Visit the Philhellenic Perspective Homepage Read the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits (24 July 1923) Read the Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits (24 July 1923)
HR-Net - Hellenic Resources Network Compact version
Today's Suggestion
Read The "Macedonian Question" (by Maria Nystazopoulou-Pelekidou)
HomeAbout HR-NetNewsWeb SitesDocumentsOnline HelpUsage InformationContact us
Tuesday, 5 November 2024
 
News
  Latest News (All)
     From Greece
     From Cyprus
     From Europe
     From Balkans
     From Turkey
     From USA
  Announcements
  World Press
  News Archives
Web Sites
  Hosted
  Mirrored
  Interesting Nodes
Documents
  Special Topics
  Treaties, Conventions
  Constitutions
  U.S. Agencies
  Cyprus Problem
  Other
Services
  Personal NewsPaper
  Greek Fonts
  Tools
  F.A.Q.
 

U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #140, 98-12-18

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


1027

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Friday, December 18, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

US-EUROPEAN UNION SUMMIT
1		White House, not State Department, to hold briefing on
		  topic today.

IRAQ 1-4 Secretary Albright has spoken with more than 30 foreign ministers last two days. 4-5 US Medium-term goal is to contain Iraq, as Secretary said yesterday. 5 US is sensitive to onset of Ramadan. 5 Secretary yesterday referred to long-term goal of regime change. 6 US is increasing its support for Iraqi opposition. 7,9 US has great confidence in UNSCOM chairman competence, abilities. 7-8 US sees no reason to replace Ambassador Butler. 8 US has no reason to believe UNSCOM would be allowed to be effective. 9 Military power can't assure change of Iraqi intentions. 9 US saw no further need for diplomacy before acting. 10 US pleased by Saudi Arabian Government statement today. 10 Need for international support must be weighed against military need for surprise. 10-11 US has widespread support in Europe, Latin America and Asia. 11 Defense Department has spoken to dropping of leaflets. 11 US is pleased with supportive reaction of Turkey. 12 NATO support. 12 Syria lack of support. 13 Secretary has spoken to Arafat, half a dozen other Arab leaders in past day or so. 13 Most US embassies in Africa remain closed today.

RUSSIA 1-5 Secretary had useful phone conversation with FM Ivanov today. 1 US relationship with Russia much bigger than just Iraq issue. 1-2 FM Ivanov relayed message from President Yeltsin to President Clinton. 3 Secretary's planned trip to Russia was discussed with FM Ivanov. 3 Ambassador to US was expected to leave; successor has received agrement. 3 Russia has made clear its view that Iraq must comply with UNSC resolutions. 3-4 Nevertheless US profoundly disagrees with Russia on military action. 4 US continues to work cooperatively with Russia in many areas. 6 US is familiar with anti-US extremes in Russia. 15 US sorry that Duma has postponed consideration of START II.

MEXICO 14 US expresses deep condolences to family of Phillip True for his tragic murder. 14 US consular officials have worked closely with Mexican officials on case. 14 Cooperation with Mexican officials has been excellent.

KOREAS 14-15 US deplores latest North Korean apparent attempt at infiltration of the South

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 15-16 OAU Meeting

FRY (KOSOVO) 16 US deplores killing of deputy mayor Zvonko Bojanic of Polje; KLA's condemnation welcomed. 16 US continues to urge restraint, work toward a negotiated solution. 16 Monitors observed Serb police moving in Glodanje, previously announced. 16-17 Serb police announced operation and have right and responsibility to identify and apprehend murderers.


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #140

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1998, 12:40 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Greetings. Welcome to the State Department briefing. Let me say, first of all, Secretary Albright is now at the White House participating in the summit with the European Union. There will be a briefing on that at the White House at about 2:30 p.m. with several Administration officials.

On Iraq, let me just --

QUESTION: Is Eizenstat still scheduled for here?

MR. RUBIN: No, no, it's going to be at the White House; that's why I'm announcing it.

QUESTION: That's that, same thing?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

On Iraq, let me say that over the last couple of days, Secretary Albright has spoken with over 30 foreign ministers and leaders to discuss the Iraq issue. As she indicated yesterday, generally speaking, she has been gratified by the fact that the majority of these leaders she's spoken to -- and the general view of the ministers and the leaders she's spoken to -- has been that the responsibility for this crisis falls squarely on Iraq's shoulders.

