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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #94, 98-08-03

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


925

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Monday, August 3, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

STATEMENT
1		Diversity Immigrant Visa Program

SERBIA 1-4 Additional refugees/ mediator for ethnic Albanians/ access to diplomatic observer/ Ambassador Hill's meeting/US assessment/negotiations/ use of force/ humanitarian catastrophe

COLOMBIA 4 President-elect Pastrana meeting with Secretary Albright

CONGO 5 Overnight shooting/FM whereabouts/curfew/ security checkpoints

INDIA/PAKISTAN 5,6,7,12 Killings of civilians/ fighting / sanctions/ Secy's and Deputy Talbott's discussions

CARIBBEAN 7-9 Castro visit to the region

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 9-10 AmCit Students departure / extradition status / visitors

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 14-15 Sanctions/twelve-month waiver by congress/humanitarian collapse 10-11,15 Suspend negotiations/ proposals on table/ 13 face-to-face discussions

CYPRUS 13-14 Court decision /negotiations/ US views

PHILIPPINES 15 Military vessels /Nuclear weapons/Secretary's meeting with President Estrada/ US policy


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #94

MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1998, 1:10 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: I am shocked, I am shocked - there is gambling going on here.

Today is Monday. Welcome to the State Department briefing. We have one statement on the visa lottery issues that we'll be providing after the briefing - the so-called Diversity Immigrant Visa Program. With that statement, let me turn to one of our key members of the Associated Press - let's go far left, Mr. Schweid.

QUESTION: Jamie, the Serbs are on the move, which probably doesn't surprise the State Department, and at one or two towns now have been taken; tens of thousands of additional refugees - two questions, please. The obvious - how do you ever expect to get Milosevic to hold his fire? Is this possibly a play to be in the best position to negotiate? And what happened to that drive to find a mediator for the ethnic Albanians? Apparently he doesn't even want the job - one of the possible guys.

MR. RUBIN: With respect to the Serb offensive, it is correct that Serb security forces conducted significant operations in at least three separate regions of Kosovo over the weekend. Their claims on Friday are obviously nonsense - that the offensive had stopped. The fiercest fighting was in the Decani-Djakovica area, but there were also clashes between Serb forces and the Kosovar Albanian forces in the Drenica and Malisevo regions. We have reports that tanks and artillery were involved in the attacks in Drenica, including clashes along the Pristina-Pec highway.

The key point right now is that the actions of the Serbs are creating the possibility of a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo. We condemn and deplore the Serb offensive. Our first task right now is to coordinate closely with international agencies on steps that can be taken to improve the situation on the ground. We have to get access to the displaced persons. There are problems in that effort, and we are making it clear to the Serbs that access must be guaranteed for both diplomatic observers and humanitarian agencies.

After Ambassador Hill's meeting last week on Friday with President Milosevic, access did improve; but it is not sufficient. For example, over the weekend, diplomatic observers and relief agencies reached persons displaced from Malisevo and Ambassador Hill met today with persons who had fled Orahovac. The second step is to get these people to safe locations. They are quite understandably very uncomfortable about the prospect of returning to their homes where the Serbs have taken these outrageous actions.

Ambassador Hill, with observers, will visit Orahovac and Malisevo and other locations to see what must be done to allow persons to return home. President Milosevic has promised that he will create conditions in which those displaced can return home; and we will hold him to that promise. I expect Ambassador Hill to be in touch with Milosevic in the coming days.

With respect to the question of the Kosovar Albanian executive group, that work is going on. Ambassador Hill is in Pristina today and when I spoke to him, he has been working and trying to arrange that process. We are not surprised there are different words coming out of different people's mouths in Pristina with respect to what they will or won't do. But we still believe there has been an agreement in principle. The hard part is now to nail down exactly how the all-party executive will work. That is what Ambassador Hill is doing in Kosovo.

QUESTION: When you say agreement in principle, agreement in principle that there will be --

MR. RUBIN: An all-party executive.

