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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #6, 99-01-13

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


1121

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Wednesday, January 13, 1999

Briefer: James P. Rubin

SERBIA
1		US is actively involved in assisting development of
		  functioning democratic institutions.
9		US has never taken stock in words of Serbian officials;
		  focus is, instead, on their deeds.

IRAQ 1-2,4,5,8 UN Security Council resolutions state that Iraq must disarm by disclosing its WMD programs. 1-2,5 That is the context in which US will evaluate French proposal, and others. 1-2,3,8 Positive elements of French proposal are clear mention of need for monitoring program, as well as accounting for spending of oil revenues.. 2 Iraqi regime is making hypocritical complaints about the plight of its people. 2 US remains very focused on the humanitarian problem. 2-3 US is prepared to look at ways to ensure that Iraq can pump all the oil allowed under UN program. 4 US is not prepared to 'leapfrog' over UN sanctions resolutions. 5,7 US is in contact with Saudi government on plight of Iraqi people. 6 Iraq has not begun to fill in hole it dug for itself with other Arab governments. 6 No-fly zones are there so Saddam Hussein cannot use air power to repress his own people. 6 Latest incidents resulted in direct hits to missile sites, with no damage to coalition aircraft. 18 UNSCOM has performed important work, carrying out UNSC mandates.

LIBYA 8 There is no newfound optimism over prospects for turning over Lockerbie bombing suspects.

SIERRA LEONE 8 US is encouraged by dialogue among Sierra Leone, international community and RUF.

RUSSIA-IRAN 9 Movement in right direction on preventing Iran from acquiring WMD has stopped; and is deteriorating. 10 Material assistance has been given to Iran's missile program. 10 This will be part of Secretary Albright's discussions when in Moscow. 11 Recent violations are different than previous ones: Previously Russia acted; this time it didn't. 12,14 US is deeply concerned about Iran's pursuit of a missile program. 12-13 Extension of US program to launch satellites with Russian missiles depends upon Russian cooperation on export of missile and WMD technology. 13 Secretary Albright spoke yesterday with FM Ivanov.

HAITI 15 US regrets further gap developed between executive, legislative branches of government.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT'S UPCOMING TRIP 15-16,17 Purpose of stops in Saudi Arabia and Egypt is to discuss Iraq. No plans to stop in Israel.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 18 US strongly believes Wye agreement should be implemented.


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #6

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1999, 1:22 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department Briefing. As you know, today we had a briefing here this morning and one this afternoon, and so this was the appropriate time to do our regularly scheduled program.

I do have a statement on democratization in Serbia that addresses the rather ridiculous and crass and foolhardy attempt by some in Serbia to staple together some documents and claim they have found the Holy Grail. I have a statement on that I think that will make clear to all of you the ridiculousness of the press conference held by some in Serbia in the last 24 hours. I'm happy to address that or go on to your other questions.

QUESTION: I think we have an idea of what it's going to read like, so let's move on. I'm sure you know France has got a proposal now on Iraq on more oil, which the US isn't going to get but anyhow, you know the point. Is the US - I haven't seen a US reaction. There have been some Russian, et cetera. Is this the place for an American reaction?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say that the Security Council resolutions endorsed by all the permanent members and all members of the Council make clear that Iraq must disarm, and that it must do so by fully disclosing their weapons of mass destruction programs. The burden to disclose those weapons of mass destruction programs is on Iraq, not on the Security Council, not on any body of the Security Council like UNSCOM or anyone else. The burden is on Iraq to disclose its weapons of mass destruction if Iraq wants to get out from under the sanctions regime that the Security Council imposed at the end of the Gulf War. The regime actually began prior to the war upon the invasion of Kuwait.

The fact that Iraq must disclose its weapons of mass destruction and that the Security Council is committed to disarming Iraq through that mechanism is the context in which we will evaluate any number of proposals, including the French proposal, as to how we move forward. We are aware of the French proposal. We have a number of questions and concerns that we are going to address to France about the proposal.

In addition, let me say that there are some positive elements in the French proposal that deal with the essential task of ensuring that Iraq does not rearm and is disarmed -- for example, the important stress on having a monitoring and inspection regime to fulfill that task; and secondly, a means of controlling how the Iraqi regime spends its money so that we are in a position to ensure that money the regime gets is not funneled into weapons of mass destruction programs or an effort to rearm.

Finally, let me say that what we have seen in recent days is clear evidence of the hypocrisy of the Iraqi regime in complaining about the fate of its people. While complaining that the Iraqi people are suffering, Iraq has failed to order and distribute food and medicine that would alleviate problems in this area. Iraq has refused, according to certain reports, humanitarian donations from certain countries.

In the current oil-for-food program that we constructed, Iraq plans to order less food and medicine for the Iraqi people than in previous phases. We also understand that enormous amounts of medicines ordered by Iraq after months of waiting sit undistributed in Ministry of Health warehouses. Iraq has also refused to propose improvements in the food basket the Iraqi people get - that is, the metaphorical food basket - and Iraq has promised for months to order nutritional supplements for vulnerable groups but has failed to do so.

