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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #28, 98-03-03

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


1198

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Tuesday, March 3, 1998

Briefer: James P. Rubin

ANNOUNCEMENTS
1		Secretary testifies tomorrow, no daily press briefing
1		Secretary Albright departs for Ukraine on Thursday, March 5

IRAQ 1-5 Interpretation of UN Security Council resolution calling for Iraqi compliance 1-3 UNSC authorization useful but not necessary for potential use of force 3-4 No timeframe for early test of Iraq's compliance with UNSCOM inspection agreement 3 UN SYG Annan's assurance that UNSCOM retains control over inspection process 4-7 Requirements for lifting sanctions; peaceful intentions 6,8 No USG intent to conduct bilateral US-Iraq meetings 6 Reported Iranian military incursion into eastern Iraq 7 Trigger for military action 7-8,15 No reaction to alleged FBI investigation of spy providing US military info to GOI 12 Opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi's remarks to Congress re failure of promised USG support; Radio Free Iraq; USG contacts with opposition groups

PEACE PROCESS 8-9 Israel press (Ma'ariv) report on Israeli military withdrawal from Lebanon 9 White House meeting on Middle East peace process, revitalization of talks 9-11 USG view of synchronized Israeli-Palestinian implementation; US "ideas" 9-10 Possible Albright-Netanyahu meeting in London during this trip unlikely 11 Greece concerns about expanding Israeli-Turkey relationship; effect on ME peace talks 11 USG support for relationships supporting Israel's security and ability to negotiate 11 Request for public USG assessment of responsibility for talks stalemate

CUBA 12-14 USG reaction to American citizen travel to Cuba, meetings with officials 14 Secretary Albright's Miami meetings w/ Cuban-American groups 14-15 Canadian OAS Ambassador's proposal to reinstate Cuba as active member at Summit of theAmericas, reject unilateral actions such as Helms-Burton

SERBIA / FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA 15-16 No proposal to send international forces to Kosovo; US condemns violence; Albright contacts w/ Cook, Primakov 16 Potential need for Contact Group meeting to discuss violence in Kosovo

BANGLADESH 16 USG support for freedom of the press

TURKEY / GREECE 17 GOT call for dialogue with Greece; Foreign Minister Pangalos talks in US

RUSSIA 17 Atomic Energy Minister resigns; USG expects bilateral dialogue will continue

MEXICO 17 Alleged GOM request for copy of DEA memo on US certification decision 17-18 Sen. Helms resolution rejecting Administration certification of Mexico

DEPARTMENT 18 Cannot rule out possible additional meetings during Secretary's upcoming travel 18-20 Requested readout of Secretary's conversation w/ Russian Foreign Minister Primakov


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #28

TUESDAY, MARCH 3, 1998, 12:40 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. RUBIN: Welcome to the State Department briefing. Today is Tuesday. Tomorrow the Secretary will be testifying; we will not be briefing. And on Thursday, as you know, she will leave on her trip to Ukraine.

Mr. Schweid.

QUESTION: It may be worthwhile, I think, to go into the Security Council resolution again. In at least one newspaper's headline, the Security Council has not authorized using force against Iraq. Richardson says he's happy with what they did. Is this authority to use force? Is that what severest consequences could mean, if Iraq reneges?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm going to break my rule about not reflecting on particular newspapers or media organizations, in this case. The actual headline in the newspaper is much worse than the one you read.

QUESTION: This is the web site headline.

MR. RUBIN: Right. The actual newspaper headline suggests to me that that headline writer should go into fiction work, rather than nonfiction work. The United States did not seek authorization to use force, and any suggestion that we did is based on fiction, not fact.

This resolution was the clearest possible threat to use force that the Security Council has taken since this crisis began last year. The words "severest consequences" is diplomatic code for military action. As you know, the United States has said for some time that we do not believe we need Security Council authorization for the use of military force, and that is why we did not seek Security Council authorization.

