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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #84, 98-07-13

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


521

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Monday July 13, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

IRAN
1		No official contacts between US Government and Government
		  of Iran
1		There have been unofficial contacts between Americans and
		  Iranians
2		There have been some public responses to new tone of US
		  statements

LIBYA 2-3 US would not support air travel waiver in UN sanctions committee for non-humanitarian reasons

CUBA 3 US strongly condemns violent activities against Cuba allegedly supported by persons or groups based in the United States

CHINA 4 US continues strong efforts to achieve progress on human rights

JAPAN 5,7 Change in government does not change US policy 5,6 Japan must move forward to implement concrete fiscal and banking measures 5 Healthy Japanese economy critical for Asian economic health 6-7 US has broad relationship with Japan as the cornerstone of US Asian policy 7 New summit date remains to be worked out with new Japanese government

BOLIVIA 6 US statement on Friday, July 10, raised concerns of domestic air carrier safety

NORTHERN IRELAND 8 Sen. Mitchell's formal role has ended with the Easter Agreement 8 Death of the three boys an abomination; no march is worth the lives of children

NIGERIA 9 US does not have conclusive evidence that Gen. Abacha was poisoned; 9 US accepts the findings of the autopsy board in Chief Abiola's death 10 US never did other than to call for Chief Abiola's unconditional release

RUSSIA 10 US welcomes agreement reached between IMF and Russian government 11 Failure of Congress to provide IMF funding damages US interests

SAUDI ARABIA 12 Al Khobar investigation is ongoing; FBI is the lead US agency

KOSOVO 12 Amb. Hill has met with Belgrade authorities and Kosovar Albanian leaders 12 Primary responsibility for conflict rests with Slobodan Milosevic of the FRY 12 International community does not support independence for Kosovo

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 14 Inability of two sides to talk to each other a key problem of the past year 14,17 Face-to-face discussions between the two sides is essential for peace process 14-15 US understands that Israelis will meet with Palestinians when Chairman Arafat returns from China 15,17 Palestinians have agreed in principle to create an anti-terrorist infrastructure 15,16 Palestinian Covenant: Additional Israeli concerns should be addressed to the Palestinians 16 US ideas attempted to forge a compromise on both sides 16 Israel has not yet come to a position to accept US ideas in principle 15,16 Palestinians took an important step in April 1996 on the Covenant 18 US efforts are "in the end game" and cannot go on indefinitely

BELARUS 18-19 US expects to have analogous statement to EU actions shortly

NORTH KOREA 20 Body of DPRK soldier found on ROK beach a serious violation of the armistice 21 US wants to see North-South dialogue, four-party talks go forward 21 US will continue to meet its commitments under KEDO


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #84

MONDAY, JULY 13, 1998 12:45 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today, as you know, is Monday.

Let me say, we don't have any announcements or any statements; so we will go right to your difficult questions.

QUESTION: Jamie, the Egyptian Foreign Minister who is here, as you know, had a lot to say this morning. One thing he said is that there are many contacts - a lot of contacts - between the United States and Iran. Is that so?

MR. RUBIN: No official contacts.

QUESTION: What do you mean no official contacts?

MR. RUBIN: I think we all know what an official contact is.

QUESTION: Sure, coming with a brass band and everything, but --

MR. RUBIN: No, to my knowledge, there are no official meetings between US officials and Iranian Government officials. As far as any diplomatic ability to communicate, you're aware of our ability to do that. I'm not in a position to get into any details of when and where that happened anew; but I'm not aware of any ramping up of any kind.

I am aware that Secretary Albright made an important speech on this subject; had some important words to say about what the future could hold; made some important discussions of what has been going on in Iran. And I'm certainly aware that there have been unofficial contacts in terms of experts and journalists and, as you know, there was a sporting contact involving US and Iranian soccer players. So there is contact between Americans and Iranians; but if Foreign Minister Moussa was suggesting there's been official government contact, I think he's --

QUESTION: But he didn't say government; he said a lot of contacts. In any event, I'm interested, of course, in what you're telling us about this. On the one hand, she made this overture; on the other hand, you say there's no ramping up of contacts. Now, if I put one and one together, I would say despite her overture there has been no acceleration in US-Iranian contacts; is that correct?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: Doesn't that mean that they didn't respond to her overture?

MR. RUBIN: No, on the contrary, I think we've seen some public responses. We saw some responses, including by President Khatemi, indicating that he was encouraged by the new tone coming out of the United States and that they may have more to say at a later point. So there have been responses. But in terms of official US-Iranian dialogue, the kind of government-to-government dialogue we've been calling for, I'm not aware of it.

QUESTION: One quick one, and then maybe someone else wants a shot. He was all over the lot - he was on Libya; and you know what happened last week, so we won't go over that again. He's determined - Egypt apparently is determined to maintain its contacts - I don't know at what level, I don't know into what rationale. And I look back on what Albright said, and she said she wouldn't approve of just going there to pay respects to Qadhafi. He's not talking only about paying respects; he's talking about improving relations between Egypt and Libya.

What if somebody like Mubarak or what if the Egyptians went to Libya not just to pay their respects, but to talk substantively of improving relations with Libya. Is that something the US would oppose?

MR. RUBIN: There's no new issue here, Barry. There are many countries in the world that have continued to have contact with the Libyan Government, including their neighbor, Egypt.

