U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #105, 98-09-10
From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>
562
U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing
I N D E X
Thursday, September 10, 1998
Briefer: James P. Rubin
STATEMENTS
1 Swearing in of Admiral William Crowe as Chairman of
Accountability Review Boards
1 US to Sign Rotterdam Convention on Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade
NORTH KOREA
2,6 Results of US-DPRK Talks/Series of Talks Set Up
3 Delivery of Heavy Fuel Oil
3,5-6 Provision of Light Water Reactors by KEDO
3,9 World Food Program Appeal/Additional Food Aid
3-4 Assessment of Recent Missile Test/Possibility of Satellite
Launch
4 Dates For the Resumption of Four-Party Talks
4-5 Assessment of Congressional Support for Funding for Fuel
Oil/Food Aid
RUSSIA
6-7 President Yeltsin's Intention to Nominate Foreign Minister
Primakov for Prime Minister
6,7,8 Secretary Albright's Conversation with Foreign Minister
Primakov Today
SERBIA (Kosovo)
7-8 Situation on the Ground/Humanitarian Situation/Internally
Displaced Persons
8-9 European Union Ban on Landing by Yugoslav Airliners
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #105
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1998, 1:20 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. I have a
few announcements which I will try to put forward in some reasonable order.
Let me start with an announcement about Secretary Albright's swearing in of
the chairman of the Accountability Review Board.
Yesterday Secretary of State Albright swore in Admiral William Crowe as
chairman of two accountability review boards charged with investigations of
the August 7 bombings of Embassy Nairobi and Embassy Dar Es Salaam. Under
the provisions of existing law, the Secretary appoints such boards wherever
there is loss of life, serious injury or significant destruction of
property.
The two boards chaired by Admiral Crowe will examine the facts and
circumstances surrounding the Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam bombings and will
submit written findings on several issues which this statement will
indicate, including the extent to which the incidents were security
related; whether the security systems and security procedures were
adequate; whether the systems and procedures were properly implemented; and
the impact of intelligence and information availability. The boards'
reports to the Secretary will include the findings and any recommendations
and any personnel recommendations.
Once formed - and it will take a few more days to form the boards - they
will present their findings to the Secretary in 60 days. Each board will
consist, in addition to Admiral Crowe as chairman, of four members and an
executive secretary. We've been in touch with several respected former
officials and others and we expect to be able to have the full boards in
place in a matter of days.
QUESTION: 60 days from when?
MR. RUBIN: From the time it's fully formed. Right now we only have the
chairman. When we have the fully formed Accountability Review Board, we'll
let you know.
We also have a statement on the first worldwide agreement to protect human
health and the environment against risks from toxic chemicals - you can
stop writing, George. The United States will sign the Convention on Prior
Informed Consent for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in
international trade tomorrow in Rotterdam. That statement will be put out
and we will have some Q&A available for you.
Now, with respect to North Korea, I do have an important announcement. As a
result of seven meetings in late August and early September, our negotiators
in New York obtained important commitments from their North Korean
counterparts on a range of issues of major concern to the United States, to
our allies in South Korea and Japan, and to everyone in the region.
Our objectives in those talks were to obtain from the North Koreans
concrete steps to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and to insure that
the DPRK continues to abide by all of the terms of the agreed framework.
Working closely with our allies, we sought to remove threats to that agreed
framework - the Nuclear Framework Agreement - and to begin to clarify
certain North Korean underground construction activity of concern to us; to
raise our deep concerns over the missile tests; and to restart talks on the
North Korean's missile program. We made progress on each of our goals.
The North Koreans have agreed to continue the discussion which began in New
York about our concerns with respect to the nature of certain suspicious
underground construction in North Korea. We made clear during those talks
that verbal assurances will not be sufficient to meet our concerns. We
intend to press for access to clarify the nature of suspect construction;
and we have made the North Koreans aware that access will be necessary if
our concerns are to be clarified.