So those who suggested that we didn't get what we sought were writing fictional work. We wanted something different, and we got what we wanted. What we wanted was the clearest possible message to the Iraqi regime that a failure to comply with this agreement would lead to worldwide condemnation and increasing support for the US determination to use military force, if necessary.

I can only say that I remember sitting in this room just a couple of weeks ago - standing in this room - and hearing from all of you about the lack of support for the threat to use military force from countries around the world. This Security Council resolution now unanimously puts the Security Council on record -- and therefore, by implication, the world on record -- supporting the strongest possible threat language you can use in diplomacy.

I was in New York for four years. I never saw the word "severest," the superlative form of the word, used. I often saw "grave"; I often saw "severe"; I often saw "serious". But "severest" means there is no more severe consequence, which makes quite clear that what we're talking about here is military force.

It is true that some countries did not want this resolution to authorize the use of force, but they were arguing against a phantom. We did not seek authority to use force. So what's changed here is the fact that the world is now supporting a strong, clear threat that military force will ensue if Iraq violates this agreement. And that's why we think this resolution was so important.

QUESTION: If this is the strongest language that you've seen after your experience there, why stop short there? You have severest consequences; why not just spell it out once and for all for Saddam to see and really have that to be the icing on the cake? Why not just make it plain?

MR. RUBIN: Well, as is normal in the world of diplomacy and the resolutions of the Security Council, even Resolution 678 - the Gulf War Resolution - did not spell it out to the satisfaction of some people, if they wanted to see the word, "military force" or "ground invasion" or "air power." Those are not words that are used in Security Council resolutions.

That resolution, 678, authorized all necessary means to be used. We have said for some time that our view is that if Iraq violates this agreement, it will be in fundamental violation of Resolution 687, the Cease-Fire Resolution, which will then give rise to Resolution 6878, which authorizes the use of military force. So in our view, a new authority to use force is not necessary. What was useful was a clear threat from the international community directed at the leadership in Iraq that a failure to comply would lead to the severest consequences. That's what the resolution says. That is a marked shift from the international lay of the land that existed just a couple of weeks ago, and that's why this resolution is so important.

QUESTION: Does this in any way - some might look at this and see the UN once again backing away from something and giving Saddam higher ground, even yet again.

MR. RUBIN: All I can say is you'd have to use an awful powerful microscope to find anything in this resolution other than a clear threat to use military force - the same threat that the Security Council obviously did not make two weeks ago.

QUESTION: You call this a useful resolution. Why has it been, from this podium and elsewhere the last week or so, there have been statements, repeated statements that no resolution is necessary at all?

MR. RUBIN: Well, that's the difference between the word "useful" and the word "necessary," Roy. We've made clear that a resolution is not necessary, from our standpoint, in terms of international legal authority. We believe the international legal authority exists, based on the fact that Iraq, if it violates this agreement, will be in fundamental violation of the cease- fire, and therefore the underlying authority to use force will pertain. So that is what is necessary.

What is useful is a signal from the entire world that a failure to comply with this resolution would lead to the most severe consequences.

QUESTION: My question is why, then - why not strive for what you now say is a useful resolution? Why not have said this would be a useful thing to have a resolution doing the following things?

MR. RUBIN: I think I just said that it was useful.

QUESTION: Yes, but why not - in other words, you've been taking such a neutral stance on the value of a resolution for the last week or so.

MR. RUBIN: I think if you look back at the words that we've used - and I know you do that on a regular basis - we've said that a strong message from the Security Council would be welcome.

QUESTION: What about the Russians this morning were talking about the issue of an automatic recourse to force. And their interpretation was that, if there was a breach, that it would return to the Security Council, and you wouldn't have - you wouldn't automatically --

MR. RUBIN: Well, I wouldn't be surprised if there was a breach, the Security Council would talk about it. What I am saying is that, from the standpoint of the United States -- the country that has gathered the military force in the Gulf and is prepared to use that military force -- we believe the authority exists; the warning has now been issued; and Saddam Hussein should be put on notice that the President of the United States has the power, the will and the authority to use military power, if he violates this agreement.