The issue was the UN sanctions, sanctions that prohibit air travel to Libya. The issue was President Mubarak getting an exception through the Sanctions Committee. So it wouldn't come as any surprise to us if there was dialogue between Egypt and Libya; that has continued throughout. There's no sanction on that. We've made a general statement that we think governments around the world should down-grade their contacts with Libya in light of the fact they're under sanctions. But there's a difference between a UN sanction, for which there is a prohibition, and some diplomatic contact, which is not prohibited.

QUESTION: Well, I'm really asking about the travel ban. There was no chance to follow up her statement. She spoke of what happened as humanitarian, and she was clear that the US was against exceptions just to pay respects. I'm asking, where does the US stand if the travel is not simply to pay respects, but to deal --

MR. RUBIN: We would not support airplane travel to have a government- to-government dialogue.

QUESTION: That was my question.

QUESTION: We support another waiver, then, for --

MR. RUBIN: It's not our intention.

QUESTION: So you would not support a waiver for anything but a humanitarian --

MR. RUBIN: Correct, that's the way the sanctions work.

QUESTION: You said you would be surprised if there were a dialogue between Egypt and Libya. Do you think Egypt can play a role in trying to resolve the Pan Am bombing?

MR. RUBIN: Any country that can convince the Libyan Government that it's time for it to comply with UN sanctions - to give up the suspects and send them to the UK or the United States for trial - would be helpful. I am skeptical that they're going to have a sudden change of heart, but we certainly would welcome it if it happened. Is that it for today.

(Laughter)

QUESTION: Did you see The New York Times articles on Cuba? Did you read them all the way through? No, I withdrawal that question.

(Laughter.)

It does make reference to arrests by the Cuban Government of three, I guess they're residents of South Florida - arrested in June. The Cuban Government has made no public disclosure of these arrests. Obviously, if they're American citizens, American consul --

MR. RUBIN: I'm unaware of the answer to that particular point, and will get you an answer for that today.

Let me say that in general, the United States has repeatedly and strongly condemned violent activities carried out against Cuba, allegedly supported by persons or groups based in the United States. We have made clear that we oppose such terrorist activities. US policy is aimed at promoting respect for human rights and a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

The US Government has investigated and will continue to investigate allegations and prosecute violations of US law. This is a law enforcement matter; and therefore, I would have to refer you to the Department of Justice for any discussion of the law enforcement issues.

Similarly, we regard the fact is well-known that we have indicated to Central American countries that we strongly oppose the perpetrating of terrorist acts in Cuba, whether they occur as a result of assistance from US exiles or from the territory of Central America. We would expect the Central American authorities to take appropriate law enforcement action against persons or groups carrying out such activities.

So that is our view overall. As far as the specific question you had about these three individuals, we'll have to get you that for the record.

QUESTION: Over the weekend there was some reporting about some dissidents, some pro-democracy activists being arrested in China. I was wondering how you felt about that, given the President's strong pitch.

MR. RUBIN: We have seen reports that Chinese authorities have detained 10 dissidents in recent days. We have been unable to confirm those reports independently. Embassy Beijing is following up on these cases, requesting information from the relevant authorities and urging the release of those who reportedly remain detained.

It is our view, which President Clinton made very clear at the summit, that China should allow the peaceful expression of political and religious views. We urge China to release all persons held for the peaceful exercise of their rights. That is a right that has been codified under international standards.

The President made clear during the summit, both publicly and privately, that promoting respect for human rights is a top priority for the Administration. He made those views well known, as you know, in a live press conference, a speech at the Beijing University, an interview on central television, as well as on a radio talk show. Those were unprecedented events, as many of you noted.

Simply engaging with China does not mean we endorse the Chinese policies, and we have serious problems with respect to Chinese policies on human rights, including the detention of dissidents for expressing their political views or attempting to register a political party. That's a classic example of what we think the Chinese should allow that they do not that we think is wrong. We will continue to address these problems with the Chinese and continue our strong efforts to achieve progress in this area.

QUESTION: But given the fact that the President was so outspoken on this issue, do you feel that these arrests are a direct sort of rebuttal to what he had to say?

MR. RUBIN: The President and Secretary Albright have made very clear that we do not expect China to change overnight. But rather the signal the President was sending through his public comments was that China is going to have to change if it's going to bring itself into the mainstream of acceptance of human rights, of acceptance of people's right to pursue free expression and freedom of association.

So there were problems with dissidents for many years, things that we think are bad practices that we've condemned. Those practices continue, and our policy and reaction to them remains the same.

QUESTION: Different subject, same neighborhood. As far as events in Japan, there were several public pledges - one while the Secretary was in Tokyo - that Japan would not try to export itself out of their current malaise. Do you have any reason to doubt that they will uphold that pledge now that there's going to be, apparently, a change in government?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we've had many changes in government in Japan over the years and there's been a continuity in our policies. Certainly we have a close, enduring relationship with Japan, and a change in leadership does not alter the strong nature of our relationship. We look forward to working with the new Japanese Government, and we think it's extremely important that the new government move quickly to implement concrete, fiscal and banking measures to achieve strong domestic demand-led growth in Japan and to restore confidence in Japan's financial system. A healthy Japanese economy is critical for the Asia region and the global economy.

I'm not aware that we have any reason to believe that any one or the other previous statements by the Japanese Government is now under threat. So what we want to see happen is that the new government proceed along the path that I described to implement these concrete measures. We are familiar with transitions between prime ministers of Japan; it's happened before.