She has spoken several times in recent days with Foreign Minister Ivanov; and most recently, she did speak to him this morning. Let me say that she was quite pleased by the phone call: that she and Foreign Minister Ivanov had an extremely useful exchange. The Foreign Minister passed on to her a message for the President from President Yeltsin. Obviously, the Russians still believe that they don't agree with this operation; they still oppose this operation. But the message that she took from her discussion was that the Russians understand the importance of maintaining a broad- based relationship with the United States, that they recognize the importance of having US-Russian relations be a stabilizing factor in the international community, not a destabilizing factor, and that they are going to continue working with us on a wide variety of issues.

That is, so far as I know, the only foreign minister she spoke to today. With that, let me go to your questions.

QUESTION: Jamie, he called her?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know who initiated the call. They've been speaking - I think she's spoken to him at least four times over the last couple of days.

QUESTION: Now, the President sent a letter to Mr. Yeltsin last night. Would this be a response, or might this have been in the works before?

MR. RUBIN: Well, he did indicate that he had a message from President Yeltsin that he wished to pass on through her to President Clinton. Beyond that, it would be up to the Russians to tell you whether they intend to respond in some other way. But certainly, Secretary Albright will pass this on to the President.

QUESTION: You know what I'm saying: Is that a reply?

MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly in a form it is. It wasn't a letter that he was passing back. He was passing a message.

QUESTION: I see, all right.

QUESTION: Ivanov was quoted in the last hour as saying that if the strikes continue, this may damage ties between Russia with the United States. Was this reflected in the conversation that the Secretary had with Ivanov?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not in a position to repeat everything that was said in the conversation, but let me simply say that it's no secret that the United States and Russia have a profound disagreement on the wisdom of using force against Iraq. This has been long-standing, and Secretary Albright has pointed out to the Russians, as she has to other governments who have expressed concern about this, that they don't seem to have any other solution, and that we didn't come to this decision easily, that we gave diplomacy every chance, that we went the extra mile and the extra ten yards of the last mile and did all we could to try to avoid using force, which we regard as a last resort. But Saddam Hussein broke a new record in terms of promises made and promises broken since November, when he said that he would comply with this Security Council resolution; so we felt we'd given him every last chance.

The fact that Russia and the United States disagree on the use of force, which clearly came through in the phone call, we have said that we think that our relationship is bigger than just Iraq, and that we have a lot of business to do across the board, in Europe and around the world. We want to be able to manage differences like we have on Iraq, work together cooperatively in other areas. So what I'm suggesting to you is that there is no question the Russians oppose this operation; but the phone call Secretary Albright regarded as an extremely useful one, in which she believed it was apparent that we both recognize the importance of maintaining an effective and stable relationship -- both for ourselves and for the security of others.

QUESTION: Did Mr. Ivanov come up with any ideas at this stage? Are there any proposals coming from the Russian-Chinese-French side for ending this crisis, ending these strikes and getting some kind of new inspection regime?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't care to comment on Foreign Minister Ivanov's specific words. Let me simply say: I think we have made clear that we're going to continue this mission until it's completed.

QUESTION: Jamie, your statement that they don't seem to have any solution - did she make this point?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think he's quite familiar with that view. I don't know whether - I think she's said that to him in the past; I don't know whether she said it to him today.

QUESTION: All right, and two quick things: She's been entertaining the idea of taking a trip to Moscow in January, perhaps. Has that been --

MR. RUBIN: That did come up in the conversation today. Foreign Minister Ivanov confirmed his invitation to the Secretary. She expressed her intention to come. They talked about the possibility of a trip in late January.

QUESTION: Isn't that - don't you see that as constructive?

MR. RUBIN: Certainly it's part of the general tone of this call, which is that we do want to keep our channels of communication open despite the unfortunate decision of Russia to recall its ambassador yesterday.

Let me point out, in that regard, that we have pointed out to others that Ambassador Vorontsov has been expected to leave, that we have provided agrement to a new ambassador that we expect and hope to receive in January.

QUESTION: Can I ask you one last thing? It's a little broader. You and she seem to cast this disagreement as almost intellectual -- they're more diplomacy minded. I mean, this has been going on for a long time. I'm not inviting you to take a slam at them - or maybe I am - but aren't the Russians enormously protective of regimes like Iraq's? Certainly Mr. Primakov's whole past has been very solicitous of the radical or the militant regimes. Doesn't this go beyond diplomacy? Isn't this some sort of - as the United States might be protective of a friendly country in Europe, like Denmark or Norway - isn't this their field of - what should I say - they're the little brothers, aren't they, in a way?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't agree with your characterizations, and let me say, especially in light of the phone call that Secretary Albright had with Foreign Minister Ivanov today. I would remind you that the Russians, like us, have both made clear that Iraq must comply fully with all Security Council resolutions. We do have a profound difference on what to do in the event that Iraq did not comply - and frankly, interfered - with UNSCOM's ability to operate. We do have a difference there. It's not a new difference; it goes back a long time. I could give you historical references going back to 1991 about the Soviet Union's position and Russia's position; but it's not really relevant.