QUESTION: One of the things that the United States was looking for was an early test. Do you have any assurances now from UNSCOM or anybody else that there will be an early test of the Iraqis' willingness to cooperate?

MR. RUBIN: I don't have a time frame for you. I believe that those who have been in contact with UN officials are reasonably confident that they are working assiduously on developing a program for going back into Iraq and seeing whether Iraq is going to move from a pattern of non-cooperation to a pattern of cooperation. And they are working assiduously on such a program, but they would be the ones to describe the time frame.

As I indicated yesterday, Chairman Butler - and I will also point, by the way, to another statement here for those of you who seemed also interested in taking your microscope out when this agreement was put forward. Secretary General Annan, the signer of the agreement, makes clear in his statement that the agreement ensures that UNSCOM, the UN Special Commission, "remains in full operational control of the inspection process." Secondly, Secretary General Annan makes clear that, according to the agreement, Iraq has to provide immediate, unconditional, unrestricted access to those teams to every area, facility, piece of equipment, individuals and means of transportation.

So for those of you who were so anxious to find holes in this agreement, or those outside this room who might have done so prematurely, let me point out that the two principles we went in - and I know these words are going to sound familiar to you - total access and operational control for UNSCOM were preserved and strengthened, and those are the words of the Secretary General.

QUESTION: Jamie, on the issue of sanctions relief, there is a provision in this resolution that talks about fulfillment of Resolution 687, I think it is. And I'd like to know, is there some light at the end of the tunnel, as some of the other countries have talked about it, for the Iraqis, should they comply with the Annan agreement?

MR. RUBIN: If Iraq complies with this agreement -- and that's a big "if" - - in other words, if Saddam Hussein acts like a wise man not a wise guy and implements this agreement, then the UN Special Commission will be in a position to make judgments that they have been unable to make -- namely, whether Iraq is in compliance with Resolution 687's provisions on destroying weapons of mass destruction; whether they can certify that the Iraqis have eliminated all of their weapons of mass destruction; and whether they can certify that the long-term monitoring regime is in place that will prevent them from ever building weapons of mass destruction or missiles over 150 kilometers. When that is in place and when Iraq is in compliance with other relevant provisions of UN resolutions, then it's possible to think about lifting sanctions.

We are not sanguine about that prospect. We have grave doubts that Iraq has changed its behavior. We have doubts whether Saddam Hussein has changed his stripes. Will he move from a pattern of non-cooperation across the board with the United Nations to a pattern of cooperation is a question that, at this point, it's hard to answer yes to.

With regard to the resolution, it merely points out what every resolution points out, which is that Iraq is not in compliance with those provisions and that if it were, that would be a different situation. So that's, as far as we're concerned, a statement of the obvious.

QUESTION: Does the fulfillment of Paragraph XXII of that resolution satisfy the obligations? Or are there a whole series of other obligations that have to be carried out by Iraq in connection with other resolutions?

MR. RUBIN: Well, it's been our view that Iraq has to comply with all relevant resolutions. And that goes beyond simply the question of weapons of mass destruction. I would caution you against tossing around the word "Paragraph XXII." There is a preamble to the Resolution 687 that talks about Iraq's peaceful intentions. The point there is, if Iraq has not changed its pattern of behavior, and it were to temporarily comply with weapons of mass destruction provisions, but demonstrate flagrant abuse of all the rest of the Council's demands, one would have justified doubts as to whether the moment they had oil to export and money to import and pour into its weapons of mass destruction, whether they would just kick the inspectors out and the long-term monitoring system out and begin building weapons of mass destruction in earnest.

So our view has been based on the rather straightforward premise that we are looking at Iraq's peaceful intentions. We're looking at a pattern of compliance with UN resolutions across the board; and that one shouldn't over-interpret these things when one's dealing with a dictator as dangerous as Saddam Hussein.