QUESTION: I know your view of Monday morning quarterbacking, but looking back to President Clinton's trip, in retrospect do you think it might have been a good idea for him to stop, given the --

MR. RUBIN: Our view was not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other governments. If your suggestion is that somehow by going there it would have affected an election, that's not what we do in this business.

QUESTION: How about the reverse? Is it possible he didn't go to show disapproval of the slow action on some of the economic issues?

MR. RUBIN: I think, for those of you who heard me discuss this matter, know that he didn't go because Hashimoto was coming here; that he had several visits with the Prime Minister of Japan; that it was not unprecedented for an American President to go to China without going to Japan; and that there's been no change in our view of the importance of the US-Japanese relationship.

QUESTION: Jamie, there's not the possibility that this Administration so misjudged the fragility of Hashimoto's rule in Japan that you didn't think anything like this would happen? I mean, we're talking about sort of misreading the economic intelligence on this matter.

MR. RUBIN: It strikes me that that's an absurdity.

QUESTION: Do you think the drumbeat of criticism from Washington contributed to Hashimoto's --

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to make any comment on what the Japanese voters were reacting to. They've made a decision; they've conducted an election; they're a democracy. If you're interested in what the Japanese voters were responding to, I welcome your counterparts in Japan to interview the Japanese voters.

QUESTION: Jamie, this building has a number of expert analysts, and you're privy to their thinking. What is the view in this building of --

MR. RUBIN: What our thinking is about what foreign governments' citizens react to in terms of democratic elections is not something we normally discuss on the record.

QUESTION: On Friday the State Department released a warning about the security concerns - or safety concerns about Bolivia's national airliners. I gather it's created a hubbub in Bolivia. Do you have anything about it?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you something for the record.

QUESTION: Going back to Japan, I suppose that this time, election results reflects Japanese voters basic distrust in government, traditional Japanese politics style.

MR. RUBIN: Well, you certainly seem to have a view of what the voters are reacting to. Maybe you can talk to Mark over there and share that view.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: What I mean is, like, traditional Japanese politics style, including the bureaucrat-led policy making style and the fact that Japan has been always criticized as too little and too late. From long-term perspective, I'd like to ask, would you say that this election result, which served as a turning point for Japanese politics or Japanese political style to change or to improve?

MR. RUBIN: That will be up to Japan and its political system. We don't know the answer to that question. Certainly we want to see the kind of long-term fiscal and banking measures, the strong domestic demand-led growth in Japan that I've talked about. That's something we believe is important because a healthy Japanese economy is critical for the Asian region, for the people of Japan and for the people of the world. That's, from our perspective, sufficient to say what we'd like to see.

With respect to how their political system evolves and what changes are made, that's for the Japanese people and its government to decide.

QUESTION: Regarding with Prime Minister Hashimoto's resignation, many people focus upon just the economic prospect of what the - how do you think - what kind of affect does it have as an aspect, for example, of political dialogue or strategic dialogue in the entire Asia-Pacific region?

MR. RUBIN: To the extent that I understood the question, let me say that we have a broad relationship with Japan, a security relationship, an economic relationship, a military-to-military relationship. All of those relationships add up to what Secretary Albright has said that makes Japan the cornerstone of our Asian policy. We intend, despite this change in government, to pursue activity and improvement and stability along all of those elements of our relationship.

QUESTION: On that front (inaudible) - good support, by the way. That cornerstone was laid on a presidential trip to Japan. You did have a good relationship building with the government that is now saying goodbye. Do you expect the new government to accelerate that security relationship?

MR. RUBIN: We would certainly hope to continue to work on all elements of our relationship with the new government of Japan that hasn't yet been formed. So it would be hard to predict exactly how things would go with a government that hasn't yet been formed.

QUESTION: But do you want that as well as you were citing the economic --

MR. RUBIN: We certainly want to continue our policy goal, things that were agreed to across the board - in the military field, the security field, in the economic field, in the regional security area; so nothing has changed. Japan has had changes in prime ministers before, and yet our relationship has endured and our policy objectives have endured.

You're still on Japan? Wow.

QUESTION: I'm with Japanese media, so --

MR. RUBIN: No, I understand; but I just can't imagine I have more to contribute.

QUESTION: As to the scheduled US-Japan summit, since Prime Minister Hashimoto just announced that he has to cancel due to the election result, what would be the next possible meeting from US side?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the summit was canceled, and there isn't a new prime minister with which to discuss the possibility of any additional meeting. So it's hard to predict what the new government would want and what we would therefore be able to arrange as far as a mutually agreeable schedule. It's hard to, again, predict what exactly will happen with a new prime minister who's yet to be selected.

QUESTION: Perhaps in September there's going to be a UN general meeting and also at APEC. So my question comes down to whether it's going to be the US is thinking about having that meeting before these two meetings that it's already set up or after that.

MR. RUBIN: Right, the election was yesterday; the Prime Minister stepped down not so many hours ago, canceled the meeting not so many hours ago. So US thinking about scheduling another summit with a prime minister who's not yet been selected has not fully jelled.

QUESTION: But with a new government coming in, it's conceivable that the State Department would have a view as to whether there should be some haste - or haste is the wrong word - some eagerness to get together or to sit back and wait for a lead.