What's relevant right now to us is that we made this decision because we thought that we had given diplomacy every chance. We did what we needed to do to protect our national security. We acted pursuant and in furtherance of an international principle enshrined in the Security Council resolutions - that is that Iraq must be disarmed from its weapons of mass destruction. So we were acting on behalf of the international community. We believe that very clearly the Security Council resolutions provide us the authority to act, because by blocking UNSCOM, Saddam Hussein's Iraq is in violation of the cease-fire resolution. Thus, the underlying authority in Resolution 678 applies.

That is our view. Obviously, the Russians have a different view. But what's important is that we continue to work together cooperatively where we can.

QUESTION: So would you say that they are as interested as the US is in inspections, and that their position isn't influenced by some kinship to the Hussein government?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not going to speculate on what motivates Russia and make the speculations that you're suggesting. I will simply say that they have said that they want to see -- and have voted in the Security Council time after time -- for resolutions demanding full compliance by Iraq with Security Council resolutions. That's not just words; those include votes in the Security Council.

QUESTION: Jamie, without asking you to tell us what Foreign Minister Ivanov said specifically, did he indicate to the Secretary that the Russians might be sending an envoy to Baghdad, or did he indicate that they would not?

MR. RUBIN: I didn't get the sense that that was imminent.

QUESTION: Did sanctions come up, and is there any concern in the Administration that the sanctions regime could start to weaken, or that there would be a new effort within the Security Council to ease them?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the Russians, like all countries in the Security Council have voted quite clearly and made clear their position that in the absence of full cooperation with UNSCOM, and a clean bill of health from UNSCOM and the Security Council on the disarmament side, that that is the only path to sanctions relief. We've had no indication that any of the countries that have voted on that time after time have changed their position.

Secretary Albright did point out yesterday, that one has a medium and long- term strategy here. The medium-term strategy is to contain Saddam Hussein through the sanctions regime. We would welcome the return of an effective UNSCOM; if we had reason to believe that UNSCOM could be effective, we'd welcome its return. But in the absence of that, certainly there will be no sanctions relief; there will be no comprehensive review. We have -- other than extremists within various countries who had been for sanctions relief prior to the use of force, we haven't heard anything new on that.

QUESTION: Did Ivanov talk about sanctions?

MR. RUBIN: That didn't come up to my knowledge.

QUESTION: Tomorrow morning, the Islamic month of Ramadan comes up. First, did that come up in the Ivanov conversation? And second, does that fact -- Ramadan starting -- change anything as far as this government is concerned?

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say on Foreign Minister Ivanov, I think the public position of the Russians is that they didn't want this abhorration to take place, and they want it to stop. So, I don't think that Ramadan is a factor in their considerations.

As far as our considerations are concerned, let me simply say that we are very sensitive to the onset of Ramadan. We are also determined to complete the mission. I don't have any operational details to fill those two points out.

QUESTION: The mission is not going to be complete by tomorrow morning, so can I translate that to mean that, yes, the campaign will continue?

MR. RUBIN: You can't draw any conclusion about the operational length of time of this mission from anything I've said. All I have said is that we are sensitive to the onset of Ramadan and that we intend to complete the mission.

QUESTION: Can I ask you if NATO-Russian relations --

QUESTION: Yesterday, the Secretary in response to a question by Steve Erlanger, I think, about the goals of the Administration --policy goals of the Administration -- when she talked about the long-term goals, she talked about shoring up the Iraqi opposition or working with the opposition. Is there any other long-term goal that this Administration has, besides working with

the opposition?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the long-term goal, I think, that she referred to was regime change, and that we believe that the Iraqi people would be far better off -- and the world would be far better off -- if there was a regime change in Iraq. It's very difficult to imagine any leader that could be worse for the people of Iraq or for the world than Saddam Hussein.

In the meantime, we will continue to pursue Security Council resolutions, and if we have reason to believe an effective UNSCOM can be operating in Iraq, we would be supportive of that. We have no reason to believe that at this time.