QUESTION: What are the other relevant resolutions - other relevant things that Iraq must do in order --

MR. RUBIN: Well, there is a list, and I will get that for you. But there are more than one, and I will try to get you a considered legal judgment on this. But they include things like accounting for Kuwaiti prisoners of war that are still missing - cooperating in that effort, which they have not done so to date. They include returning Kuwaiti property that was stolen in the invasion that the Security Council authorized a force to reverse. And there are other provisions, but those are two examples.

QUESTION: You've spent a lot of time today talking about the technicalities of the agreement and how it was negotiated and what it means. The Iraqi deputy prime minister, who signed the agreement yesterday said, "We will live up to this agreement. It is our agreement; it was not imposed upon us." My question to you is, does the US see anything qualitatively different about the nature of this agreement as distinct from all the other resolutions which it embodies and so on? And is there, in your view, any more hope that because of the way this agreement was reached, that perhaps it has more success at security compliance?

MR. RUBIN: Let me answer it this way - Iraq is a dictatorship, and Saddam Hussein has been in charge of that country all along. And if Saddam Hussein wanted his people to comply with UN resolutions all along, I am confident they would have followed his orders, lest they suffer the fate of those who have not.

So we do not think that the simple fact that Saddam Hussein had a discussion about this necessarily leads us to be more optimistic about their intentions. But frankly, it's not intentions, with regard to this agreement, that matter. What matters is whether Iraq lives up to the agreement, and the proof of that will come in the testing.

Saddam Hussein has had numerous opportunities to live up to the resolutions of the Security Council over the last five and a half, six years. He's failed to capitalize on those opportunities. If he does so this time, that's fine and good. That is the best way for the United States and the international community to combat the threat he poses from maintaining weapons of mass destruction. But we have no illusions about who this man is and what his pattern of behavior has been. If he decides to change that pattern of behavior, we will be pleasantly surprised.

QUESTION: And if I can just follow up, in light of the comment by Tariq Aziz -- and also in light of your comment about the fact that Saddam Hussein had a discussion about this agreement -- is there any consideration being given in the Administration now to having any kind of discussion with the Iraqi Government; that is, the US having such a discussion with the Iraqi Government, or perhaps the US in conjunction with others on the Security Council -- the P-5 or any other combination the US might want to suggest?

MR. RUBIN: My understanding, the existing pattern has been as follows, is that we do not have bilateral meetings with the Iraqi leadership. We have met for what we in the diplomatic business call demarches, where a specific message is delivered. Ambassador Albright - or Secretary Albright, when she was Ambassador Albright, in New York, has done that in the past with Iraqi Ambassador Hamdoon. That kind of contact has existed, so it's not that there has been no contact.

But what we want to focus on -- and the reason why we do not believe it's appropriate to change that pattern -- is the fact that Iraq is in flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions. Iraq's complaint has often tried to direct itself at the United States, but it's not the United States that passed this resolution demanding compliance and making clear that military force was a realistic threat if they did not comply; that was the United Nations Security Council.

So we think that so long as Iraq is not in compliance with UN resolutions, there is no point in having meetings. I am not aware, therefore, that there's been any rethinking of that position in a comprehensive way.

QUESTION: Also on Iraq, have you heard of an Iranian incursion into what would be Eastern Iraq, in which there were reported scores of casualties?

MR. RUBIN: I've heard some reports and rumors about that, but I have no details about it.

QUESTION: Could you look into that?

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: Jamie, going back, you were just saying, in answer to Ralph's questions, that Iraqi intentions did not - it's not the intentions that matter in the carrying out of the Annan agreement. But when I was asking you about sanctions, you were saying what we want to look at is the intentions - the peaceful intentions.

MR. RUBIN: Boy, you really can work the nit-picking, Roy, go ahead.

QUESTION: Well, it may sound like nit-picking at the podium, but it sounds awful like an inconsistency to my ears.