QUESTION: -- and that there will be a mediator, essentially, or a new prime minister. There have been various accounts that Prime Minister Hajriozi doesn't care to live in Yugoslavia; so apparently, you're looking for a successor. And he would also be the chief mediator, by most accounts. The names keep changing and besides, nobody has said yes yet; have they?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I am not underplaying the difficulty of working this out; on the contrary, I think I've been very clear that one of the big problems on the negotiating front has been to get a credible, organized process built around Dr. Rugova. We did have an agreement in principle last week from the various officials that they wanted to create this all-party executive. We are working on it. We want it to be Pristina-based, and that continues to be our view.

There are difficulties in working out these arrangements, but that's what Ambassador Hill is doing right now. We certainly believe that one of the difficulties - and the primary difficulty - is a direct result of the Serb offensive. It is very hard for the Albanian side to want to organize itself in a negotiating context at the very time the Serb side is conducting these offensives that are displacing tens of thousands of people.

QUESTION: Looking also - last point, if I could. What is the State Department's assessment of Milosevic's - you said last week you can't creep into his brain nor would you like to live there. But what is the US assessment? One account is that he's trying to gain maximum advantage before negotiations. You just spoke in terms of how difficult it is for the Albanians to negotiate while there's an offensive. Those two contradict each other, of course. Is there any thinking here of what he is up to - besides killing people?

MR. RUBIN: Other than causing the potential humanitarian catastrophe, the rest is speculation, obviously. I'm not saying that the relevant officials aren't speculating as to what his motivations are - and they are speculating - my point is that if he thinks it is improving his negotiating standpoint to have taken these offensives, he's sadly mistaken; because it has made it harder for there to be a negotiation. You can't improve your negotiating posture if there isn't a negotiation.

We believe that Milosevic is coming to understand over recent weeks that there has to be a negotiation in order for the situation to be rectified in the best interests of Yugoslavia as well as the Kosovar Albanians. In short, it's fully possible that Milosevic is shooting himself in the foot again - acting tactically in contradiction to what his stated objectives are. But again, it's not very useful for us to try to speculate what has motivated this person. What's important is to demand access for the international organizations; to get the access so that the humanitarian catastrophe that's threatening doesn't occur; and to make clear that this can only be solved through negotiations.

Q: Jamie, at what point does NATO live up to its threat to intervene in this, what is clearly a catastrophe? I mean your lack of access to information probably is the reason you're downplaying it, but I don't think there's any analysis that it's not already become a catastrophe.

MR. RUBIN: The living conditions are clearly deplorable in the cases where our diplomatic observers got access to the displaced persons from Malisevo, for example - holed up in forests surrounding the town. And let me very clear, it is deplorable now. What I'm talking about is the humanitarian catastrophe that could occur in a matter of weeks if we don't get the aid to the people who are in desperate need.

With respect to NATO, let me say this - and I hope President Milosevic understands this. NATO has now approved a range of contingency plans for the use of military force in this regard. The Secretary General has requested further refinement of those initially approved plans that were approved in the recent days and that effort is continuing apace; and we would expect that work to further refine the options to be done very, very quickly.

QUESTION: NATO has approved a number of things they might be willing to do militarily. Can you tell us - give us any idea what the range of those things are?

MR. RUBIN: I don't care to get into the job of detailing military planning - that is not for us here at the State Department. I think it's important to note that a set of contingency plans has now been approved by NATO, and that is an important development. But further refinement is ongoing.

With respect to what will generate a decision, again, that is a prerogative for the Commander-in-Chief and the other political leaders of the NATO alliance. I can say this - the two factors that have obviously made it justified for NATO to go about doing its planning are getting worse; and that is the fact that the refugee situation and the internally displaced situation are worse - that is humanitarian concerns and the humanitarian situation is worse. As the fighting continues, the risk of causing instability in the region also becomes greater. What will trigger a decision by the decision-makers and the political leaders I do not care to speculate. The factors that made us begin this planning continue and, as I indicated, if there is a humanitarian catastrophe, that would be quite important. The NATO contingency plans have now been approved; there is some further refinement; and that's the situation - that's where we are.