In short, Iraq continues to manipulate with cynical means the plight of its people, even as we and other members of the international community are deeply concerned about the Iraqi people. In my final comment on this, since the French proposal is partially related to the humanitarian issue, let me say that we are very focused on the humanitarian problem. We have ideas and are looking at ways to improve the program so that the people of Iraq do not suffer as a result of the actions of the leadership.

So in short, to summarize, the context in which we need to address this proposal is that Iraq must disclose its weapons of mass destruction, pursuant to the unanimous decisions of the Security Council. The French proposal has some areas where we have some concerns and some questions. In other areas, we see some positive elements because it gets at the problem of ensuring there is an inspection and monitoring regime and ensuring that the regime does not misuse resources in order to rearm or reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction.

QUESTION: Two things, please. When you deal with their warehousing pharmaceuticals and food, and this is well-known -- also, you didn't touch on the fact that they don't even pump the amount of oil that they're entitled to. Apologists or a rationale for their behavior say that they simply don't have the equipment to all of the things. They don't have the trucks to distribute; the embargo keeps them from the spare parts they need to keep their oil petroleum industry going. Is there a point to that, or is it the cynical deprivation of humanitarian needs?

MR. RUBIN: I do not think there's a point to that, and I think it's a little tiresome to see people making excuses for a regime that is so clearly manipulating cynically their people. When we know that they're going to order less food and medicine than in previous phases; when we know that after months of waiting, enormous amounts of medicine are waiting in warehouses; when we know that they're not taking steps to improve the food basket for the average Iraqis or ordering nutritional supplements for vulnerable groups, I think you don't need to know more than that to know that this Iraqi regime is not doing all it can to help its people.

Let's remember -- and please, once I'd like to see you all include this fact - the embargo does not prohibit the provision of medicine and food to Iraq. If Iraq were to use its money on food and medicine for its people rather than weaponry and weapons and palaces for the regime, a lot of this problem could be handled. The fact that they won't do that is what has caused us to create an elaborate program to control the revenues, to control the use of those revenues and to try to encourage the purchase of food and medicine.

On the supply side, the oil side, all I can say is that we are ready to work with other countries to ensure that there are no obstacles to allowing Iraq the means necessary to produce the oil that is permitted by the oil- for-food program, provided we have confidence and safeguards that those efforts will not be misused for purposes other than the oil program or exaggerations or bad analysis will be used to explain why they need to spend scarce money on equipment rather than spending scarce money on the food and medicine. In other words, we are not the impediment to them being able to sell the amount of oil that is permitted. It is Iraq that is using that as an excuse, just the way it is using the demand and distribution side to cynically manipulate the international community.

QUESTION: Does that over-extend to distribution of food and medicine?

MR. RUBIN: Which offer?

QUESTION: You seem to be making an offer to make sure they - unless I misunderstand you, it seems the US is ready to help mechanically to get the oil out of the ground.

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm not proposing American oil companies going over there pumping oil. What I am saying is that we're prepared to look at ways and explore ideas to ensure that the humanitarian program - that is, both the demand side of the food and medicine and the supply side, which is the sale of oil - that there are no impediments to them moving forward as comprehensively as possible.

QUESTION: Can I get to the other question? You've just seen the French proposal. You're talking about the objective of wanting Iraq to declare its weapons, true. But the issue is inspection, and they're blocking inspection. Do you have a sense yet that the French proposal would permit adequate search, adequate monitoring of what they may have hidden, or are the French more inclined to take Iraq's word for it than the US would prefer?

MR. RUBIN: I'd rather not comment on French motivations, other than to say that certainly I think it's fair to say the United States has always been fairly skeptical about Iraq's intentions and actions; and perhaps some are not as skeptical as we are. But they will have to speak for themselves.

With respect to the French proposal, let me say that one of the positive elements that I identified was the clear need spelled out for a monitoring and inspection mechanism. Obviously, I'm giving you a preliminary reaction to some initial ideas. It's going to require further exploration and discussion. And until we've done so, I wouldn't be able to get into the level of detail that you've described.

QUESTION: As I understand it, though, the heart of their proposal is to lift the oil embargo with the monitor - while monitoring it in an appropriate way. How do you feel about lifting the embargo?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say I am sure that French officials in Paris are spinning at your description of their proposal as them proposing the lifting of the oil embargo.

What I can say on the sanctions side is that we do agree and find positive the aspects of the French proposal that make clear there must be a means of controlling how the regime spends its money so that we can ensure that Iraq doesn't use that money to rearm or reconstitute or for other nefarious purposes.

Exactly how we will get from here to there are one of the things that we are going to discuss. But we have certainly made clear that we do not support leap-frogging Security Council resolutions to lift the sanctions on Iraq in the absence of the resolutions' required confirmation that Iraq has been disarmed and is monitored.