MR. RUBIN: Right, Barry, but normally the State Department would discuss that view with the Japanese Government before discussing it publicly. And since there isn't a Japanese Government with which to have that discussion, a new government, it would be hard for me to propose a new summit date, as seems to be the goal of the question.

QUESTION: Northern Ireland - can you bring us up to date on what role, if any, US diplomacy is playing in trying to resolve it currently? And last week I asked you specifically about Senator Mitchell.

MR. RUBIN: Senator Mitchell's formal role has expired with the successful completion of the Easter agreement. Whether he is talking on the phone to any of the leaders - expired may not have been the most felicitous phrase because there was some chatter seemingly about it. But his formal role is not now being replaced by somebody else. Whether he's contacting people over the phone, I do not know.

I believe the White House has talked about discussions the President has had in this regard; and I'd rather leave that to them to detail that any further. But let me just simply say that the White House did put out a statement on the violence yesterday. We regard the death of the three boys in a sectarian arson attack as an abomination that is unjustifiable under any circumstances. No commemorative march is worth the murder of children. We renew our appeal to responsible Unionist and Loyalist leaders to abide by the decisions of the independent parades commission and to end this inflammatory situation which has provoked a week of violence.

We continue to monitor closely the situation and remain in touch with British, Irish and Northern Ireland officials to help in any way we can.

QUESTION: Nigeria - there's a report in a major newspaper on Saturday, citing US sources, that General Abacha had not died of a heart attack, but had died as the result of being poisoned during a night of Bacchanalia --

MR. RUBIN: What was that word?

QUESTION: A night of fun.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: What was the first word you used?

QUESTION: Bacchanalia.

MR. RUBIN: Bacchanalia, I'll have to look that up.

QUESTION: I'm sure you've had a few of those.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Strike that from the record.

QUESTION: Anyway, I'm sure you saw the story. Can you comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say that this is a very serious question. As you know, Nigeria is in flux right now in light of the death of Chief Abiola.

With respect to General Abacha, we do not have conclusive evidence that General Abacha was poisoned. We're aware of reports to that effect. As you indicated in your question, the government has said he died of a heart attack. It would be very difficult for me to be any more specific than that, other than to say that we have no conclusive evidence that he died in that way.

QUESTION: When you say reports, are you referring to media reports?

MR. RUBIN: I'm referring to reports.

QUESTION: You say no conclusive evidence; but you have some evidence, then?

MR. RUBIN: I think the three points really lead you to a very clear understanding of what the US Government knows and doesn't know. We are not, number one, in a position to confirm conclusively that he died of poisoning. We are aware of reports to that effect. The government has indicated that he died of a heart attack.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - on your view of affairs in Nigeria, or does that have any practical affect on the policy?

MR. RUBIN: Well, clearly the whole question of leaders in Nigeria has been a source of some instability recently. We accept the findings of the autopsy board with respect to the death of Chief Abiola. These two play on each other for fear that the reports about one will suggest that might apply to the other.

We note that many opposition leaders in Nigeria seem to be modifying their earlier predictions that Chief Abiola had been poisoned. The opposition continues to maintain, with considerable justification, that the conditions of Abiola's imprisonment contributed to his death.

In the same respect, there have been some rather unfortunate and incorrect suggestions recently that somehow the US in concert with the Secretary General pressured Chief Abiola to renounce his claim to the presidency. These suggestions are utterly false and without foundation. The US never conveyed any such message other than Abiola's immediate an unconditional release from detention. We have always maintained that his detention was wrong and wholly unjustified.

One of the primary purposes of Under Secretary Pickering's mission was to press for Chief Abiola's immediate and unconditional release. The delegation did so in its meeting with General Abubakar and other government officials. The US delegation never suggested that we favored Abiola renouncing his claim to the presidency as a condition of his release. The US delegation was able to discuss these issues briefly with Chief Abiola before he fell ill.

We told Abiola that a primary reason for the visit was to seek his immediate and unconditional release, and also expressed our hope that Abiola would play an active role in the national life of his country, following his anticipated release.

So any suggestion that somehow there was pressure placed on him by the United States, as I've seen in several news accounts, is wholly unjustified and utterly false and merits a correction.

QUESTION: The subject of the loans by international institutions to Russia is very much in the news. The US obviously has quite a lot of influence over those institutions. What does the US believe Russia should do in order to qualify for these loans?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as far as I know, our view is consistent with that of the International Monetary Fund. I believe Mike McCurry had some preliminary reaction, and let me say that we welcome the agreement reached between the IMF and the Russian Government. My understanding is that the President will be making that point during the course of the day.

It's a demonstration of the Fund's confidence in the Russian Government's commitment to take the necessary fiscal and structural measures to address Russia's economic difficulties. The purpose of the IMF package is to support financial stability in Russia. A financial collapse in Russia would have dire consequences for the Russian people and set back the cause of economic reform. On the other hand, cooperation between the Russian Government and international financial institutions to stabilize financial markets will advance economic reform and democracy and Russia, which are profoundly in our national interest.

With respect to the specific reform measures that your question referred to, what I can say is that I'm not aware that there's any difference of view between us and the Fund on the necessary reforms. The Fund is the appropriate source to describe what the specific reforms are that they have apparently agreed on with the Russians.

QUESTION: There's apparently also some World Bank negotiations.

MR. RUBIN: I believe that is going on, as well. Again, it's up to the World Bank to speak to its specific discussions in a public forum. We are supportive, as necessary, of actions that the international financial institutions are working on.