On the missile front, the DPRK has agreed to resume missile talks on
October 1, which will allow us to press strongly our concerns about their
production, development and export of missiles as well as their further
testing, heightened by the recent launch of a ballistic missile by North
Korea. We have made and will continue to make clear to the North Koreans
that such a missile launch should not be repeated.
Again, on the nuclear side, the DPRK will resume the canning of remaining
spent fuel rods starting in mid-September. This canning, which has not
taken place for several months is a North Korean obligation under the
agreed framework, and is to be completed without further delay.
In the area of our long-term negotiations, the North Korean delegation has
agreed to attend a third plenary of the four-party talks in October. And
finally, in the negotiating sphere, the DPRK has agreed to restart talks on
steps they need to take in order to be removed from the U.S. list of state
sponsors of terrorism.
In short, we have set up a series of negotiations based on the principle of
getting access and information and resolving the concerns we have both in
the nuclear area and the missile area. These do not resolve concerns, but
they set up a framework by which we wish to see those concerns resolved. We
have no illusions about the difficulty of dealing with the North Korean
Government and we do not trust North Korea. But we have a system in
place now - a series of talks - in which our concerns on the nuclear
side and the missile side can be addressed if the North Koreans so
choose.
With respect to our commitments, what we did is reiterate our determination
to complete the delivery of the remaining 284,000 metric tons of heavy fuel
oil planned for this year - that is, 1998. We also reaffirmed that the
North Korean side would be provided two light water reactors by KEDO - the
Korean Energy Development Organization - in accordance with the agreed
framework.
Throughout this process we worked very closely with our South Korean and
Japanese allies, and we also consulted very closely with Congress and we
will continue to consult with the South Korean and Japanese allies and
friends as we go through this extensive discussion.
QUESTION: We haven't asked in a while about contributions to support the
energy program. Where do things stand now?
MR. RUBIN: We believe that with the combination of consultation with
Congress and executive authority, that we will be able to provide the
necessary heavy fuel oil to meet that 284,000 metric tons that I mentioned
this year.
QUESTION: So the commitment means one way or another they're going to get
what they --
MR. RUBIN: That is what we - we are working with Congress; there have
been a lot of consultations; there's various waiver authorities that have
been discussed with Congress. But we believe we have a program that will
enable that heavy fuel oil to be provided this year.
QUESTION: Food aid - what can you say about food aid to North Korea,
please?
MR. RUBIN: With respect to food aid, as you know, for some time it has
been our view that the humanitarian suffering of the people of North Korea -
the children and the women who are suffering so dramatically from their
food shortages - is something that we should continue to pursue regardless
of our differences in other areas - our very serious differences.
We have important humanitarian objectives in assisting the international
community and preventing a famine in North Korea. We provide food solely on
humanitarian grounds. As you know, earlier this year the World Food Program
put forward an appeal, I believe in the realm of 650,000 tons. We have
previously indicated a desire -- we have previously offered 200,000 metric
tons of food pursuant to that appeal; and we are now working with the World
Food Program to work on the possible provision of additional food aid to
North Korea. But we have nothing more to say at this time on that.
QUESTION: This morning the South Korean Foreign Minister said that the
consensus of the United States, South Korea and Japan is now that the
missile was most likely a satellite launch that went awry. Is that how you
see it?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have new assessments by us on that situation. Clearly
there are those who hold that view. I can confirm again what I said to you
two days ago, which is that we cannot confirm the presence of an orbiting
satellite or were not able to see a satellite leave the missile. That is
all we know for sure.
There are those who hold the view that you described; I do not believe
we've reached a final judgment on this. It's a very important issue that we
intend to work on very closely. But regardless, we have very serious
concerns about North Korea's missile program. Their program is dangerous;
their program is dangerous to the region; it is dangerous to the world.
That is why we think it is so important that we obtain new commitments from
North Korea in that regard.
QUESTION: In other words, it's irrelevant if it was -- in terms of the
potential threat to the region, it's irrelevant whether it was a missile or
a satellite?