MR. RUBIN: No, it's not an inconsistency. In the one case, what we are dealing with is a regime that has shown a pattern of disregard for the international community; that has violated resolutions, invaded another country, failed to comply with the resolution setting forth the cease-fire. In the other case, we are having our doubts about the intentions of Iraq, and waiting to see its pattern of behavior.

So I really don't understand the inconsistency. I mean, it's useful, perhaps, in argumentation to note the inconsistency; but I don't see the inconsistency.

QUESTION: Well, it's very simple. If you are looking for compliance, according to a written agreement, then there's a way to measure whether there's compliance. But if you're going to try to read people's intentions by overriding other measures, then --

MR. RUBIN: But, Roy, if you listen to what I said, what I said was that we're not - the words "peaceful intentions" are significant, and we are going to measure them by actions, Roy. I said actions in the case of Kuwaiti prisoners; actions in the case of Kuwaiti equipment. In other words, I said that peaceful intentions can be measured by actions, just the way intentions, in the case of this agreement, can be measured by actions in its implementation.

QUESTION: Well, doesn't compliance - just to finish up, doesn't compliance with this agreement -- and this is a hypothetical, to say the least - constitute a demonstration of intentions?

MR. RUBIN: The Iraqis have a long, long way to go to build back the confidence that was lost by the international community on the day they invaded Kuwait and the day that they ravaged the country of Kuwait; the day that they burned oil wells; the day that they slaughtered their own people in the Kurdish areas. They have a long, long way to go to build back confidence by the international community in their pattern of behavior.

QUESTION: -- back to the next phase, the testing of the accord. Does the United States feel, then, that military action might be warranted at the first glitch?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we'll make that judgment at the time and place of our choosing. But we are making clear the principle underlying our policy, which is that a violation of this agreement is one that will, in our view, justify the use of military force.

QUESTION: Could you comment on a report that the FBI has been made aware that an Iraqi spy passed information from the Pentagon to a senior intelligence official in Baghdad? And has this individual been captured or - -

MR. RUBIN: I'm smiling because I think I counted the word "FBI" once, the word "intelligence" three times in the question, and I just wondered what your hopes were in terms of me answering the question.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Well, you know what my hopes are; you know I have to ask the question.

(Laughter.)

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: We also know that you do occasionally address all of those issues from this podium.

MR. RUBIN: Never when they're combined like that. No, no comment.

QUESTION: Never say never.

MR. RUBIN: When they're combined in that particular way, it's a standard I don't think we'll meet in the next three years.

QUESTION: Can I ask a question about the report that the leader of Jordan, who is coming here shortly, has suggested that what is needed is a dialogue between the United States and Iraq directly now. In the last 25 years, we've only had normal relations with Iraq, I believe, about five years. You can blame that on them, of course, but what is your attitude on that? Secondly, would you comment on the report in Maariv this morning that there was a mission by Ambassador David Newton, a fairly senior Department of State official, to Damascus, probably in connection with the possible withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon?

MR. RUBIN: The first question I believe I gave an extensive answer that required me to stop myself and drink water twice to that question when Ralph asked it to me. The short answer is, I don't believe there's any consideration being given to changing our view that Iraq should meet with the United Nations and answer the concerns of the United Nations, not the United States.

With regard to the second issue, I believe the ambassador that you're referring to was not on a diplomatic mission, but was on a mission to explain our policy to various governments and officials and journalists and other interested figures in the region, and was not engaged in any diplomatic exercise along those lines.

QUESTION: I'm tempted to ask you, did they clap him on the back and say, atta boy, that's the way to go?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know the answer to that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) in Paris, with representatives of Prime Minister Netanyahu?

MR. RUBIN: Who?

QUESTION: Newton.

MR. RUBIN: I can assure you that the channel for dealing with the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on the Middle East peace process has not changed. That channel runs from the President through the Secretary of State, directly into the special Middle East coordinator's office; and that is where the business is done.