QUESTION: Is there any thought of convening a Contact Group meeting to talk over the options?

MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard that is in the works. Again, the vehicle for this discussion of the options has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the North Atlantic Council.

QUESTION: I'm talking about the political decisions.

MR. RUBIN: I have not heard. I wouldn't presume that the fact there isn't a Contact Group meeting necessarily means that is a necessary prerequisite for decision-making; other than to say that we've been in touch with the Contact Group on the negotiating front. Ambassador Hill has been working with his Russian counterparts and briefing them in Belgrade and Pristina about what he's been doing. But I'm not aware of a Contact Group meeting scheduled at this time.

QUESTION: Is there unity among the countries that are trying to manage this conflict? In other words, is Russia on board for all these military options?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't think it will come as any surprise to you that we've long known the Russians have not supported that option.

QUESTION: Another topic, another issue - I understand that the president- elect of Colombia, Mr. Pastrana was here to meet with Mrs. Albright. Were you present, Jamie? Do you have anything you can report from those meetings? And how much longer will they go on?

MR. RUBIN: President-elect Pastrana is visiting the Department today to meet with presidential advisor McLarty and to attend an inter-agency meeting chaired by Under Secretary Pickering to discuss the entire range of US-Colombian bilateral relations. Secretary Albright is scheduled to host a luncheon in his honor. With respect to the meetings that he held at the White House, I expect there to be a briefing later this afternoon, and would rather leave those questions to the White House on the subject of what transpired with the Administration with the President of Colombia.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. RUBIN: Do you want to go back to Kosovo?

QUESTION: I think you're saying - is it correct to assume, then, that NATO military action is closer since Milosevic lied and broke his promise and sent thousands of refugee? Is it closer now than it was, say, on Thursday?

MR. RUBIN: I am not going to be in a position to write leads for your stories.

QUESTION: If your intention is to warn Milosevic then --

MR. RUBIN: I've made that clear; I've told you the state of play. The state of play is different, as stated publicly today, than it was last week. The decision to use force, i.e., the ultimate being close to using force and using it, is a subject that I am not going to entertain at this point, because it's far above my pay grade.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on events in the Congo? Several high- ranking Cabinet ministers, including the Foreign Minister seem to have fled to Johannesburg.

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I don't have information of the whereabouts of the Foreign Minister. There was shooting in Kinshasa overnight, mostly in the vicinity of two military camps -- Camp Kokolo and Camp Tshatshi. The shooting involved both light weapons and mortars. Sporadic fighting continued today.

Based on initial reports from our embassy, the clashes appear to pit Tutsi elements of the Congolese forces against non-Tutsi elements. The clashes follow the departure last week of Rwandan forces, again mostly Tutsi, from the Congo. We do not know precisely what incident provoked last night's clashes.

The Interior Ministry has announced a curfew of 6:00 p.m.; access to the airport is currently blocked; additional security checkpoints have been established in the city. Military commanders in two cities in Eastern Congo - Goma and Bukavu -- have announced that their forces no longer respect the authority of the Kabila Government. Although we have only sketchy information from these locations, they are reported to be calm.

American citizens appear to be safe at this time. We've issued a warden message through the embassy in Kinshasa. Our general view is that we are trying to gather further information. It's tricky to get accurate, real- time information from that part of the world. We urge all sides to show restraint and to seek a non-violent resolution of their differences.

QUESTION: Has there been an attempt by our ambassador to meet with Kabila?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of such a meeting. I think initially their work was primarily to try to make sure that during a tense moment like this the American citizens receive their warden message, and we tried to make sure there was no problem in that area. If I get information about a subsequent meeting by our ambassador, I will let you know.

QUESTION: Is the State Department keeping track of the violence that is going on between India and Pakistan? And does the United States play any role in trying to mediate an end to that?