MR. RUBIN: We've made clear that these kind of long-range missile
capabilities - demonstrating these long-range missile capabilities should
not be repeated. This demonstration has made reaching and understanding on
missile development and proliferation all the more important.
We want to establish tight constraints on North Korea's missile activities -
both it's exports and it's indigenous program. In combination with its
missile program, whatever the intended purpose of that launch, it had a
demonstrated capability to launch a ballistic missile with that range.
QUESTION: On the specifics, the resumption of the four-party talks, do
you have a date and a location; and do you have a location for the missile
talks?
MR. RUBIN: I do not have a location for the missile talks. I'll try to
get you that afterwards. October I have for the four-party talks, without a
date or a location at this time; but I'll try to get you that.
QUESTION: Prior to these latest developments, there was already if not
opposition, reluctance among members of Congress to fund any additional aid
whether it be fuel oil or food to North Korea. Do you think in light of the
latest developments for President Clinton that what political capital might
have been available for him to use or for Secretary Albright to use to get
this additional money for North Korea, do you think that will be made more
difficult now?
MR. RUBIN: We're obviously at a time when a lot of people are going to do
a lot of thumb-sucking about what could or couldn't happen with or without
what's going on in Washington. I am not going to participate in that from
the podium here.
What I can tell you is the importance of an issue; I can tell you a little
bit about what we're doing to try to deal with it. I can try to give you a
flavor of how Congress is reacting to it. But as far as why - the political
reasons why things do or don't happen either in the foreign policy sphere
or anything else is just not my job.
With respect to our goals, they're clear: our goal is to get as much
support as possible from Congress for the important North Korea agreed
framework plan. Let's remember, if we weren't able to achieve these steps
most recently, we could have been facing very seriously the possibility of
a breakdown in the agreed framework and a return to the brink of crisis --
the crisis that riveted the world in 1994. So what we are trying to do is
focus on a substantive problem, which is getting the heavy fuel oil so that
North Korea will freeze the parts of its program that they've committed
to under the agreement and we can move forward in trying to get additional
commitment.
What responses Congress takes to that is up for them to decide. I can tell
you the importance of it. I can describe to you the important role the
Secretary is playing in trying to get agreement from Congress. As I
indicated in response to Barry's question, we believe that through a
combination of executive authority and congressional consultation that we
will be able to provide the heavy fuel oil necessary for this year. There
may be continuing discussions about what happens next year, and we would
expect that to go on. There's been opposition to this agreement from
some quarters for a very long time; and I don't expect that to go away. But
in the meantime, that's the job that we're doing.
QUESTION: Are the Japanese going to provide the money that they had
promised?
MR. RUBIN: Well, you'll have to ask the Japanese for their stated view.
What we've indicated is that we are committed to keeping the light water
reactor schedule - putting it back on track so that the light water
reactors can be provided, pursuant to the agreement.
With respect to their decisions as to how they will contribute to that,
that's for them to say.
QUESTION: But can it be done if the Japanese do not contribute the money
that they have said that they would?
MR. RUBIN: Well, they've indicated in the past their intent to provide a
very substantial portion of that. They, as you know, decided not to go
along with some final planning that was being done by KEDO. They said
they're reviewing that. Either the Japanese will make clear they're
prepared to provide that support or we will try to get other support. But
we believe that this agreement is extremely important, and I think the
Japanese and the South Korean allies have given us every indication that
they also share the same level of importance we attach to this agreement.
With respect to any announcements that they may or may not make about
their position, that's up to them to say.
QUESTION: Regarding KEDO construction, there's been reports that the US
promised North Korea to start construction of light water reactors in
November. Do you have anything on this?
MR. RUBIN: We continue to expect the light water reactor project to go
forward as agreed by all the parties under the framework. In the just-
concluded talks with the North, we acknowledged that construction is behind
schedule, and we reaffirmed that the project should be implemented
according to the agreed framework. We will fully respect the position of
the South Korean and Japanese Governments on this issue and consult closely
with them regarding this implementation.
So it was behind schedule. We've committed to try to put it back on
schedule, and we're going to work with the South Koreans and the Japanese
on that.