QUESTION: Do you have anything on the talking at the White House today about Middle East policy, by various people, including the Secretary?

MR. RUBIN: Yes. Mike McCurry, I believe, mentioned - discussed this. But to the extent that I asked the Secretary about this, she said that she has been actively engaged in an internal process to try to see whether there are steps we can take to revitalize the increasingly moribund Middle East peace process. We have grave concerns about this. There hasn't been any progress. Neither of the parties are making the hard decisions that need to be taken. And we're looking at ways to revitalize it.

To this point, we have adopted the view that our role should be one of promoting ideas, presenting those ideas, looking for ways to narrow the gaps and expand the areas of agreement. Those have obviously not borne fruit, and we're looking at what we can do to revitalize it. But I don't believe any firm decisions have been made.

QUESTION: Let me ask a quick follow-up. We lost - at least some of us lost the thread of this issue, because Iraq dominated the news.

MR. RUBIN: Yes.

QUESTION: Ned Walker, Ambassador Walker, was the next in line to try -- I think you were working - I think downscale instead of upscale - but the ambassador in Israel was the centerpiece, was the mediator. I don't know where we stand; maybe you can tell us: where do the two sides stand now on at least the Clinton suggestion of a procedural way to have withdrawal synchronized to security steps? Has that been accepted?

MR. RUBIN: We believe there was generalized acceptance of the idea that you would have a parallel process, but the devil was in the details; and the details were how much land, what specific steps the Palestinian Authority should take in the area of security, what the timing of any transfer of land would be, what the quality of any transfer of land would be. But the idea of a parallel process we didn't feel was running into resistance. It was the substance of those four issues that I mentioned that were unable to be overcome, and that is still the case.

The discussions that Ambassador Walker was having were primarily on the so- called interim issues -- the airport, the seaport, the safe passage - and to the, although not the surprise, but the continuing concern of the Secretary, even on issues like that, there was no ability on the two parties to overcome technical issues that seem to matter more than they ought to, and not enough political will was being exerted to overcome those technical issues. So that has not made a lot of progress, either.

QUESTION: Doesn't sound like it's right for her to see Netanyahu in London, does it?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I can say that there - I checked this out all morning, and there's no evidence that I'm aware of that anyone here is giving that serious consideration.

QUESTION: There's another report in an Israeli newspaper this morning, which on Prime Minister Netanyahu addressing a group, warned the United States against going public with any plan designed to break the deadlock. First, is there any American plan per se - anything that you would regard as a formal plan? And second, has the United States said it would go public with it if there were not agreement between the parties?

MR. RUBIN: Let me begin that answer by saying, with regard to the Israeli press, my normal rules of press criticism do not hold.

(Laughter.)

And there are many examples in the Israeli press of what I could call rumor that somehow manage to get themselves into the newspaper, including the firm statement that we were meeting Prime Minister Netanyahu in London, in one of the Israeli publications.

With regard to your specific questions, there is no US plan; and we have not told anybody that we intend to go public with our plan if they don't agree to something that we don't have. We do have ideas for how to overcome the gaps and the obstacles in the four areas that I mentioned earlier - namely, the steps the Palestinians would have to take in the area of security; the quantity of land; the quality of land; the timing for any transfer of a further redeployment. We've had ideas, and we've been discussing those ideas assiduously with the parties. That process is still ongoing, but we cannot report any progress in that area.

QUESTION: Just to follow up, and without regard to US or Israeli newspapers or reports, but isn't it possible that you're dealing with a semantic difference in what you call ideas and other people are, loosely or wrongly, even, interpreting as plans? Would the same - would your answer hold for your ideas as well as the non-existent plan?

MR. RUBIN: Well, semantics matter in the Middle East; I've learned that. By adding a comma here or a colon there or an adjective here, my phone starts ringing off the hook. So let me just say that we have said what our view is about the ideas that we've put forward. If the Secretary believes that that effort of discussing those ideas has run its course and we intend to pursue some other tactic to try to promote peace, we'll let you know; but it hasn't run its course yet.