MR. RUBIN: From Thursday through Saturday, artillery and small arms exchanges across the line of control separating Kashmir intensified, reportedly killing dozens of people -- many of them civilians. Sunday and today, however, the fighting tapered off significantly. There are firing incidents along the line of control almost daily during the summer, but the recent exchanges were particularly intense. Adding to the tensions are continued killings of civilians inside Kashmir and now in the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. We condemn these acts of terrorism.

The volatility of Kashmir is a stark reminder of the pressing need for India and Pakistan to resolve their differences. This is particularly true now, following the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in which have significantly raised the stakes in their disputes. We have made clear to both sides in the past that they should refrain from provocative actions as well as provocative rhetoric. I would expect those messages to be sent -- most recently in response to those fightings - very shortly.

We urge the two countries to resume the senior-level dialogue as soon as possible, and to approach these talks imaginatively and constructively. We are willing to assist the parties in this process at the request of both parties; we don't offer to mediate unless requested by both sides.

QUESTION: You said messages have been sent - someone is on his way or --

MR. RUBIN: I expect it to be done shortly. If it hasn't occurred already.

QUESTION: Well if you don't want to announce --

MR. RUBIN: I just don't know, Barry.

QUESTION: But you mean physically will be delivered.

MR. RUBIN: No, no, I'm talking about a diplomatic message from our government to the Indian and Pakistani Governments, not a new trip or a new envoy or anything.

QUESTION: Not the Secretary of State or anything?

MR. RUBIN: No. I'm talking about a message - government-to-government message which either has occurred or will occur shortly.

QUESTION: Jamie, the situation appears to be deteriorating with the bad meeting in Colombo between the two leaders; now the fighting intensifying in Kashmir. And as you said, given the background of all of this, isn't your concern raised even higher than it was after the tests now? Do you see things deteriorating as they appear to be or is not --

MR. RUBIN: I don't know that I would agree with the characterization of an across-the-board deterioration. Clearly, the meetings were not fully successful and at the - in Sri Lanka, I guess they were; but, we have been in touch with both the Indians and the Pakistanis in a very intense discussion in recent weeks. Secretary Albright had some opportunity to do that on her trip, and obviously Deputy Secretary Talbott has gone through extensive discussions with the two sides. He's going to continue to do that, and there are additional meetings planned in the coming weeks. So that is the diplomatic effort that we're doing, and we believe there is enough reason for optimism to continue working on it. That doesn't mean that we're likely to see a breakthrough by any stretch of the imagination, but we're working the problem.

With respect to the fighting, I think what I - the information I've received is that it tends to go up and down at this time of year. This was a particularly intense outburst of fighting with a particularly tragic loss of life, but it has calmed down today and yesterday.

QUESTION: Do you see one side or the other being more inflexible than the other? I mean, it seems like --

MR. RUBIN: At this point, I haven't gotten the kind of report from Deputy Secretary Talbott that would encourage me to make that kind of a judgment.

QUESTION: President Castro has been touring the Caribbean, and one of his objectives, not surprisingly, has been to stir up anti-Americanism. Do you have any observations on his travel?

MR. RUBIN: I needed a glass of water for that one.

Let me start by pointing out that at this very moment that Castro is tooling around the Caribbean, I understand the WHO is trying to put together an appeal to get food to the people of Cuba. Perhaps Castro would show a little greater interest in his people if he spent some of the money and funds and interest of his travel on the people who need food in Cuba because of the failed system that he leads.

With respect to the broader point on the Caribbean, it is our strong view - and we have made it clear to the nations of the Caribbean - that governments which engage with Cuba ought to condition such engagement on fundamental systematic change by the Cuban Government and respect for human rights.

While welcoming Fidel Castro may give some the impression of condoning his communist regime and dismal human rights record, we expect that our Caribbean friends, whose systems are fundamentally different from Cuba, are urging the Cuban leader to take concrete steps towards democracy, human rights and a free economy.