QUESTION: And you're confident that the US Congress will come up with the money?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're not confident that the US Congress will see the wisdom in providing the necessary funds to the IMF unless the US Congress starts to act consistent with the national interest. The national interest clearly requires us to have an adequately funded IMF system so that when problems occur around the world that affect the daily lives of the American people, that the IMF is in a position to respond. The failure to provide that funding is damaging the interests and the livelihoods of every American citizen. We are hopeful that they will get that message and provide that necessary funding.

QUESTION: Does the United States believe there is any limit to the extent to which the international community should go to try to save Russia?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I'm sure there's a limit. I don't intend to define it for you.

QUESTION: I mean, presumably there's been some thinking about that, though?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think it's appropriate for one to define limits in this context. What's appropriate is to define what progress is. Progress is going to require reform measures by the Russian Government; that is what they are working on. They have worked on a package with the IMF that we are welcoming.

As far as what would be a bridge too far, a bridge too far would be supporting assistance in the absence of Russian economic reforms that the Fund is demanding. That would be an example of a limit.

QUESTION: To Mexico - what is the take of the State Department regarding the rehiring of judiciary department employees in Mexico that had tested positive for drugs? Mr. Madrazo's agency was being forced to take those people back on to payroll - people who were obviously corrupt. Where does the US stand on that matter? How could US law enforcement cooperate with people who are users?

MR. RUBIN: I don't believe our position has changed. I'll have to get for the record for you our basic view on what steps the Mexican Government has now taken to try to now ensure that its officials are properly vetted for their activities and what additional steps we'd like them to take.

QUESTION: Another one on Cuba. A year ago at the time of the bombings of the hotels, Cuba said that it had evidence that these plots originated from the United States. At the time, you asked Cuba for its evidence. Did they ever get back to you on this?

MR. RUBIN: I don't believe so, no.

QUESTION: Jamie, a quickie - Friday one of the princes of Saudi Arabia held court out at the ambassador's residence late Friday and spoke of, again, the US not being given direct access to the investigations of Al Khobar bombing - it's their investigation; it's not something for the US to get directly up front in looking into. I wondered is that - are we going to see this crime against Americans sort of recede into the mists of time, or is there anything the US can do to try to get this solved?

MR. RUBIN: The Al Khobar bombing remains under investigation. The FBI is the lead US Government agency for conducting such an investigation. As this is an ongoing criminal investigation, the status of the investigation I cannot get into. I can tell you that the difficulties in the investigation have been discussed for some time, and these criminal investigations are based on where the facts might lead them, not speculation about international relations.

We've talked to the Saudis at diplomatic levels about this issue, and we expect them to provide full cooperation. I don't think what the Saudis have said in recent days changes their view as to how the procedural elements operate in terms of the fact that this is on Saudi territory; that's simply a fact. And we want the FBI to get full cooperation from the Saudi Government; that's our expectation.

QUESTION: They say they'll cooperate, but I wondered if you felt that the Saudi investigation is vigorous enough and professional enough to get this resolved?

MR. RUBIN: That's for the FBI to describe in the detail of a law enforcement agency that only a law enforcement agency can describe.

QUESTION: Jamie, anything new about Kosovo? The news says that the European Union today voiced alarm at growing support for armed Kosovo Albanians. (Inaudible) -- Foreign Minister - (inaudible) - said that pressure also has to be applied on them as a growing radicalization can be detected. What is the US position?

MR. RUBIN: Our view hasn't shifted. The sporadic fighting continues throughout the region, primarily in the areas of Decani and Pec. Problems with food deliveries have arisen in these areas of fighting. On Friday, Ambassador Hill met with authorities in Belgrade; on Saturday, he held a series of meetings in Pristina with a number of members from the Kosovar Albanian leadership, including Dr. Rugova. Ambassador Hill had additional meetings with the Kosovar Albanian leadership today.

We have said for some time that the primary responsibility for this conflict and for the fighting and for the repression and for the dying is Slobodan Milosevic, the President of the FRY - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That doesn't mean that extremist elements on the Kosovar Albanian side are free of responsibility. We do believe that they need to realize that their independence goals are not going to be achieved; the international community is not going to support independence for Kosovo; that the international community is never going to support greater Albania; and that they are not going to, therefore, solve any of their problems that are legitimate problems about stripped autonomy, about the denial of basic human rights, the denial of legitimate ethnic and minority rights -- they are not going to solve those problems on the battlefield and by extremist violence. If they think they are going to resolve and achieve independence, they are fundamentally mistaken.

None of that view changes the fact that President Milosevic is primarily responsible for stripping these people of their rights, taking away their rights and radicalizing the population of Kosovo such that they have extremist groups now pursuing totally and wholly unrealistic objectives using military force.

QUESTION: How is Hill doing on working out principles?

MR. RUBIN:Well, he is continuing to work on -

QUESTION: -- the autonomy plan - (inaudible) --

MR. RUBIN:Again, it's hard to give you a snapshot each time. He continues to think it's useful to have these discussions. This is a complex issue that will require many, many discussions in order to reach agreement, if that is possible. So he is continuing to do his work and giving regular updates to the Secretary.

QUESTION: How can you bridge that insurmountable gap between Belgrade and Pristina? Is it fair to say that you are ready to apply some sanctions against Albania, since sanctions against Belgrade didn't give us any result?

