Earlier Ambassador Chris Hill had referred to the KLA as a terrorist organization. Does the United States feel that that was a mistake? And how do you view the KLA today?

MR. RUBIN: Usually that is attributed to a different ambassador; but that other ambassador claims he didn't say it either.

QUESTION: That was Gelbard.

MR. RUBIN: Right, that's okay. Neither ambassador wants to be credited with that statement. But let me take more seriously the answer as follows.

There is no question that there have been acts committed by people affiliated in some way or another with the Kosovar Liberation Army that we have condemned because they have been the use of military or the use of force against innocents, and therefore are condemnable and, in a specific sense, could be considered terrorist acts because they are the use of violence against innocents in the furtherance of a political cause.

That is not the same as declaring an organization or a group of individuals who have some affiliation a terrorist organization. That is not our view of the KLA; it never has been. The terrorist organization designation has a certain meaning in the Department of State, especially from this podium. It carries with it a whole series of legal requirements to prohibit the raising of money for that purpose, and it carries with it a requirement on our part to go through extensive legal work to prove that.

It is our view that those affiliated with the KLA are engaged in an insurgency, and they are trying to win back freedoms that were lost during the crackdown by the Serbian authorities and were lost by the stripping of the autonomy of the people of Kosovo. But in so doing, they are declaring an objective that we think is wholly unrealistic and is simply not going to happen; that is the independence of Kosovo.

There have been individuals affiliated with that organization who have committed acts that we condemn. But let's bear in mind the bottom line here - the bottom line is that the primary burden for the problem in Kosovo rests on the shoulders of Slobodan Milosevic who, number one, stripped these people of their autonomy, took away their basic rights; and number two, used heavy military equipment in a violent crackdown that involved the killing of innocents. So we have very strong views about who's responsible for the situation. But that doesn't mean we can endorse the use of force against innocents, whoever does it.

QUESTION: On Indonesia, I'm wondering if you have any concerns about the shooting in Irian Jaya.

MR. RUBIN: First let me say that the United States recognizes Irian Jaya as an integral part of Indonesia. We are disturbed, however, by reports of Indonesian troops' use of force against demonstrators, and that security forces fired on demonstrators with rubber bullets and detained as many as 180 people. There are unconfirmed reports that some of those shot have died. A student remains in critical condition with a bullet wound in his head, according to these same reports.

We urge the Government and military of Indonesia to exercise maximum restraint, permit peaceful demonstrations to proceed and to foster a climate of dialogue, not confrontation. We urge all demonstrators to refrain from violent acts. Violence will benefit no one.

We also call on the Indonesian Government to release as soon as possible all those detained or arrested for the peaceful expressions of their political beliefs in Irian Jaya or anywhere else.

QUESTION: The US and China apparently are going to hold joint search and rescue operations, and that China is going to be allowed to observe other US military options. Can you say for the record what the significance of this is, please?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. The fact sheet laying out what was agreed in China that some of you got a look at made clear that the United States and China will hold in July the first annual meeting, under the auspices of the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, a meeting to promote safety in naval and air operations. In addition, the United States and Chinese militaries agreed to send personnel in the near future to observe a joint training exercise of the other side on the basis of reciprocity, the size, location and timing of the exercise to be discussed and decided by the two sides. That's what they agreed to in Beijing.

My understanding is the Pentagon may have a little more information about what may happen as a result of that understanding. But the basic value of this is a long and tried-and-true tradition, which is that the more militaries understand about what each other is doing, the less likelihood there is for misunderstanding and miscalculation and accidents to occur that will endanger either the relationship of the countries or would involve risk to a particular situation.

Secondly, when it comes to humanitarian efforts, we believe that the more people can work together to prepare for the possibility they may need to engage in some search and rescue operation could lead to the saving of lives in the event that they had to work together to do just that.

So both on humanitarian grounds and in terms of preventing unwanted risks and preventing miscalculation, these kinds of greater military-to-military contacts are of benefit both to the security of the United States and to the Chinese as well. So we want to see that kind of greater military-to- military cooperation occur, and this is in that context.

But the specifics of what is going on, I would have to leave to my counterpart at the Pentagon to describe in detail.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)


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