With respect to working with the opposition, Secretary Albright, like others, has pointed out that we are increasing our funding for the opposition, increasing support for efforts to publicize and provide documentation of Saddam Hussein's war crimes. We are hoping that a viable alternative can be found. It's a step-by-step, long-term process. We're quite realistic about how difficult an enterprise this is, but we think there is great benefit in at least starting down this long road.

QUESTION: Jamie, when you all announced, I guess about a month ago, that you were going to begin talking more with the opposition figures, you said that by the middle of December that you all should have some idea of exactly which groups might begin to get some of this money. Has this assessment been completed?

MR. RUBIN: I don't think we've made specific decisions yet as to exactly how the money will be parceled out. I will have to check for you when that is likely to happen.

QUESTION: This question is: When did the United States notify the Russian Government that we were intending to launch attacks against Saddam Hussein?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't be in a position to speak to that.

QUESTION: Did the Secretary notify -- was any notification made prior to it? Because Boris Yeltsin is saying that he received no phone call from President Clinton.

MR. RUBIN: Well, that's certainly true, but I'm not in a position to describe every -- if I begin down the road of telling you who received advanced notification and who didn't, then you would have every right to go down the list of every country and I would be hard-pressed to give you a reason why I couldn't answer it with respect to every country. That would not be wise, diplomatically.

QUESTION: Okay, and is the US Government at all concerned or alarmed by what some describe as a growing anti-American sentiment in that country?

MR. RUBIN: Well, for a long time in Russia, there have been anti-American sentiments expressed by both extremes. We're familiar with that, and we've come to expect that. In the meantime, we've developed a very effective working relationship with President Yeltsin, with Foreign Minister Ivanov, with Prime Minister Primakov. We continue to value that relationship very highly; that's the reason Secretary Albright will going to Russia in January. We will continue to work with the Russians.

We're familiar with radical views from both extremes that have expressed themselves in the past, and that we expect to continue to express themselves. Russia is going through a very traumatic change in its political and economic system. There's much dislocation and much resentment, and that tends to cause some in the extremes to try to blame Russia's problems on outsiders.

QUESTION: Do you think it's fair? Because there are some in Russia who are very angry, obviously, about the US decision to launch attacks, and there are those that say that this strong symbolic reaction by withdrawing their ambassador, et cetera, has to do with the feeling that Russians feel that their interests are being ignored.

MR. RUBIN: Well, we have most certainly not ignored Russia's interest. We and Russia have a common interest; and the common interest is in the disarmament of Iraq. This is a regime that has used weapons of mass destruction and seems determined to keep them, and keep their ability to make them and deploy them. That is a common interest of the United States and Russia, and it's something we've been working on very closely with Russia for a long time. We did come to a point, in pursuing that common interest, where we had a very different conclusion as to what the right course of action was.

Russia's opposition to this was no secret to us, it was no surprise to us; we expected it. But we decided that for our national interest and for the world's common interest in disarming Iraq, that we needed to act.

QUESTION: In their conversation, was there any reference to Russia's relationship with NATO? There are stories coming out of Moscow about troop movements, but also that Russia's reconsidering --

MR. RUBIN: Right, I've gone quite far in describing the conversation, and I've reached the end of my ability to be specific.

QUESTION: Then let's forget the conversation. Is there any sense in this building that Russia is re-evaluating the relationship that indeed the United States set up for Russia with NATO to try to allay their concerns or irritations?

MR. RUBIN: I've seen press reports about Russian non-participation in a defense ministers' meeting, et cetera. In the meantime, Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov had a very constructive phone call. So we'll just have to see how things unfold.

QUESTION: You keep saying that you'd welcome the return of an effective UNSCOM. Is there any consideration being given, is the United States amenable to any proposed changes in the structure or leadership of UNSCOM? There's a lot of talk about, for example, Tariq Aziz said that UNSCOM could come back but Butler must go. How do you feel about --

MR. RUBIN: We have great confidence in Chairman Butler's abilities, in his independence, in his judgment. We don't see any reason why the leadership in Iraq or the leadership in other countries, frankly, should be shooting the messenger.

Chairman Butler was delivering the message to the world that Saddam Hussein had violated its commitments, and acted in a series of ways that we have detailed for you: including cleaning out rooms before UNSCOM arrived; including interfering with helicopters; including issuing instructions to their people to destroy documentation; including creating new safe havens; including trying to declare Fridays off limits. These were facts, these were realities - decisions made by Iraq.

What Chairman Butler did was communicate those facts. We do not see any reason whatsoever why the messenger should resign, or do anything other than continue the fine work that he's doing. If Iraq were to decide to allow UNSCOM to be effective, and we had reason to believe that was going to happen, then we would want UNSCOM to go back in. But we're certainly not supportive of anyone's suggestion that Butler is to blame, and we have the highest possible regard for him.