MR. RUBIN:Unlike in theory, in practice actions don't always immediately cause results. We've put very stiff sanctions in place, and it has helped to bring home to President Milosevic the error of his ways; but we will see whether over time it continues to do that. With respect to the Kosovar Albanians, there is an embargo on arms going into Kosovo which has an effect on them. So there is, in that sense, a sanction already in place.

QUESTION: On the Middle East -- have you heard from the Israelis or the Palestinians on whether they plan to arrange a meeting?

MR. RUBIN:Let me say, I'd like to put this in a little bit of perspective because there's been some misreporting and some rather unfathomable particular arguments put forward by a number of commentators and officials.

We stand by the ideas that President Clinton set forth, that Secretary Albright shared with the Israelis and the Palestinians, and believe that an agreement based on these ideas can be reached if the parties are willing. Let me make this very clear - the Palestinians have said yes in principle to these ideas. We have been working with the Israelis to determine whether they can respond with a second yes to our ideas. The Israelis have moved in that direction, but gaps remain. The Israelis have indicated they have concerns about some key elements in our ideas which they have expressed to us; and we have made it clear to them that many of these concerns are concerns that can only have an impact if they are expressed directly to the Palestinians.

Indeed one of the principle problems over the last year is the inability of the two parties to talk to each other. The reason why the United States has been engaged in this continuous and exhausting mediation effort is precisely because the two sides were unable to talk to each other and they asked us to talk to them. But there is no way to get an agreement and no way to close this phase down one way or the other, unless they are in a position to meet with each other and at least hear each other out. If we are to bring our efforts to a conclusion, these contacts between the two sides are essential. We understand that that will begin when Arafat returns from China.

So, in short, the ball is not in the Palestinian court as I've seen it suggested. The ball is in the court of the Israelis to try to work with the Palestinians and work with us to come to a second yes. We have a yes from the Palestinians, and we are looking to get ourselves in a position where the Israelis can say yes, as well.

QUESTION: What will begin when --

QUESTION: What happens when Arafat gets back from China?

MR. RUBIN:There will be a meeting between - that's our understanding -- that when Arafat returns, there will be a direct meeting between the two.

QUESTION: Between the two leaders?

MR. RUBIN: No, between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

QUESTION: The Defense Minister?

MR. RUBIN: It's really up to them to tell you who's meeting. It's not up to describe those meetings. It's my understanding that our desire to have engagement between the two is going to happen after Arafat returns from China; and it's up to the Palestinians and the Israelis to describe particular contact. I think that's a reasonable protocol.

QUESTION: When is he due back?

MR. RUBIN: I believe Wednesday.

QUESTION: Is there a date and a time and a place for the meeting?

MR. RUBIN:The meeting between the Palestinians and the Israelis that by protocol I specifically didn't want to describe any further?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. RUBIN: After he returns from China on Wednesday.

QUESTION: Will the US be there, too?

MR. RUBIN: No, the idea is a direct engagement between the two sides.

QUESTION: Let's roll back to the second, at least, day that you've told the Israelis to take their problems to the Palestinians. The US has a position on issues, doesn't it? Does the US - and we happen to know, may of us, what the hurdles are now; and there's been no secret that Netanyahu doesn't think the PLO has done all that it should on its covenant - the 34-year-old call for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state.

MR. RUBIN: Well stated.

QUESTION: That's what is says, by the way. It doesn't say destruction of Israel; it says destruction of Israel as a Jewish state.

MR. RUBIN: And what's the question?

QUESTION: Does the US have a position on whether the PLO has done everything that should be necessary to move on and pass this point; or/and is the US saying whatever opposition is, we can't help you, go talk to the Palestinians? I don't quite get - obviously because you haven't gotten into detail - where the US is on that issue.

MR. RUBIN: All right. Let me try to help you. We set out some ideas earlier this year that were designed to bridge the gaps between the Palestinians and the Israelis on all the key issues: the size of the further redeployment; the timing of a further redeployment; issues related to the Palestinian national covenant; the PNC issue; issues related to the fighting of terrorism. And we created a scheme of parallel actions that would involve front loading - right up front - fighting of terrorism by the Palestinians. The Palestinians accepted those ideas in principle, so they've accepted the idea of building an infrastructure right away to fight terrorism. That has been accepted by the Palestinians in their acceptance in principle of our ideas.

In our ideas, we've also addressed the issue you've mentioned. We have made clear in the past that in April 1996 the PNC took an important step in fulfilling their commitment. We welcomed that at the time. Last January, Chairman Arafat sent President Clinton an important letter which addressed the issue of spelling out the specific provisions of the covenant which have been canceled. So there were some important open questions as to which provisions of the covenant have been canceled, and Chairman Arafat spelled that out in response to concerns from the Israelis.

Apparently Israel still has concerns, and we have made clear that they should take those up directly with the Palestinians. So we have put forward ideas that we think are sufficient to deal with the issue of the Palestinian covenant, including taking into account our April 1996 position and the letter that we received from Chairman Arafat. If there are additional concerns the Israelis have in this area like in other areas, they would be well advised to express those concerns directly to the Palestinians.

So the point I'm making here is that we've included, to the extent we could, our expectation of what the views of both parties were. As you can imagine, after these hundreds of hours of meetings and hundreds of hours of phone calls, we're in a pretty good position to predict the views of both parties on 20-25 to 30-35 specific issues. We're well aware of their positions. So knowing all these positions, our ideas were designed to propose a compromise. That compromise involved a serious reduction in the amount of land that Palestinian leader Chairman Arafat was seeking to have referred - redeployed during the second further redeployment. So it as well dealt with what we understood to be the Israeli desires for real fighting of terrorism built in in a parallel way so as land is turned over, terrorism-fighting infrastructure is established.