QUESTION: Speaking of terrorism talks, do you have a date and a location
of the terrorism talks?
MR. RUBIN: No, I don't; I'll try to get you some of the details on dates
and locations as soon as they become available.
What tends to happen in these negotiations is an agreement in principle is
made to meet on a certain time frame, and then the venue and exact dates
are worked out closer to that time frame.
QUESTION: To the tune of "West Side Story," or whatever tune you'd like,
would you like to talk about Mr. Primakov; and do you think he'll mend his
ways so far as Persian Gulf and Middle East policy is concerned?
MR. RUBIN: Let me say a few things on that. First let me say that
Secretary Albright spoke to - I guess I should call him Prime Minister-
designate Primakov earlier this morning, just a few hours ago. They had a
very warm and friendly discussion. She indicated she hadn't thought she
would be calling him to congratulate him on being named for such a post,
short of being confirmed for such a post. They indicated they intended to
continue to work as closely as possible together in the future, and that
they would be seeing each other in New York at the General Assembly.
More broadly, we've said all along that it's up to Russia to choose its
leaders, its government and its policies. A key tenet of our policy has, of
course, been Russian democracy and constitutional rule, and that is the
process that is unfolding here.
Many questions remain to be answered before we or the Russians themselves
have a clear sense of where the country is heading. Our views will depend
on whether they will keep Russia on the course of reform - that means
democracy, market economics, integration with the rest of the world and a
foreign policy that respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all states - particularly neighboring ones.
That said, Prime Minister-designate Primakov is well-known to Secretary
Albright and many of us at the Department, and he enjoys considerable
respect. Secretary Albright has found him to be a worthy interlocutor on a
number of subjects, on a number of important issues, and in several
occasions, a genuine partner in certain efforts. She regards him - to get
at your last question - as a skillful, dedicated and effective advocate of
what he understands to be the Russian national interest. Sometimes that has
meant that we have worked together in partnership, in concert, to
solve problems together; sometimes that has meant that the Secretary
and Foreign Minister Primakov had to manage differences between U.S. and
Russia while preserving an atmosphere of candid and constructive engagement.
That is her view of Foreign Minister Primakov and Prime Minister-designate
Primakov; and obviously we will stay in close touch with him in the days
ahead.
QUESTION: Do you consider that Mr. Primakov has the necessary economic
background to tackle the economic problems that seem to be the most crucial
things facing Russia at the moment?
MR. RUBIN: He has not yet been confirmed by the Duma, as you know, and
therefore it is premature and inappropriate for us to comment on the
prospect of his being Prime Minister; and certainly answering that question
could effect that prospect.
QUESTION: For the time being, did he tell Albright that he will retain
the Foreign Ministry?
MR. RUBIN: He did not say that to her as far as I understand it. He did
indicate he would be in New York at the General Assembly, but for a shorter
period of time.
QUESTION: Do you know - it's hard to ask a specific question, but the
situation is so enormously dramatic and sad. Is there any hope, with winter
coming on - and it is in Europe -- those of us who were just there know
they are a month ahead of us, at least - for those refugees in Kosovo? The
Monitor, for instance, had a heartbreaking story yesterday. Is there any
way you can stop the Serbs from torching these people's homes and
casting them out into God knows where?
MR. RUBIN: I don't have any particularly new policy to report to you. I
can say that we did have heavy reports of Serb shelling around Decani
beginning on the previous day. On September 8, the Serb prefect of Kosovo
conducted a visit to what he described as a newly discovered mass grave.
Our monitors identified eight bodies at the scene, but were unable to
determine ethnicity.
More broadly, on your general question, we have reports of some 70,000
internally displaced persons in the valley east of Krusavac. The group
claims to be surrounded by Serb forces. Our monitoring teams plan to
investigate the situation today. Assistant Secretary Shattuck was just in
the region. In respect to one of the cases - that is the separation of men
from women and the jailing of those men -- I believe somewhere over 500 of
those men have now been released with some remaining members in prison and
the ICRC access promised. So that is in that case.