QUESTION: What about the composition, though, and the mandates of UNSCOM?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the composition and mandate is - the mandate has been determined by the Security Council. The composition has always been determined by Chairman Butler and the chairman before him, based on his determination of what professional expertise would be necessary.

But I think the direction you're going is the opposite of the direction we're going. We would need reason to believe -- new reason to believe -- that UNSCOM was going to be effective before we would support going through a charade where you would have a non-functioning UNSCOM back in there again.

So on the contrary, we think that we need reason to believe it was going to be effective; and we don't have that at this time.

QUESTION: Is it wrong for Russia and China to lead the charge to remove Butler?

MR. RUBIN: We certainly disagree with them wholeheartedly. Secretary Albright said yesterday that the Russians and the Chinese have no alternative solution. I'm not sure about the Chinese with respect to Butler, but certainly we're open.

QUESTION: She said it.

MR. RUBIN: I said I'm not sure --

QUESTION: No, she did say they're leading the charge.

MR. RUBIN: I'm just not sure on the details of that. But with respect to the Russians, I think that's publicly known. All I can tell you is that we disagree with them that Butler should be taking responsibility for Iraq's failure to comply. It's Iraq that caused this problem; it's Iraq's non- compliance that Butler was reporting, and we don't think it's appropriate to attack the messenger.

QUESTION: Should Saddam Hussein try to climb down and look for a way to bring the inspectors back, would the United States be willing to sacrifice Butler as a way of resuming inspections?

MR. RUBIN: On the contrary, what I just indicated in response to a series of questions that just came up -

QUESTION: It's a pragmatic world.

MR. RUBIN: We have the highest regard for Butler, and we would need reason to believe that an effective UNSCOM was going to be possible. It wouldn't start by challenging the independence and integrity of Butler. It would start by us having the kind of reason to believe that Iraq was going to change its tune and allow UNSCOM full access, full cooperation and allow UNSCOM to do its job; which are points we certainly don't have assurances on now.

QUESTION: Two questions, Jamie - first, why hasn't the United States stated, as a goal of this current round of military strikes, that UNSCOM be allowed to come back into Iraq and allowed to operate effectively and without any restraint?

MR. RUBIN: Well, because military power can't assure that. We have stated what the goals are as: degrading their capability on weapons of mass destruction and their capability to threaten its neighbors. That's what military power can do. But causing a change of heart by Saddam Hussein is not necessarily something that military power can do. We would welcome it if it was an effective UNSCOM and we had reason to believe it was effective. But we don't consider that a military objective.

QUESTION: And on the diplomatic contact, was there a decision by the Administration to limit or circumscribe the diplomatic contacts prior to the launching of air strikes, just to prevent the sort of footwork that occurred at the UN in mid-November?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say it a different way - I understand the intent of the question. We said that we were prepared to act without warning and without delay and that we saw no need for further diplomacy. So that is the rubric under which we were acting.

On the military side, I believe the Pentagon has stated, and others have stated, that we didn't want to gather a large coalition - the kind of group that we had gathered earlier this year in February-March - because of the risk that might make it more difficult to catch the Iraqis by surprise. So there were military down-sides to gathering a large group together. I think it applies on the diplomatic side as well.

QUESTION: Do you think that some of the opposition that has stirred up since then is pique among countries that were not given any kind of advance notice?

MR. RUBIN: No, I don't believe so. I think that what we've seen is very limited opposition. What I would hope that those of you who read diplomacy as well as I know you do would understand (is) that any suggestion that our allies are not supportive of us is nonsense.

If you go throughout Europe, Japan, other countries, the Canadians, the Australians, the New Zealanders -- across the board, our allies have been very supportive. In other parts of the world and with other relationships, there are nuanced differences, which are totally understandable if one understands the neighborhood they live in and some of the ways in which they need to speak publicly.

Certainly with respect to the Arab countries - and we're quite pleased today the Saudi Government put out a statement that made very clear the responsibility for this crisis and this use of force and the consequences belong to Saddam Hussein and no one else. So we've seen a different type of support, different type of reaction and different terminology used in different parts of the world. But overall, we've been quite pleased that our allies, our friends and many others are all squarely blaming Iraq for this crisis. Many of those are overtly supportive; many are supportive privately and expressing regret publicly.

So based on acting so quickly in order to maintain operational security, we think that the response is much the same as it would have been in November, had we not given Saddam Hussein one last chance.