With respect to the claim that we have failed to isolate Cuba, let me simply point out Castro's system is isolated. A summit meeting of the remaining Marxist, Lenin estates could be held in a telephone booth. This man is isolated, no matter what he says to the contrary. Cuba is not listening to the message of others that the time has come for fundamental change. Fidel Castro and his government are hearing a more concerted message from others than ever before - whether it's the leaders in the Caribbean, whether it's the European countries, whether it's His Holiness the Pope, whoever it is are telling Castro that it's time to permit his people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms and economic prosperity that they deserve and that so many other countries in the region now have.

There may still be places Castro can visit and receive a public welcome, but not one nation has expressed an interest in adopting Castro's system no matter how much proselytizing he does. We note that wherever he goes, private citizens protest the visit. So I would hardly call it a victory tour.

QUESTION: He's making gains isn't he Jamie? I mean, a few weeks ago, this Administration, like its predecessor months ago, years ago, for a number of years has been able to say he's alone, he's isolated.

MR. RUBIN: He is.

QUESTION: He has no support in Latin America or the Caribbean?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: At all.

MR. RUBIN: For his basic objectives.

QUESTION: It looks like he can squeeze a couple of people into that telephone booth with him, though, doesn't it?

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: No, on the contrary.

QUESTION: Now you're saying nobody supports his policies. But isn't he on a fairly successful offensive now?

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, on the contrary. You have to put yourself in the mind of the person trying to do the proselytizing. He's trying to convince the world that Cuba's great; that you should all emulate my terrific Marxist-Leninist system. What I'm telling you is that everyone is basically saying no. To have a repeated message that you are wrong and everyone else is right, means that you are isolated.

With respect to what is being said to him, our objective was to make sure that the countries of the world that dealt with Cuba pounded home the message that human rights and economic freedoms need to come to the people of Cuba. Since in recent years, that message has been spoken more loudly by every visitor to Cuba and by every meeting that Castro has abroad. Can he still fly around and say that he's still there - look, I'm still here? Of course he can. But the question is whether his message is being well received and whether he's receiving from others support or condemnation for his policies. And he continues to receive pressure on the human rights and economic freedom front.

QUESTION: Jamie, does it not outrage the government of the United States that Fidel Castro was first received in Grenada, but also received some kind of commendation, some kind of plaque was commemorated for those Cubans that died at the airport, fighting US Marines?

MR. RUBIN: I didn't see that particular reference. But let me say this - we have good relations with the government of Grenada, and take Prime Minister Mitchell at his word that his government does not intend the Castro visit as a rebuke to us.

QUESTION: Jamie, -- (inaudible) - today's meeting, and it hasn't ended yet, between Israel and the Palestinians?

QUESTION: One more on this - did the United States ask either the governments of Jamaica or Grenada not to receive Castro?

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check; I don't know the answer to that.

QUESTION: I'd like to stay in the Caribbean. What's the latest on the situation in St. Kitts with Mr. Miller?

MR. RUBIN: The situation is quiet. The government of St. Kitts Nevis continues to cooperate closely with us. Department of State security and consular personnel remain on the island to assist the students. We understand that some of 50 of the 280-odd students plan to leave by the end of the semester, which I guess is on August 15, or have already left. So we're continuing to work with them, and trying to accelerate the extradition of this wanted criminal.

QUESTION: I've heard reports that - I don't know if you call him the attorney general or the leading legal person in St. Kitts is here in Washington. Do you know if that's true; and if so, is he meeting --

MR. RUBIN: I believe there was a high-level visit over the weekend; I'll have to get you the name. I believe there was, yes.

QUESTION: And any result of that meeting?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the work is continuing to work with them on accelerating the extradition and meanwhile protecting the American citizens who have been threatened.

QUESTION: Are they being - are they reluctant to extradite?

MR. RUBIN: At this point, they have their own legal system, and we are working with them on that. I'd rather not characterize their views for them.