QUESTION: Is what you're saying in any way different from or in addition to what Under Secretary Pickering had announced before Christmas about there being more oil that could be pumped in the oil-for-food program? Is this an addendum to that?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that question. All I can tell you is that I've given the importance we attach to exploring ideas on the humanitarian side. One way in which one could do that is by increasing the limit on the oil that could be sold. On the inspection and monitoring aspects of the French proposal, I've said what I can about that.

QUESTION: Jamie, would you outline or at least give us some kind of sense as to what aspects of the French proposal the United States does not agree with?

MR. RUBIN: I know that disagreement is your stock and trade, but it's not ours. We think it's preferable at this time to make clear that there are issues of concern that we want to ask for the questions about, and there are some positive elements that I have identified.

QUESTION: You've often made clear that the conditions for lifting sanctions against Iraq are laid down in Security Council resolutions and, as you say, you just can't leap-frog those resolutions. What about a brand new resolution that in a sense superseded existing resolution that, perhaps, reformulated those conditions and laid down, perhaps, even some new ones? Would you then be at a point where you would reappraise this whole issue?

MR. RUBIN: Well, that is why I gave you the main point, and that is the context in which we continue to approach the problem and would evaluate the French proposal -- namely, that under Security Council resolutions, which we continue to support, Iraq must disclose its weapons of mass destruction; and that burden has to be on Iraq. That is our view today, as it was at the time that the resolutions were passed. What other's views maybe they can speak to but, again, it is my impression that in none of the discussions that we've had - and Secretary Albright has talked to the Russian Foreign Minister in the last couple of days and we have been in contact with the Russian delegation and other delegations -- and that no delegation is saying that they want to step away from the requirement, which is in the national security of Russia, of France, of the countries in the Middle East and all the countries in the world, that Iraq must be disarmed to protect us from the threat that he poses from his behavior.

As far as what a new system would look like if we moved and talked to the French and others and find out how to move forward, I can't speculate for you. That's too many steps down the road. What I can say is we've looked at the French proposal. There's some things we have concerns about and questions about and there's some things that we find positive, and I've identified those.

QUESTION: Theoretically, that requirement could be, if not stepped away from, perhaps, rewritten?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I would think that every time a Security Council resolution passes of a substantive content, since 687, there have been new elements on the disarmament side added - 715 added certain requirements on Iraq to accept the various programs of UNSCOM and the IAEA. So, yes, a resolution was passed that created an exception for the oil-for-food program, and that's what you do as you continue to work on the objectives. I'm simply pointing out that the objective of disarming Iraq and making clear the burden of proof is on Iraq to disclose its weapons of mass destruction is and objective we continue to support strongly and is the context in which we will discuss any new proposals.

QUESTION: Is there any likelihood that the Secretary will go to Paris either to or from Moscow?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that. For those of you who have been with us for a couple of years, I'm sure you've gotten use to the fact that stops can be added and removed as per the needs of our diplomacy and the Secretary's decisions. When those stops are removed or added, I try to provide that information to you as quickly as I can.

QUESTION: Have you seen details of the Saudi initiative yet? If not, are you coming to the conclusion, perhaps, that it's not very substantial? Secondly, what do you make of Iraq's apparent attempt to mend its fences with Arab countries after the outburst last week?

MR. RUBIN: On the first question, we are in contact with the Saudi Government. Secretary Albright will be there shortly. We want to work with the Saudi Government on ideas to deal with the humanitarian plight of the Iraqi people that Saddam Hussein is uninterested in dealing with. We will do that. As I just indicated, we have some ideas and are looking at ways to improve that program, and we are doing that in consultation with the Saudi Government.

But as far as the specifics and our specific reaction to any specific idea, I don't have one at this time.

QUESTION: And the --

MR. RUBIN: Oh, and the Iraqi attempt to get out of the deep hole they've dug for themselves in the Arab world, I don't think they've even come close to filling up that hole. They can say a lot of nice words about how they want to work with other countries, but I don't think anyone will soon forget the intemperate, irrational diatribe of Saddam Hussein against fellow leaders in that region. I don't have any reason to believe that they all suddenly think he's terrific because they finally say something that's not irrational and not intemperate.

QUESTION: Yes, Jamie, today, I believe, was the seventh attempted attack of SAM reaction to patrol planes of the United States over no-fly zones in Iraq. My question is, what does the Administration see as the objective of Saddam's administration in trying to do what is technologically not likely to succeed? To shoot down a US plane, is that what they're trying to do, to get a pilot or something else? And then what is the remedy for this current situation that's going on in the no-fly zones?

MR. RUBIN: As far as Saddam's attempt, again, I think we've said this before, it's by lashing out in this way and the remarks he's made about other Arab leaders and trying to deal with the no-fly zones, we need to start from the premise of what the no-fly zones are for. That is to ensure that Iraq cannot use the skies over the North and the skies over the South to repress his people so brutally in the way he has in the past.