QUESTION: Why was the element of surprise more important now than it was back in February?

MR. RUBIN: Well, its always important, but one has to weigh it against other needs. It's also important to have international support. We gathered international support in November, we gathered it in February-March, because it was very important where we were reaching a new threshold where we were talking about a substantial use of force, and that we wanted to gather as much support as possible.

But having gathered it in November, we made a decision that we thought, for military reasons, preventing the disbursal of Iraqi forces was an important benefit; and weighed against additional diplomatic contacts and the possible benefits thereto, we decided this was more important.

QUESTION: Now, how do you view the fact that three out of five of the permanent five members of the Security Council have already voiced - at least two of the five have voiced extremely strong disapproval and condemnation of US action? The third, France, has voiced - it has said it's not in favor of military strikes.

MR. RUBIN: That's fine.

QUESTION: But I mean, how is that international support?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I went through - I don't think international support means doing a tally of how many countries there are in the world and how many countries there are in the permanent members of the Security Council. International support means those countries that, in any case, would be likely to support the use of force.

China and Russia have made very clear that they wouldn't. So their lack of support is to be expected and not particularly relevant to the question of whether there's international support. The question is across Europe, with our allies, across Latin America, in Asia, around the world, what are the leading countries in the world saying? Well, across Latin America there is widespread support. In the Gulf states, with different levels of public comment - and certainly we have said we have the necessary military support - we are receiving support. In Asia, Japan has been quite strong on this. Even countries like Singapore and Indonesia and others are expressing merely regret about the consequences, but not criticizing the United States.

So if one wants to pick those countries that would be expected to criticize the United States and make those the barometer of international opinion, I don't think that would be an accurate reflection of the widespread support we've seen.

QUESTION: Jamie, we hear the US military is dropping leaflets in Southern Iraq --

MR. RUBIN: I think Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shelton just addressed that in the last hour, and made clear that there was a - repeating his words - that these leaflets were designed to tell certain units not to move against their neighbors, and that if they stayed put they wouldn't be hit. That was what the leaflets were. I believe those leaflets are going to be made available in the Pentagon.

QUESTION: So this is not - okay, can I - has there been any intensification of contacts with Iraqi opposition? I mean, have you, kind of, brought forward the term of your strategy of encouraging --

MR. RUBIN: I think we're continuing to work on the same pace, which is talking to them, gathering them together, trying to get them to develop a coordinated position. But I wouldn't make the link that you're making.

QUESTION: What box would you put Turkey in, or if you don't want to be particular -

MR. RUBIN: Supportive.

QUESTION: Supportive? Because their statements haven't all been that supportive. You say there are no -

MR. RUBIN: Secretary Albright spoke to the President of Turkey and, I think, supportive. Each country has its own way of expressing its views, and we are pleased with the reaction of Turkey. That's what supportive means. We're not expecting people to be cheering about this. We're not cheering about this. I don't think any American Administration official has reacted with pleasure to the decision to use force. It's something we don't do easily; it's something we do as a last resort.

So the fact that people aren't cheering about this should not be seen as an indication of anything other (than) that force is a last resort; that in different parts of the world, different countries have different ways of expressing their support publicly and privately.

QUESTION: What I was driving at is, we sometimes refer to Norway, Denmark as being supportive. Is France the only - are all NATO allies except for France supportive of the United States?

MR. RUBIN: I would have to check the records. I mean, the French Foreign Minister Vedrine and the Secretary had several calls about this that were quite constructive. The Foreign Minister made clear that the responsibility belongs on Saddam Hussein.

QUESTION: No, no, I understand - whatever category you put France in, is everybody else --

MR. RUBIN: Let me say this - if you want to be critical and you want to find something critical to write a report --

QUESTION: No, I want to find where the support is.

MR. RUBIN: Can I finish my answer, please? Then you can look for a "rah- rah" level of support and say anything short of that is non-support. What we consider a reasonable level of support is to place the blame for the consequences on Saddam Hussein. Any country that is in that category, we believe, is supportive.

QUESTION: That takes care of the Arabs as making them all supportive, because they feel the consequences are Saddam Hussein's. But I'm thinking of the Europeans and the allies and NATO. I just want to know if one can safely describe all the countries in NATO except France as being supportive.

MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check each of the countries' positions.

QUESTION: Over all, there were a number of countries that were, kind of, lined up in support of the United States in mid-November, and in the month since - like Syria, for example - some of that support has fallen away. It seems unmistakable.