QUESTION: Another topic --

QUESTION: No, the same topic. (Inaudible) - object to you - they certainly speak - the whole bit about semantics. We may be talking past the point when they object publicly, as the ambassador to the UN did yesterday, about anybody - any third party trying to impose a settlement. But is there any resistance to Dennis Ross throwing out numbers as to how much ground Israel should give up? You may call them ideas, but they come awfully close to suggesting the contours of an agreement. Anybody dislike that particularly?

MR. RUBIN: I'm sure there are some critics, who must criticize to earn a living, who don't like that. But as far as the Palestinian Authority and the government of Israel are concerned, I think they have seen Ambassador Ross' role of putting forward ideas and the Secretary's role of putting forward ideas to try to overcome the impasse as useful and constructive, in the sense that they continue to urge us to do more on the peace process rather than less.

QUESTION: Can I try one fast? Months ago, when Israel and Turkey were beginning to solidify some sort of a defense agreement, the State Department said they thought it was a good thing. It's growing, and the Greek Government is becoming increasingly uneasy and vitriolic. There's a report that - I didn't check it out, so I shouldn't quote it - but that it was called by a high-ranking Greek official a "pact of the wicked." What is the US Government's view as to the bearing this Israeli-Turkish agreement might have on Israel's confidence to make peace?

MR. RUBIN: We believe that this kind of a relationship between two democracies, two allies -- Turkey being an ally and Israel being a country we've committed to the security of in the Middle East -- is appropriate. It's a dangerous neighborhood, and it's perfectly appropriate for those two countries to work together on security issues. So if others don't like that, we respectfully disagree.

With regard to whether it would improve the prospects for Israel being able to sign a peace agreement, let me say this. We have been seeking, as our overarching goal that President Clinton has laid out, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, including with Syria, including with Lebanon, including with all of Israel's neighbors. That is the goal of the peace process. To the extent that any security arrangements or relationships improve Israel's security and willingness to enter into such an agreement, that is a good thing for those who support the peace process, and we are foremost among them.

QUESTION: The Secretary has said in the past that when she hits an impasse and one party or the other is not cooperating, she will give details in public, she'll be candid. Since you're saying that both sides have failed to show the will to move ahead, and they're raising technical difficulties, is this a reason you can't give us some elaboration of exactly what each side is doing to --

MR. RUBIN: I believe, in answer to a question, two questions ago, I said, when the Secretary of State is ready to say that and to state publicly her views on what ought to be done, she will do that. In the meantime, we are continuing to work on our assistance by presenting ideas, in the hopes of overcoming them. And if that tactic reaches the end of its diplomatic string, we'll let you know.

QUESTION: I have an Iraq question also. Mr. Chalabi - Ahmed Chalabi spoke in Congress yesterday, in the Senate, and talked about guarantees that had been written to the opposition as early as 1993 that were then not carried out. He also called for a lot of support for the opposition to establish a base in, I think, Southern Iraq. Two questions - one is what your comment is on what he had to say. And secondly, what kind of reception is he getting in the Administration? Has he seen top people at the State Department?

MR. RUBIN: We do have meetings with Iraqi opposition figures on a regular basis. It's not our practice to detail every meeting; but we do meet with them.

As far as the set of ideas put forward - and I'm not going to be able to comment on the specific ones he put forward, because I haven't seen them - but there has been a set of ideas out there that we have talked about in the past, including Radio Free Iraq, and other steps to work more effectively with an Iraqi opposition. We examine and review those ideas, and some of them appear worth exploring, and we're exploring them.

QUESTION: Secondly, on the question of the guarantees that the Iraq opposition had and that the Administration failed to carry out - he says he has a letter from Vice President Gore that promised support.

MR. RUBIN: Yes, I can't comment on somebody saying they have some letter that I haven't seen.

QUESTION: Jamie?