QUESTION: What about the Caribbean regional security system personnel, about which you spoke last week - the idea of sending Caribbean police officers to St. Kitts in view of the problem there?

MR. RUBIN: Did I speak about that? I don't remember that.

QUESTION: In the press release of last Thursday.

MR. RUBIN: Ah, thank you.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Let me try to get you some more information on that, George.

QUESTION: Jamie, does the US want the Palestinian-Israeli talks --

MR. RUBIN: Wait, wait, he wants to stay in the region, but we will get to that region. I'm ready for that.

QUESTION: No, that's all right; there are roughly 80 countries in that region.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Well, let's see how far a field he --

QUESTION: The Trinidad, Tobago circus --

MR. RUBIN: -- how far a field he stretches.

QUESTION: No, still on St. Kitts.

MR. RUBIN: On St. Kitts; well, that's the same island.

QUESTION: This may be the same man who was here over the weekend, but the man who's representing the United States in the extradition case told us on Friday that things had accelerated; that the extradition itself looks more likely now in the next couple weeks.

MR. RUBIN: I have no information on the exact status of the request, other than to say that we want it to move as quickly as possible.

QUESTION: Okay, even before today's meeting -- and there are no reports yet on how well or badly it may be going, doing - the Palestinians were saying that this is it, if this meeting isn't productive, it's all over. I wondered if the US thought this was the time to suspend negotiations or to keep trying. Do you have a view? The Israelis say there's progress being made.

MR. RUBIN: It's my understanding that there were additional meetings today that may have recently completed. I haven't received my read-out through the various channels that I get such read-outs. But let me say the following, as to our view. We would like to see the negotiators put specific proposals on the table. We think they should deal with each other with respect and confidentiality and a greater sense of urgency and meet intensively so that they can make sure they've done everything they can to try to reach an agreement. They also, as we've said before, need to make tough decisions. But we want specific proposals on the table that can be dealt with.

Obviously, from our view, a breakthrough is better than a breakdown; and we believe it is still possible, although I cannot predict how likely, that it is still possible to achieve a breakthrough. The parties are moving closer to agreement in recent weeks. I'm not going to say that it's a result of the meetings over the last couple of days.

If they put concrete proposals forward, we believe it should be possible to reach an agreement. That's why we think it's so important for specific proposals to be put down on the issues that they are focused on.

QUESTION: Very clear statement, but it doesn't - it can be read either way, in a sense. In other words, if these negotiations that are ongoing now are not the sort with substantive, clear-cut proposals, would the United States like to see them suspend and regroup; or would you rather they sit there hoping that maybe out of these meetings will evolve the kind of negotiations you prefer to see?

MR. RUBIN: We will continue to make our assessment of the state of play, based on the briefings that we have and what we think is going on. As I indicated, we have not yet received a read-out of this most recent meeting. So I would like to simply repeat that it is our view that now is the time for a sense of urgency and for specific proposals to be put on the table. If that's done, we believe there is a chance that an agreement can be reached - a strong chance. That should be the objective of both sides.

QUESTION: Jamie, there is a specific set of proposals on the table. It's the American proposal which was made to both sides in early May. That, according to the State Department, has been accepted in principle by the Palestinians. So what you seem to be saying is that the Israelis, if they don't like it, should make a specific proposal that they haven't made.

MR. RUBIN: No, that's not what I'm saying. I try to do the best I can in the public forum to talk about confidential discussions and what the nature of them are; and I'll try to do the best I can, but it's not easy.

We put down a set of ideas that, taken together, met the objective of the four-part agenda the Secretary arranged in the fall of last year. That dealt with the further redeployment the size of it, the timing of it, the question of further security steps the Palestinians must and should take, the question of the time-out and the question of how to move to final status. Our ideas, which are not one proposal, per se, across the board, are a set of ideas that can meet the test of all those objectives. That's what Secretary Albright did.