MR. RUBIN: I don't accept the premise. In November, with the exception of Syria, there were statements by the GCC, by other Arab countries, by European countries, by others around the world about the use of force. We never expected, if we had used force, for Syria to stay with the statement that they had managed to be associated with.

So we believe the level of support now is roughly the same as it was with November, with a minor exception or two.

QUESTION: Notwithstanding the official support from various governments around the world, in some parts of the Middle East there have been street protests against US military action. First of all, can you tell us whether or not Secretary Albright spoke with Chairman Arafat or with President Mubarak or Foreign Minister Moussa? And has she asked anyone in governments there to take any action to try and dampen street protests?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we certainly respect, in all parts of the world, the right of citizens to express their views; that's something very fundamental to the United States. And we, therefore, wouldn't be asking other governments to interfere with freedom of speech.

However, we have spoken to Chairman Arafat, I believe she spoke to President Mubarak, and she spoke to Foreign Minister Moussa. She spoke to a half a dozen Arab leaders in the last day or so, and has made clear the reasons for our action. Certainly in the case of Chairman Arafat, you did not see him associating himself with some of the comments of his people purporting to speak for him.

We've seen rather limited and sporadic public demonstrations on this subject. It certainly wouldn't be appropriate for us to ask other governments to suppress freedom of speech.

QUESTION: So she did not ask Chairman Arafat to --

MR. RUBIN: No. I think there's certainly an effort to calm the public waters and explain things, but suppressing freedom of speech is not something we would ask other governments to do.

QUESTION: Have there been any additional embassy closings, warnings, any plans to take additional security measures?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know what "additional" means, but I don't think since yesterday anything's really changed.

QUESTION: So then will the African embassies open up --

MR. RUBIN: They're being closed today. A decision hasn't been made on their re-opening.

QUESTION: Secretary Cohen repeatedly said that it's not an aim of the current military action to destabilize Saddam's regime. Isn't that going to be disheartening to the opposition that you say you're trying to encourage?

MR. RUBIN: No.

QUESTION: Why not?

MR. RUBIN: Because I think if they are watching TV, they're seeing that Saddam Hussein is paying a heavy price for his non-compliance, and that he's going to be worse off as a result of this. I think that's their calculation.

It's one thing to say what a military objective is; it's another to just look at the results. Clearly, he's going to be worse off, and that certainly would be their goal if they were in opposition.

QUESTION: On another subject, is the US Government taking any part in the investigation into the apparent murder of the American reporter in Mexico, Philip True?

MR. RUBIN: On that subject, I do have some information. We certainly have been active in working with the Mexican authorities on it.

We wish to express our deepest condolences to the family of Philip True, a well-respected foreign correspondent who made Mexico his specialty, and whose reports in The San Antonio Express-News were widely read.

The Department of State is following the investigation into Mr. True's death very closely. We have seen the news accounts indicating that Mr. True was murdered, and have been informed by the coroner in Guadalajara that the cause of death was strangulation. While we will reserve making a judgment until the final report of the Mexican authorities is made, we are very disturbed by what appears to be the violent demise of a journalist who had undertaken an effort to report on little-covered regions of Mexico.

Mr. True's tragic death has saddened all his friends in Mexico City, including those in the embassy who knew him well. He was a prominent member of the foreign press corps in Mexico.

Since being informed on December 12 that Mr. True was missing, our consular officers at the embassy in Mexico and at the consulate general in Guadalajara have worked closely with Mexican officials. A consular officer traveled to the area where Mr. True had last been seen. Cooperation with the federal, state and military authorities has been excellent. We wish to express our great appreciation for the assistance provided, including the contribution of more than 250 officers and men, five helicopters, four search dogs, in the effort to find Mr. True. We anticipate further excellent cooperation as the Mexican authorities continue their investigation. Therefore, it's going quite well. I have no information about an American component to that.

QUESTION: Jamie, do you have anything on the North Korea sub -- or seems to be a sub -- that the South Koreans discovered?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, various details have been provided by the South Korean defense ministry, which I won't repeat to you here. But let me say that we understand that President Kim's spokesmen have expressed his satisfaction at the military's handling of this issue.

On our part, the United States deplores this latest North Korea action, which appears to be another attempt at infiltration of the Republic of Korea by elements of the North Korean military. We are consulting closely with South Korea. This incident highlights the need for tension reduction and confidence-building measures on the Korean Peninsula, as the President of South Korea and President Clinton have called for.

We will continue our various efforts to resolve our concerns through bilateral dialogue with North Korea and through the four-party talks.