That was the concept of our ideas. We took into account all the issues that we knew of and we tried to come to something that we thought would meet the urgent and real needs of both sides. As a result of that, the Palestinians said yes in principle; the Israelis have not yet been able to say yes. We are hoping that in adjusting some of the refinements that we have, which don't go to the heart of the ideas, which don't change the key principles, the Israelis will be able to be in a position to say yes. That hasn't happened yet.

We think that to the extent they have additional concerns beyond what our ideas laid out, that, if this is a peace process between two parties that signed an agreement, they should be able to talk to each other. One of the things that has been sadly missing from this process is an ability for the two sides to hear each other out, to talk about their problems, to resolve their problems. We've gotten to the point where every little problem often has to be resolved by a US mediator or the Secretary of State or something else. So if we're going to get an agreement or if we're not going to get an agreement, we still think it's important for them to talk to each other.

QUESTION: You said the Israelis still have concerns on the covenant. Does the US - presumably the US has a position on terrorism, on withdrawal, on Jerusalem - some of these positions are stated, some are deferred to further negotiations. Does the US - we know Israel has concerns or they register expressed concerns - does the US have concerns that the Palestinians - the PLO - has not done all that it should for whatever end you seek - an agreement or because you think it would be right - does the US still have concerns about the extent to which the PLO has moved on the covenant?

MR. RUBIN:We do not have a new position in this area, Barry.

QUESTION: I know you don't.

MR. RUBIN:Our existing position is that in April 1996, the PNC took an important step in fulfilling their commitment in this area. In January, Chairman Arafat sent President Clinton an important letter which addressed the issues spelling out the specific provisions of the covenant which have been canceled. In other words, the Palestinians have gone a long, long way towards meeting the concerns of the Israelis. It is our view that if the Israelis have additional concerns beyond that, they should address them directly with the Palestinians.

QUESTION: Let's take the second hurdle - extradition of terrorists. Does the US have a position whether the Palestinians should comply with the Israeli request that terrorist be extradited to Israel? People who blow up Israeli civilians, should they be extradited for trial?

MR. RUBIN:We have - I'm not going to get in a position of getting into the details of our ideas.

QUESTION: I'm sure it's a trivial matter.

MR. RUBIN:Nothing you ask is a trivial matter, Barry. What I'm suggesting to you is that the ideas that we created, the proposals that we put forward were based precisely on building an infrastructure to fight terrorism, including those who would be responsible for terrorism. So our ideas have built into them very strong provisions to deal with terrorist and suspected terrorists. Those were the ideas that the Palestinians had agreed to. If we can get on with getting this agreement agreed to and implemented, the infrastructure to fight terrorism will begin to take shape in much stronger and stronger form as soon as this agreement is reached.

So we are so anxious to see the terrorist-fighting infrastructure created, that is why we built it into the system. We want to see the terrorists stopped - those who continue to use terror to pursue their political aim. An additional way to do that is to get these ideas implemented.

QUESTION: Jamie, why do you think this face-to-face meeting at a - it appears to be a ministerial level will resolve issues the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister and the Palestinian was unable to resolve?

MR. RUBIN: It is our judgment that in the absence of a direct face-to- face discussion between the two sides, that it is not going to be possible to resolve this problem. Even if we don't resolve it as a result of such a discussion, we think that kind of a discussion is the kind of thing that should be going on. They live next to each other, and their officials should be able to meet with each other to express concerns that each of them have about their future. If that can't happen, it's hard for us to see how a peace process can ever be fully entrenched over the long term and can endure. I mean, an enduring peace process has to include contact between the important officials from each side.

QUESTION: One more on this and then onto Belarus. On this, the Knesset closes up business at the end of the month. I gather that an important member of Mr. Netanyahu's Cabinet, Mr. Sharon, goes on a longish trip towards the end of the month.

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of Mr. Sharon's travel schedule.

QUESTION: Is it your belief that the US effort to achieve a solution to this particular interim problem can go on after the Knesset is in recess and the Cabinet is all over the place? Are you going to go on after the end of July?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to state any deadline at this time, other than to tell you that we are in the end game. We have said if it becomes clear that we can't reach an agreement, we will bring our efforts to an end and provide an explanation of why no agreement was possible. That is fully our intention. But as far as when that happens, I don't intend to set any time frame for it right now, other than to tell you that it can't go on indefinitely. We're in the end game, and we will, when we think we can't reach an agreement and we've done our best - and we've certainly done a lot of work up to now - we will let you know.

QUESTION: Well, aren't you there now, basically, when you say they should talk to each other? Aren't you saying American mediation has gone about as far as it can go?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: What's the distinction here?

MR. RUBIN: The distinction is there are many issues still remaining to be discussed. Some of them we think need to be discussed between the two parties directly. There are still other issues to be discussed that we intend to continue to work on.

So if we were indicating that we were at the end of our mediating role, I can assure you that we would say it.

QUESTION: On Belarus, the Europeans have announced that they are not going to allow the President of Belarus to visit their countries any more or any other senior Belarus officials or their families. Is the US going to do something similar?