In the course of our discussions in recent weeks and months, we've refined those ideas while sticking with the essential elements of them on the key and major components, but refining them. These are very complex negotiations. For those of you who have ever tried to work their way through the Oslo accords, they're very detailed. So there are a lot of details that go with it. What we're talking about here is specific concrete proposals to refine the ideas so that an agreement can be struck -- not some brand new separate proposal.

QUESTION: But Jamie, I was left with the same impression as Jim - I mean there's one side --

MR. RUBIN: I think I really tried to answer Jim's question as best as I can.

QUESTION: Yes, well, I was left with the same impression in that there's one side that should be making proposals now, and that's the Israelis. So I was left with the impression - correct me if I'm wrong - that you all were saying that the Israelis are stalling at the negotiating table and not producing any proposals.

MR. RUBIN: No, I'm saying to you that refining a set of ideas --

QUESTION: What are refinements?

MR. RUBIN: Refinements are not - they're details. But as you know, in this business between Israelis and Palestinians, sometimes details can be extremely important. So one shouldn't assume that there was one American proposal with every detail spelled out and that's it. There have been key elements of these proposals, and I think most of you are familiar - at least think you're familiar with most of the key elements; and what I'm saying to you is that refinements are something that ought to happen. But to the extent we are stalled, the way to get out of that is for specific proposals to be placed on the table.

QUESTION: Proposals from both sides?

MR. RUBIN: That's all I'm prepared to say.

QUESTION: Has the Secretary been on the phone again with any of the --

MR. RUBIN: Not today, to my knowledge.

QUESTION: Jamie, for quite a while now you've said that it's up to the parties to decide; they have to be the ones to make the tough decisions and bring themselves to the table. In light of the Palestinians saying now that they're ready to walk away and they're threatening to do so, should they make that decision, would it change the US role? I know that you've been saying that you want to try to let them make this decision and not insert yourself in a high profile way, but would it bring a sense of urgency to the United States and would you change your lower profile?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to - I understand the question. I'm not going to preview exactly what we would do under various hypothetical cases, but I can say that it would certainly be important if the Palestinians didn't think there was anything more to talk about. It is our view, based on our understanding and our daily read-outs, that the right thing to do is for specific proposals to be put down so that the parties can overcome the concerns that they've had. If the meetings don't yield those specific proposals and we're in a situation days from now where there is a view that additional meetings shouldn't be held, it will depend on where they are in the substance for us to make a judgment what we do next.

We have argued for face-to-face discussions because we thought the issues lent themselves to face-to-face discussions; and we do believe the parties are moving closer to an agreement. If concrete specific proposals were put down with respect to the US ideas, we believe it should be possible to reach an agreement. If they cannot, we will be forced to conclude that no further progress is possible along these lines and will say so publicly; but we are not at that point yet.

QUESTION: I just want to be clear - if the Palestinians walk away from this and it's continued to spiral down into the stalemate, would the US continue in its lower-profile role and just let things spiral out?

MR. RUBIN: Again, that will depend on what the substance is. We're going to be in touch with them to try to assess the substantive development and to see whether they're continuing to get closer to agreement. I have told you before, and the Secretary has made clear, that the reason why we want to continue to have them talk is because we were narrowing the gaps. If that process stops, we'd be in a different position and then we would make our decisions accordingly.

QUESTION: Jamie, you said in answer to Barry's question that she hadn't talked to the Prime Minister today or been in contact. Can we go over the last ten-day period when she's been --

MR. RUBIN: I don't have every phone call from the trip, but I don't think there has been the kind of flurry of phone calls over the last ten days as there were the ten days before that.

QUESTION: And that goes for both Chairman Arafat as well as --

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: On Cyprus, there is a decision by the European Court of Justice under which Turkey has to pay compensations to a Cypriot woman. Because of this decision, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, announced that he will not plan to meet with anyone and discuss the Cyprus problem. Since May, when Mr. Denktash refused to restart the direct talks when Mr. Holbrooke was there, this is another precondition by the Turkish-Cypriot leader. How does the US view this incident; and what's your prediction for the future of the peace process there?