QUESTION: Is there any reaction to President Jiang Zemin's speech that he gave today, in which the tone and the tenor of which was a much stronger indication that the Chinese Government will not adopt what it views as Western political reform?

MR. RUBIN: We have not studied that speech in detail yet, but as soon as we have, and we have a reaction, we'll provide it to you.

QUESTION: What is your outlook on START II, and on the prospects of a follow-on arms control--

MR. RUBIN: We have said quite clearly that in the absence of ratification of START II by the Russian Duma, we can't proceed with START III negotiations. It's certainly unfortunate, and we're sorry to see that the Russian Duma has postponed consideration of START II.

In our view, START II is in our interest, and it is in the Russians' interest. Increasing numbers of Russian officials and legislators seem to be understanding that START II is in Russia's interest. And although we want to see START II ratified, we couldn't hold our concern about START II above other national security interests, for example, in needing to take action against Iraq. So we just hope that, eventually, the Russian legislators will see that it's in their interest to ratify START II as soon as possible, and then we can move onto START III. We can't make the judgment that this is in their national interest for them.

QUESTION: Do you understand that the Yeltsin government, or that Ivanov will be lobbying?

MR. RUBIN: We still believe the Russian government is supportive and wants to see it ratified. They've been making a more and more effective case. It's unfortunate that the consideration was postponed. We expect it to be reconsidered as soon as the time is right. That's really a decision for the government to make. We don't see any lessening in their support for it.

QUESTION: In the contacts over the past couple of days -

MR. RUBIN: That hasn't been a prominent feature of those discussions.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on - I saw a wires story that seemed to indicate that there seemed to be, maybe, a solution to the civil war in the Congo; that the OAU had done something in -

MR. RUBIN: The OAU meeting that I've been advised about has been a tour d'horizon and not a meeting with real substantive effect. They went through various issues and talked about that.

Before closing, let me say that on December 17 the Serbian Deputy Mayor of Kosovo, Polje, was kidnapped and executed. Although the general staff of the KLA has disclaimed responsibility, the masked and armed men who carried out the attack reportedly wore KLA insignia on their uniforms.

The United States deplores this savage act of brutality. We welcome the KLA political representative's condemnation of this assault. Nevertheless, tensions in Kosovo are spiraling upwards in response to a number of serious incidents and armed clashes in recent days. The Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission is doing everything possible to ease tensions in Kosovo, is in regular contact with the KLA leadership, as well as with local officials. Harold Koh, the Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor is in Kosovo today, together with our Chief of Mission there, Richard Miles, to press for maximum restraint.

Violence, including in retaliation for violence by another party, is simply unacceptable. It works against the prospects for a peaceful negotiated settlement. We remain firmly committed to the view that Serbian threats to shut down independent Albanian-language media in Kosovo are unacceptable. We are committed to supporting independent media outlets. If Belgrade authorities target the independent press in Kosovo with the same sort of persecution they have unleashed against the Serbian language media, they will only further deepen the FRY's international isolation.

Neither the Serbs nor the Albanians can win a military victory in Kosovo. Only a negotiated solution can provide the long-term stability necessary for the region to grow and prosper.

QUESTION: We heard a report about an alleged Serb police rampage as they were searching for the killers of the six teenagers. Do you have anything on that?

MR. RUBIN: There were reports that police arrested three suspects yesterday in the village of Glodjane, who were allegedly involved in the Pec killings. We have seen press reports of two casualties, but our monitors have been unable to confirm this. Our monitors did observe police conducting a military-style clearing operation near this village. We saw well-armed police establish a 20-plus man blocking position with a heavy machine gun on the east road leading into the village. Another group of dismounted police moved in fire team formation over the hill north of the village. Small arms and heavy weapon firing was heard from the direction of Glodjane. No return fire was noted.

Observers concluded that most villagers left before the assault. Police reportedly questioned those who remained, detained four and subsequently released one. Serb police had previously announced this operation to observers and publicized it in the media. I can't go beyond the KDOM description of the Serb operation, which they continue to investigate; but let me say, the Serbs do have the right and responsibility to identify and apprehend those responsible for the appalling murders in Pec. We do expect, however, that the Serbs will carry out such investigations correctly and professionally, and we are watching carefully to see whether they do so.

QUESTION: Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)


U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article
Back to Top
Copyright © 1995-2023 HR-Net (Hellenic Resources Network). An HRI Project.
All Rights Reserved.

HTML by the HR-Net Group / Hellenic Resources Institute, Inc.
std2html v1.01b run on Friday, 18 December 1998 - 23:39:06 UTC