We have made clear that Saddam Hussein and his regime suffered damage during the last set of air strikes. I described two days ago some detail about certain assassinations in Iraq. Clearly, in the past, Iraq has tried to demonstrate that its regime is still there through actions such as this. I wouldn't rule out that as one of the motivations.

But the bottom line is that we are determined to enforce the no-fly zone; that our air crews have been acting in self-defense, firing precision guided missiles and HARMS, and there were direct hits of the Iraqi surface- to-missile sites and additional damage is being assessed. There was no damage to Coalition aircraft. Since Desert Fox, the Iraqi military has obviously increased both the pace and severity of no-fly zone violations. Despite repeated warnings, Iraqi forces have posed threats to our air crews. The actions like the ones taken today are appropriate military responses to that threat.

We have served notice, since the beginning of the no-fly zones, that we would take action to protect our forces; and on a number of occasions, we have had to resort to the use of force for this purpose. My understanding is that since the end of Desert Storm, the US has flown in excess of 140, 000 missions in support of the no-fly zone. Most have been conducted without incident. However, since the no-fly zones were declared invalid on December 23, there have been some 40 separate and distinct violations.

Our military actions are prudent responses to these violations and Iraqi actions that endanger Coalition aircraft and crews, and we have made clear that our pilots will take the necessary actions to defend themselves while carrying out the mission of enforcing the no-fly zone.

Let me simply say that with respect to the rules of engagement in dealing with this problem, I would have to refer you to the Department of Defense.

QUESTION: Do you think that in view of the superior technology and the general superiority of American air forces in this theater that Iraq, Saddam is in fact acting in a suicidal way; he's sacrificing his people by one SAM battery after another, and this just shows the insanity of the regime?

MR. RUBIN: Well, if I were an Iraqi pilot, which is something I certainly wouldn't want to be, that might be a conclusion that I drew.

QUESTION: I just want to follow up on Jonathan's earlier question about the Saudi proposal. Did I understand you correctly to say that we've recognized or acknowledged that there is the need to improve, did you say, the program?

MR. RUBIN: No, what I said was the same as I said in response to your earlier question - that we are looking at ways and exploring ideas to improve the plight of the Iraqi people through these humanitarian programs, like the oil-for-food program. The Saudis have put forward some suggestions in this area, and we are going to work with the Saudi Government because, like the Saudi Government, we share a deep concern about the plight of the Iraqi people - a concern that Saddam Hussein does not share.

QUESTION: Are those the only such ideas that the US is willing to entertain?

MR. RUBIN: No, we're exploring many different ideas, including the Saudi ideas as to how to improve the program.

QUESTION: I meant only within the oil-for-food, humanitarian aspect of the --

MR. RUBIN: Well, that's the mechanism by which they - there's only three ways to get food and medicine to Iraq: either people donate it or the Iraqis spend some of their money and but it as permitted by the sanctions. They can use their money to feed their people; they don't, but they can. Or we create a mechanism by which we induce them to sell oil for that purpose. It's hard for me to imagine any other way in which food and medicine could get to Iraq. So in those three areas - either donations or Iraq's using its own money for this purpose or using oil revenue for this purpose - that's the comprehensive set of possibilities from which one can work. That is what we'll be working from.

QUESTION: Have they been part of that discussion?

MR. RUBIN: They have traditionally been part of that discussion. We've tended to consult with many of the governments in the region about that.

QUESTION: A question and a follow-up, please. Is it the American position that a complete Iraqi disarmament and full disclosure of its past weapons of mass destruction program must occur before there can be a lifting of the oil embargo?

MR. RUBIN: I think that is pretty clear from what I have said. We cannot leap-frog the requirements of Security Council resolutions. Any lifting of sanctions pursuant to those resolutions need to be in accordance with the resolutions' requirement that Iraq's disarmament is confirmed. The resolutions lay out a decision tree based on confirming Iraq's disarmament. We believe in those resolutions.

QUESTION: To the extent that the French proposals for inspection and monitoring would replace the practices of UNSCOM, is that okay with the United States?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know how to answer that question. What I know how to tell you is what I've told you about the French proposal; which is that we find a positive element to be their focus on an inspection and monitoring system. We have always said we are prepared to look at ways to improve the effectiveness of the inspection and monitoring that UNSCOM does.

QUESTION: Have you had any reports back from the envoys who went to Libya on Lockerbie - Prince Bandar and the South African?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have anything new to share with you that would lead to any new found optimism, and I haven't seen a lot of scurrying in the relevant bureau and people concerned that this is about to break.

QUESTION: Elsewhere in Africa, Sierra Leone - the imprisoned rebel leader has made an offer - (inaudible) - to the president that if he frees him, there would be a cease-fire, some sort of a quid pro quo. Does the US have a position on that by any chance?

MR. RUBIN: The leader, who was convicted last year on eight counts of treason, was flown to Guinea yesterday, where he met with UN Special Representative Okelo and the Foreign Minister of Cote d' Ivoire, Togo and Sierra Leone.