MR. RUBIN: We're aware of the court decision and Turkish-Cypriot statements about the court decision. With respect to the decision, I have no particular comment that's new. As far as what Mr. Denktash has said about the decision, I think it's up to him to clarify his remarks; it's not up to us to describe them. We would like to underline the need to begin a process that addresses the full range of issues in a Cyprus settlement. We hope the parties can engage in a process that leads to negotiations with the previously stated goal.

So I have no comment on what Mr. Denktash has said about the decision, and he's really the one who ought to explain it.

QUESTION: But aren't you saying whatever the decision, the negotiations should proceed? Without commenting on his response - reaction --

MR. RUBIN: We want to continue to work on the Turkish-Cypriot -- we want to continue to work on this issue and we want to continue to make progress; that is what we want to see happen. We think a process needs to be begun that addresses the full range of issues in a Cyprus settlement. That's what we've been doing; that's what Ambassador Holbrooke has been doing; and that's what Ambassador Miller has been doing.

QUESTION: This is getting back to the cross-border shelling between India and Pakistan over the weekend. Some of our sources have speculated to us that Pakistan especially is being made very desperate now by the impact of our sanctions on its economy. Congress is considering a 12-month waiver --

MR. RUBIN: Who - our sources - who?

QUESTION: I'm with Radio-Free Asia.

MR. RUBIN: All right. So your sources --

QUESTION: Our sources are speculating to us that Pakistan is being driven to irrational actions because of its economy suffering from our sanctions. Congress is considering a 12-month waiver on our sanctions. Do you foresee any way that that process could be speeded up in order to take some of the pressure off?

MR. RUBIN: Let me address those one at a time. Number one, on the sanctions, we intend to continue to pursue the sanctions policy that was a result of Pakistan's decision to test. We never wanted to see the sanctions destroy the Pakistani economy, and we're very cognizant of the state of their economy. We are not seeking, nor I believe is Congress proposing, a 12-month waiver across the board of all sanctions. We do want to see greater flexibility provided to the Executive Branch so that we're in a position to waive, in whole or in part, certain of the sanctions if, and only if, there is progress made on the steps that we want to see in the area of arms control -- and that is, in principle, the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban and commitments not to exacerbate the arms race.

To the extent that legislation is designed to give us flexibility to respond to changes by India and Pakistan, by waiving, in whole or in part, sanctions, we support that as a matter of flexibility; but we are not there yet. In the meantime, we will continue to implement the Glenn Amendment and other laws with an eye towards making sure there is no humanitarian collapse as a result of these sanctions. But the sanctions are in place; I don't believe Congress is seeking to eliminate them for the next 12 months. We, the Administration, would like to see flexibility so that we can waive them, in whole or in part, in response to changes and developments in the field.

QUESTION: President Estrada of the Philippines is saying that Secretary Albright told him that any vessels - military vessels - dispatched to the Philippines by the United States would not carry nuclear weapons.

MR. RUBIN: Nothing has changed in our policy. We've normally made clear that we don't confirm or deny the presence of or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines or aircraft. The Secretary addressed this issue publicly following her meeting with President Estrada; and it's also important to point out that the Bush Administration announced that it is general US policy not to deploy nuclear weapons aboard surface ships, attack submarines and naval aircraft. However, we do not discuss the presence or absence of nuclear weapons aboard specific ships, submarines or aircraft.

QUESTION: Did she restate the Bush Administration -

MR. RUBIN: She did not make any change in the existing policy.

MR. RUBIN: I don't know what exact words she used - I just don't know what words she used.

QUESTION: Did she by implication, by inference or by actual assertion say, you remember the Bush Administration policy? That still stands.

MR. RUBIN: I think that the intention of the Secretary, although I wasn't there, was to reiterate standing US policy on the subject, and I believe she did so.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:55 P.M.)


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