With respect to the broad problem you've identified, let me say this -- we
hold President Milosevic personally responsible for the welfare of those
people. This has been caused by Serb activity, and it is the Serbs who are
responsible for the situation these people are in.
With respect to what steps we are taking to deal with it, I don't have
anything new for you on the military force side of the question. I can say
the President has approved a $20 million draw-down from the Emergency
Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund to respond to urgent appeals to fund
non-governmental organizations providing aid in this region. These will
supplement previous contributions of about $11 million.
The Serbs must stop targeting civilian populations; and we obviously are
pursuing vigorously the negotiating track. We talked last week about some
of the movement in that regard, but the bottom line is until President
Milosevic stops his forces from raining a humanitarian disaster down on the
people of Kosovo, this problem will not go away.
QUESTION: Why doesn't NATO stop his forces?
MR. RUBIN: I said to you that I have nothing new for you on the military
side.
QUESTION: Did Secretary Albright discuss Kosovo with Primakov this
morning?
MR. RUBIN: I'd have to check the record; I don't know the answer to
that.
QUESTION: Could you get back to us and let us know?
MR. RUBIN: Yes.
QUESTION: You know the reference yesterday in her speech to how - not an
exact quote - but how she labored to try to bring others on the Council
aboard in areas, and Kosovo is one of them - is it your impression that the
Russians have the same sense of outrage about the refugee problem the US
does, and hold Milosevic accountable for it? Or do they take a more
tempered view?
MR. RUBIN: We're trying very hard to sensitize those who are least
supportive of stiffer measures to the responsibility of President Milosevic
for this problem. I can tell you that last week in Vienna, Secretary
Albright made clear that not only must the credible threat of force be
maintained, that although it would be best to have the broadest possible
support for any potential action, if force does prove necessary, those
nations that agree must not hesitate to act.
So I think that statement speaks quite clearly to the question of whether
one needs agreement by all. I certainly agree with you that in recent
months, the Russian Government has not seen eye-to-eye with the United
States on the subject of Kosovo. There was a joint statement in Russia at
the summit on this subject, and it did note the humanitarian disaster
potential. But in general, we have not seen eye-to-eye with the Russians on
this issue.
QUESTION: Also on Kosovo, the European Union invoked a ban on landing by
Yugoslav airliners throughout Europe. However, Austria and Britain have not
gone along, saying that there are sovereignty issues that prevent them from
doing so. Have you been keeping up with that situation?
MR. RUBIN: I believe the United Kingdom supported this ban and may have
logistical or technical or legal problems with doing it through that
particular format. But I have no reason to believe that they're not
supportive of the very ban that was agreed to, I believe, in either London
or Germany while they were there. So what the exact reasons for that are,
I'll have to check.
QUESTION: Did the Secretary take that up with the Austrian Government
last week?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check the account of that meeting; I wasn't
there.
QUESTION: On North Korea, the South Korean Foreign Minister said today
that the amount of food aid was 300,000 tons; can you confirm that?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't seen that particular statement. I can say that we
have not made a final decision on the size of food aid. Numbers were
discussed; possibilities were discussed. Let me be clear - for the North
Koreans, they bring up food aid all the time in every discussion we have
with them; and they did throughout our discussions in New York. We talked
about our pattern of support for WFP appeals. And as I indicated, we are
discussing with the WFP what another contribution by the United States
might look like. So numbers may have been bandied about, but no decision
has been made.
QUESTION: So the reporting on that is all wrong? The three or four news
agencies and six or seven newspapers that have reported that you all are
prepared to do that is wrong?
MR. RUBIN: I usually - I think I've been very clear. I think, Sid, you've
been here when I've stated that newspapers were wrong, and I didn't say
that.
QUESTION: There are reports of growing separatist movement in Dagastan;
do you have any word on that?
MR. RUBIN: No, I'll have to get that for the record.
QUESTION: Thank you.
(The briefing concluded at 1:45 P.M.)
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