The international delegation reportedly told the press that Sankoh had expressed his willingness for peace and for a political, not a military, solution. However, Sankoh demanded his freedom and official recognition for the RUF before ordering a cease-fire.

We are encouraged by the dialogue that has begun among the international community, the governments of Sierra Leone and the RUF. The goal is to establish an enduring cease-fire and a lasting peace.

QUESTION: The Serbia thing you mentioned in the beginning, given that this so-called top secret CIA document was waved around by two deputy prime ministers, the justice minister and it was clearly a forgery, do you intend to protest that, ask for any explanation; or are you just going to sort of brush it off and ignore it?

MR. RUBIN: Well, these kind of hysterical, paranoid ravings are not unfamiliar in that part of the world, as I'm sure you know. We have never taken great stock in the words of leaders of Serbia; we have focused on deeds. I think the absurdity of this is clear on its face, and I suspect that it will quickly redound and rebound against them all by itself.

QUESTION: So there won't be a demarche or anything like that?

MR. RUBIN: I mean, I'm not aware - I think most people's reaction was that this was so ridiculous, but the kind of antic that some of these people are known for, that we didn't see the need to do anything other than make clear the falseness of the paper.

QUESTION: I have a Moscow question. Yesterday Sandy Berger said that three more Russian entities were involved in, I believe, transferring technology to Iran. I don't know whether he was that specific. The Russians have now denied that these entities have been engaged in this activity. How sure are we of our information; how seriously do we take this?

MR. RUBIN: Let me give you a fairly comprehensive answer to that. Over the last several years, we have been working very closely with Russia to try to deal with real concerns we have in the missile and nuclear area. This was done first through the services of Frank Wisner and his counterpart Mr. Koptyev on the Russian side, and now has been taken over by Bob Gallucci.

The objective is to not only provide information to Russia about the concerns we have and the disturbing reports we have about cooperation in the missile and nuclear area, but to convince them to take it more seriously, to investigate those reports, to stop this activity and to pass laws that create a better deterrent for that activity in the future.

During the initial phases, we saw a significant amount of success. Laws were passed - or rather, export control regulations were set forth, in particular a catch-all export control, and the Russian Government took active steps to stop problems and fix problems that we had identified. That movement in the right direction has stopped, and there has been a steady deterioration in this area.

We have brought to Russia's attention for many months now the fact that two entities on the nuclear side - and they are the Nikyet Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power and Technology and the Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology. We have made clear to the Russians that on the nuclear side, we believe material contributions to Iran's nuclear weapons program have been made. We are very confident in the information we have. We have provided it to the Russians and given them several months in which to deal with this by stopping it. They are quite familiar with the level of detail our information consists of.

We made very clear to the Russians that if they failed to act, that we would be taking this kind of step well before we took it. And prior to the decision to announce the sanctions, we alerted the Russians to the fact that we would do so. So any suggestion on their part of surprise or diplomatic precedent being somehow affected is simply untrue.

Secondly, on the missile side, we believe that the Moscow Aviation Institute has provided material contributions to Iran's missile program. In both cases, we believe that militarily significant activities are taking place. We have very good confidence in the information that we've made available to the Russians to justify them stopping it. We do not believe that these are groundless charges; we believe that Russia's government must do more to deal with the problems.

QUESTION: The follow-up to that, I imagine the Secretary is planning to take this up on her trip to Moscow, and what concerns on the part of the US of how these sanctions could impact the success of her trip to Moscow.

MR. RUBIN: The Secretary, from the beginning, has made clear that we and the Russians have a lot of work to do together. We and Russia need to work very closely together on the security of Europe and the security of other parts of the world. In her many, many conversations over many meals and many discussions with then-Foreign Minister Primakov, she made very clear to him the seriousness with which we approach the problem of non-proliferation and the determination we have to use whatever means are at our disposal to respond and deter action in this area. This is no surprise to the Russians.

Clearly, the US-Russian relationship has many areas of agreement and some areas of disagreement. What we consider our goal to be, in the broadest sense to advance America's interest, is to work together where we can and cooperate together where we can and manage the differences where they exist. Clearly, this is a difference.

Now, rhetorically, there isn't a difference. The Russian Government has made clear to us that they do not support activities to promote the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iran or assistance to their missile program. But we believe that these entities that I've described to you have done just that; and this will be a part of the discussion. It won't be the most pleasant part of the discussion, but the business of diplomacy requires one to deal with the hard issues more often than the easy ones.

QUESTION: Jamie, why do you think there has been this backsliding?

MR. RUBIN: That is not something I would care to speculate from on the podium. I am prepared to describe to you the assessment we have about the situation and the deterioration. I'm sure there are many different views in the expert community about this, but we are going to try to reverse the trend and I think the seriousness with which we approach this issue has been made clear by these actions.

QUESTION: Jamie, there were a series of entities that had previously been cited in this way.