MR. RUBIN: I would expect an analogous action by us shortly, the details of which we will provide to you later today or tomorrow.

QUESTION: I thought you all were working in concert with the Europeans.

MR. RUBIN: We are.

QUESTION: But you're saying your announcement might not come until tomorrow?

MR. RUBIN: Well, it will come shortly. I don't think that everything has to happen on the same news cycle.

QUESTION: No, it's not the same news cycle; but maybe from the same script.

MR. RUBIN: Well, it is the same script, and that's why I said we would expect an analogous announcement shortly.

QUESTION: So you've announced it, haven't you? You're announcing it.

MR. RUBIN: I would expect an analogous announcement shortly.

QUESTION: And what about --

MR. RUBIN: Does that satisfy your concern that we're not operating on the same news cycle as the European Union?

QUESTION: It's not up to me to decide.

MR. RUBIN: Just checking.

QUESTION: What about when President Lukashenko wants to come for the UN General Assembly? I guess you can't bar him --

MR. RUBIN: That would traditionally not be something that's - the UN is a separate issue.

QUESTION: Luis Posada, in these New York Times articles is quoted as saying that he has a US passport, but denying that he's a US citizen. One, do you know whether Luis Posada or can you find out whether Luis Posada has a US passport? And two, is it possible to have a passport and not be a citizen?

MR. RUBIN: That would strike me as being inconsistent. The way I read the story was that he was claiming to have a passport under another name or something; that's the way I read it, but I may not have read it as carefully - it was very long and I'm operating from memory here.

QUESTION: The implication of that, that it's a false passport --

MR. RUBIN: That was the implication of the story, yes.

QUESTION: That the State Department would not give out passports under false names.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Of course not.

QUESTION: What other agency of the US Government?

MR. RUBIN: Again, the conspiracy theorists are going to continue to work issues such as these, but it's our view - and we have not had a relationship with this person in decades, and anybody who suggests otherwise is stirring the pot.

QUESTION: The body of the commando that washed up on the shores of South Korea - this is the second infiltration attempt, according to the South Koreans. Do you have anything?

MR. RUBIN: The body of what is believed to be a North Korean infiltrator was found on a South Korean beach the morning of July 12. He apparently was infiltrating or exfiltrating - still having trouble with that word, exfiltrate. I guess that means after you leave.

QUESTION: Can we get a clean sentence just for quoting, please?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. Do you want me to start over?

QUESTION: Yes, please.

MR. RUBIN: Anything else you want me to do?

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: No, just start over, just start over for now.

MR. RUBIN: Is my tie okay?

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: Three, two one. Yes, and I'll give you a copy for the written folks later. The body of what is believed to be a North Korean infiltrator was found on a South Korean beach the morning of July 12. He apparently was infiltrating or exfiltrating the ROK when he became separated from his submarine delivery vehicle and died.

The issue was raised at a previously scheduled colonel-level meeting held July 12 at Panmunjom, but the KPA representatives claimed to know nothing about the incident. This incident is still under investigation, but it does appear to be a very serious matter and yet another violation of the armistice. We strongly urge the DPRK to immediately cease such provocative acts.

QUESTION: Is there any sort of - does the State Department have any explanation as to why in recent weeks the North Koreans seem to have stepped up these infiltration attempts? Is it read as some sort of factualism within the North Korean regime?

MR. RUBIN: I think it's been our practice here to not try to divine the decision-making calculus of the North Korean Government. It's a very opaque society; it is very hard to know what motivates their leadership to take some of these unjustified and provocative and serious violations that they've taken in the past.

QUESTION: Can you talk about what this does to the North-South talks that the United States has been promoting so?

MR. RUBIN: We would certainly hope that the North Koreans would make clear their intention not to pursue these kind of provocative violations of the armistice.

Certainly, we want to see dialogue between the North and the South. We want to see the four-party talks go forward; and they will go forward in a much improved climate in the absence of these provocative actions.

QUESTION: Does it have any affect on talks on KEDO?

MR. RUBIN: We will continue to pursue and provide, pursuant to the agreement, the necessary heavy fuel oil and arrangements for financing the light water reactor, the proliferation - resistant reactor, because we think it's in our national interest to do so. We fully expect the North Koreans to live up to their share of the bargain.

QUESTION: Could these violations perhaps be the reason for the postponement of the Honolulu working group meeting?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that, but I would doubt it.

QUESTION: Just one more - back to Russia --

QUESTION: Just one more - Charles Kartman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, he is to be appointed as special envoy. Where does the appointment stand in Congress?

MR. RUBIN: I believe he's got a confirmation hearing coming up.

QUESTION: Do we know when that's coming up?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get that date for you. It's up to the Senate to tell you exactly when its hearings are.

QUESTION: An expatriate Russian former military intelligence officer named (inaudible)

MR. RUBIN: Did Mr. McCurry address this last week?

QUESTION: I did not hear about this; I wouldn't be surprised.

MR. RUBIN: This is the defector?

QUESTION: Yes, it's the defector who's basically saying don't give money to the Russian Government because it's going to line the pockets of the mob which already controls the government. But more relevant to the US, this man has said that the Russian military intelligence is working against the US in this country in various ways. Is this preposterous or what?

MR. RUBIN: I believe this author is in the process of talking about this in connection with the sale of a book. So let me just say that I refer to the comments of Mr. McCurry and I agree with them, from last week.

QUESTION: All right, whatever those were.

(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)


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