MR. RUBIN: Seven, yes.

QUESTION: Do we consider these current breaches to be more serious then those?

MR. RUBIN: There's a big difference. In the last case, the Russian Government had identified those seven entities for investigation. We told the Russians, in light of their investigation into the activities of these seven entities, that we were going to use our executive power to prevent any trade or import or export with those entities, along with their investigation into those entities' activities.

In this case, we have been urging the Russians to act in these three areas and they have not acted to our satisfaction. That is why we took the action we took.

QUESTION: Did the activities not stop after you told them?

MR. RUBIN: Apparently not.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: No, no, that wouldn't be covered necessarily by your remarks. They may not have taken action against the companies, but did the companies keep doing what you didn't like?

MR. RUBIN: We believe that these entities are engaging in activities of concern to us. I cannot say that every one of the activities that has gone on is still going on, but there are activities of concern to us that continue.

QUESTION: Is there any question that the Russian Government was aware, even before you let them know? You sometimes say that the Chinese Government doesn't know what their companies are doing, so I wondered about the Russians.

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me say that - I named the institutes which are --

QUESTION: You did - some kind of formal and government-like.

MR. RUBIN: Right, so I'd rather simply say that in our conversations with the Russian Government at the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister level, both then-Foreign Minister Primakov and current Foreign Minister Ivanov have said to us that they do not support these activities; that they face risks from Iran that they want to stop. So that is where I'd like to leave that speculation.

QUESTION: This is somewhat of a follow-up on Betsy's question, but does the US recognize and appreciate the difficulties that the Russian Government is experiencing and, in addition to that, that these institutions would be experiencing with their economic crisis, and that perhaps some of the state subsidies that these institutions had come to rely on in years past just are no longer there? Is that something that the US --

MR. RUBIN: Well, let me give you an example of why I understand the logic of the question. We're quite aware of the state of Russian missile and nuclear facilities' finances, and we've been working very hard at that. But let me give you a concrete example of why this is not in Russia's own national interest.

We are running out of the quota under which Russia can boost American satellites. I believe the number is 16 that have been authorized. That is expected to terminate, reach 16 this year. If we don't get progress on the missile proliferation problem, we are not going to be able to support increasing that quota. That is an amount of money that is on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars per year in revenue for Russia. The economics are better working with the United States and preventing Iran and other countries from getting missiles than to work surreptitiously with Iran or other countries' missile programs.

So it's not a financial question if one looks at it properly and in a macro sense.

QUESTION: How worried is the United States and how far does the US Government believe Russia is away from a, having an indigenous nuclear weapons program; and b, having --

MR. RUBIN: Russia?

QUESTION: Excuse me, Iran - and b, having --

MR. RUBIN: That would have been much easier if you had kept it at Russia.

QUESTION: And b, sort of being able to mass produce long-range ballistic missiles.

MR. RUBIN: We don't normally provide in this forum specific intelligence assessments of the Russian or the Iranian missile or nuclear programs. Let me say this - we are deeply concerned about Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons program and we are deeply concerned about Iran's missile testing and development in the medium- and long-range missile area. That is why we have been working so hard to stop it. Our efforts include not only an intensive dialogue with Russia, but using the global norms of the non- proliferation treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, et cetera, using informal non-proliferation tools like the nuclear suppliers group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, using export controls of our own and export control assistance to other countries, using interdiction of individual shipments of proliferation concern, using sanctions, as we did in this case, maintaining strong military intelligence and diplomatic capabilities. We do all this to impede the flow of sensitive technology to Iran from other countries. That is because of our deep concern about the prospects in the nuclear and missile areas.

QUESTION: So you're not prepared to increase the quota above 16, or you're not prepared to extend the program for the satellite launches? You're going to cut the program whereby Russia --

MR. RUBIN: Well, they're permitted to launch 16 satellites, and that is existing. Any effort to increase that and to permit future Russian launches of American-made satellites will require cooperation in this area of missile development and missile non-proliferation. That is a position that we have been taking. What I am trying to explain is that that involves the provision of hundreds of millions of dollars of hard currency to Russia.

QUESTION: I still don't understand. So you're going to stop in total allowing them - you may stop the program completely, or - I'm just not sure what you're saying - or they can still launch 16?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't made a final decision and so I'm not telling you what our final decision is. I'm explaining to you that if we don't increase the quota at the end of this year, Russia will not be able to launch any more satellites because they will reach the quota roughly at the end of the year. So we need to make an affirmative decision about whether we should increase the quota; and in so doing, we will take into account very seriously progress, if any, that we have made in getting Russia to stop its entities from supporting Iran's missile program.

QUESTION: The Secretary spoke to Ivanov late last night or early today, as Tass claims?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. I would have to get the time. I think it was yesterday, I don't think it was late last night; I think it was yesterday morning our time.

QUESTION: Strobe Talbott is meeting with the Russian Deputy Prime Minister today?

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: We will check that for you.

QUESTION: Here in Washington.

QUESTION: Can you tell us any more about - you talked about material contributions for these programs. Does that mean supplying equipment or is it expertise or what exactly does it --

MR. RUBIN: Well, I think with your able research efforts, a little work on the Internet, you'll be able to determine what it is that these entities do and probably answer that question for yourself in terms of the basic activities of these entities in the technical expertise area.

QUESTION: Are there any other possible consequences from their failure to take action?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we've taken this action and I'm not prepared to describe --

QUESTION: You said you hadn't taken that action yet. You said you're considering it.

MR. RUBIN: What are you talking about? We just imposed sanctions on three entities; that's an action.

QUESTION: No, I'm sorry, I meant are there any other possible economic consequences to the Russians if these three entities don't stop, or if there isn't progress in the missile proliferation?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the first and foremost consequence is increasing the chance that Iran would get a missile, which would be very much against the interest of Russia. I gave an example of an economic consequence, and I'm not prepared to speculate on any other areas at this time.

QUESTION: At the Carnegie Conference yesterday, Bob Gallucci was on a panel concerning the subject of Iran and Russia and the missile and nuclear proliferation matter. Mr. Gallucci was confronted at the end of his talk and basically his presentation was that for six months he hadn't received cooperation from the Russians, especially from Mr. Adamov at -- (inaudible). At the end of this presentation he was confronted by a Russian gentleman who said he was a representative of Mr. Adamov. He claimed, played dumb, said Russia hadn't heard any of these requests that had come from Mr. Gallucci's travels and could he please repeat them. Mr. Gallucci's response was, that's preposterous; that's not true that they hadn't been told what he had been speaking about. Do you have any reaction to this particular tactic on the part of the Russians?

MR. RUBIN: Thank you for making me feel like I was at the Carnegie Conference yesterday, which I did miss.

(Laughter.)

Having missed it, let me answer the question as best I can. I indicated in response to Betsy's question that we have told the Russians for some months now about the concerns we have with these three entities - the two in the nuclear area and the one in the missile area. We have told the Russians not only of our concerns about the problem, but of our intention to impose sanctions for some time now. Prior to announcing those decisions, we alerted the Russians to those announcements.

I have no idea who it was that enlivened your day at the Carnegie Conference and therefore I would have no way to comment on that specific event.

QUESTION: Just one more matter, Ambassador (inaudible), an Israeli and very expert man, says that the bottom line is that it's not too late to prevent the proliferation that will bring about an operational missile and weapons of mass destruction mating and a threat to Israel. It's not too late because of the refinement that has to go into the rocketry for targeting and other purposes. Is this the view of the United States - that it's not too late for Russia now to shut off the flow of technology?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we are not doing all that we're doing and making all the effort that we're making because we think it's pointless. We think it will presumably achieve some purpose.

QUESTION: Several US officials over the last year have been to Haiti to try to break the deadlock between Parliament and President Preval. On Monday he announced that he would bypass the Parliament and put into place his own prime minister, I believe the education minister. What I want to know is, the US has been supporting Haiti's Preval for a while. Are you at all embarrassed or concerned or disappointed with his decision to do that; and what's the next step?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to the shooting, let me say Ambassador Carney has spoken to President Preval, who confirmed that his sister is coherent and in stable condition. Her driver was killed. We hope the persons responsible for this horrible crime are brought to justice.

With respect to the political crisis, let me say that we regret the further gap that has developed between the executive and legislative branches in Haiti regarding the formation of a government and the continuity of the legislative function.

As you know or may know, former National Security Advisor Lake traveled to Haiti in recent days on behalf of the President and the Secretary of State to help resolve this political impasse. Some constructive discussions were held, and we hope, with continuing good faith and effort by the parties concerned, a resolution will be found. But obviously as yet, there has been no solution.

We hope the consultations will continue toward a constructive outcome. We will continue to work with all parties to resolve the impasse. We note that Parliament opened its new session yesterday and the diplomatic community, including Ambassador Carney, attended. The police fulfilled their responsibilities to protect Parliament members and allow access to the legislative building.

We know, as well, that President Preval has stated he has neither the authority to extend or dissolve the current Parliament. We and others in the diplomatic corps are urging all parties to continue their efforts to resolve this dispute.

QUESTION: Are you pulling your support from Preval, or do you still support the Preval Government?

MR. RUBIN: Well, my job is to tell you our views; your job is to interpret them. Our views are that we regret the further gap that has developed between the executive and legislative branches in Haiti. The efforts we have been making to try to resolve this problem - let me say that we want to see that continue. That is our view for now.

QUESTION: Jamie, can I ask you on Secretary Albright's traveling and another thing with her? It's a logistic thing; I just want to get it straight - it's getting late. She is going to Saudi Arabia --and you made the point about Iraq. Is that the main purpose of her stop there?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: All right. She's going to Egypt?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: What is the main purpose of that?

MR. RUBIN: Well, Secretary Albright is going to both Saudi Arabia and Egypt and will be meeting with leaders there who have wanted to talk to her for some time and have invited her. The main topic on the agenda, as you can see from the main topic on your agenda when you began the day today, is Iraq.

QUESTION: Iraq is big on Israel's agenda, and as you recall, the President had intended to send her - he said he would. Dennis went instead. I don't want to belabor the point. It's in the neighborhood, it worries about Iraq. I asked you about Jordan, but the King has just seen the President and the Secretary so I guess that's not necessary. Why not Israel - why not stop in Israel for a few hours?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as I explained at the time, the reason the Secretary is not going to Israel and the Palestinian Authority, pursuant to what the President said in Gaza, is because that was designed to be at the end of the 12-week period that would have involved the implementation in full of the Wye Agreement, which obviously hasn't happened. Her visit there could have sealed the ending of that agreement and begun intensifying the permanent status negotiations.

So that purpose of such a trip is no longer operative, given what is going on in the region. It has not been our practice to go to Israel every time we've gone to the Gulf to talk about Iraq. I will get you some travel lists to confirm that fact.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - Mr. Baker didn't always go there because there was a concerted effort to not put Israeli in the line of fire. This is insulting.

MR. RUBIN: In the last two years, well after the Baker period, Secretary Albright has traveled to the region and visited with leaders in the Arab world to discuss the subject of Iraq without going to discuss the Middle East peace process in Israel. We don't regard that as anything more than a simple focus of a trip. Since there isn't a lot to be done now on Wye that Ambassador Ross can't do, who is there, we are making the decision that it is appropriate and proper for us to visit Saudi Arabia and Egypt and we have no plans to go to Israel.

QUESTION: (Inaudible)-because Iraq was also my point, but I won't belabor it. Now what to Frank Gaffney, I suppose it is, saying she ought to resign?

MR. RUBIN: You know, I read that about the embassy bombings in which Secretary Albright took full responsibility. Let me just say on a personal note, with the end of the Cold War and the end of perhaps even the post- Cold War period, everybody looks for lodestars and ways in which they can understand how to think about the new world. What has become a lodestar for me is that invariably, Frank Gaffney is proposing things that are dangerous for the United States. So if Gaffney's for it, I'm usually against it; and that's certainly true in this case.

QUESTION: Michael Jordan -- (inaudible) --

MR. RUBIN: I don't want to touch Michael Jordan.

QUESTION: The political consulting firm that was broken into here in Washington - do you have any information on either Israeli involvement or just any further information on just the investigation?

MR. RUBIN: We've seen the reports. It's a law enforcement issue and being handled by the law enforcement authorities.

QUESTION: Has the Israeli Government or opposition asked for your help or information or offered any assistance in the investigation?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware of that; I'll check that for you.

QUESTION: Does the Secretary not see any need to travel to Israel and the Palestinian Authority until the terms of the Wye Agreement are fulfilled?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't want to make such hard and fast rule. The Secretary of State will travel to Israel and Gaza when she thinks it's appropriate and proper and can advance the peace process. That has been her practice in the past; it will continue to be her practice.

With respect to a specific trip called for in several weeks by the President in Gaza, I was explaining that the context in which that trip was to take place has changed dramatically.

QUESTION: I'm not sure I heard Barry's little follow-up and your rejoinder. Do I take it you don't see any foreign policy implications to Michael Jordan's resignation now?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I know that you'll have to consult the basketball experts or lawyers.

QUESTION: I thought you were one.

MR. RUBIN: Well, all I can tell you about Michael Jordan is that it does make it harder to get the same thrill and excitement from watching basketball without watching him dunk from the foul line.

QUESTION: Does the United States still believe it's possible that the terms of the Wye Agreement, and ultimately Oslo, will be able to be fulfilled before May 4?

MR. RUBIN: We strongly believe that the Wye Agreement should be implemented. We believe the Palestinians have taken two important steps in fighting terrorism and in revising the Charter as per the Wye accord. There are a number of other areas where we think more needs to be done by the Palestinians, and we think that can be done if there's better communication between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

On the Israeli side, as far as I am aware, nothing has been done to implement the second phase of the further re-deployment or other parts of the Wye Agreement. So we very much want both sides to act in accordance with the agreement and act to implement the agreement. On the Israeli side, we note that it was approved by the government and the Knesset, and we believe that it should be implemented.

QUESTION: Is the United States urging the Israeli Government to do more?

MR. RUBIN: I think I just did.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Can I just ask about Scott Ritter's latest claim that he himself installed the listening device in Iraq for the US based on Butler's orders and that intelligence from that very device was used to select targets for Desert Fox?

MR. RUBIN: I think we've been very clear on the fact that UNSCOM performed an important mission in finding out what Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities are. That was required by the Security Council.

With respect to Mr. Ritter's latest revelation about some secret, I will leave it to him and his conscience to discuss that subject.

(The briefing concluded at 2:25 P.M.)


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