MR. RUBIN: Yes, and then we'll go over here and then we'll go in the back.

QUESTION: Going to Cuba, there's been some travel --

MR. RUBIN: Going to the Cuba issue.

QUESTION: Yes, well, the - yes, whatever. Let's just --

MR. RUBIN: We're not going to Cuba.

QUESTION: We're not traveling there, right. Leonardo DiCaprio and a couple other celebrities have been in Cuba recently. He was there about two weeks ago, and he said he wanted to go down and see things first hand. Harper's Bazaar had a photo shoot down there with Kate Moss and Naomi Campbell, I'm told.

MR. RUBIN: This is news to me.

QUESTION: The question I have is, are these sort of visits - does the US consider them productive? I believe that Kate Moss and Naomi Campbell actually met with Fidel, and Naomi came out saying that he was a swell guy.

(Laughter.)

And I'm just wondering what the US thinks about this?

(Laughter.)

And if this would --

QUESTION: Is that the Kate Moss guidance?

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: And if this would in any way --

MR. RUBIN: It doesn't say Kate Moss in here.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Does it say the Pope? He's a somewhat larger figure in this.

QUESTION: Are these visits a good thing?

MR. RUBIN: At the risk of putting us in disagreement with any honorable figures in the fashion industry, we do not think that Fidel Castro is a swell guy.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: You don't include the Pope in the fashion industry, but the Pope is looking for some conciliation and she's going to see the Pope.

MR. RUBIN: With regard to the idea of visits, the - we understand that this group did go there. The spending of funds in Cuba by US citizens and residents is strictly limited to avoid providing the Cuban Government with the financial resources needed to continue its repressive policies. Certain categories of travelers can be authorized to spend money in Cuba. Some, such as journalists, can travel under general license.

We think that the relevant restrictions of the US Government should apply; that the gentleman you referred to was operating under those restrictions. We have no reason to believe otherwise. Our effort has been focused on how to promote democracy in Cuba. And we have said for some time that we are hopeful that Fidel Castro will change his policies, and that if there is fundamental change in Cuba's policies, we are prepared to respond appropriately.

We haven't seen that, even in the case of the prisoner releases. We have concerns that some of these people were forced into exile; others face re- arrest. That is not what the Pope envisaged, I suspect, when he called for people to be able to express their views.

So there are rules and regulations that apply even to important figures in the fashion industry, and those applied in this case.

QUESTION: So do you think - but should - does US feel it's good for celebrities to continue these visits? Are they promoting something? Is it deterring or what?

MR. RUBIN: I'm going to have to get you a considered answer for the record on that. But we certainly don't think Fidel Castro is a swell guy.

QUESTION: I have a Cuba question. There's some tea leaf-reading going on down in Miami with regard to some of the meetings that the Secretary had with Cuban-American groups. She evidently met for quite a while with a group called El Dictorio, which is a group which seems to favor democratic transition in a peaceful means in Cuba; and that she kept the other group, the Cuban CANF organization, waiting. And there is - they are reading the tea leaves and saying, is there a change in US policy because this other group was kept waiting?

MR. RUBIN: I was at those meetings with the Secretary, or I accompanied her to Florida, and I know that she had very constructive and excellent meetings with all the Cuban-American groups that she met with. And I don't know whether some thought they were kept waiting, but certainly there was no intention whatsoever by the Secretary of State to signal a change in our Cuba policy, based on the fact that somebody may or may not have been kept waiting. There was certainly no intention.

Those meetings can be pretty hectic. They can run a little longer than planned. She had excellent discussions with all the Cuban-American groups she met with. She inquired of them, as she intends to inquire of the Pope, what they make of Cuba in the aftermath of the Pope's visit -- whether they see any openings that didn't exist before, whether they see any fundamental changes on the ground in the views of the Cuban people and their commitment to democracy and their willingness to act to promote democracy.

So it was very much an analytical discussion of what is the best way to meet the principles of our Cuba policy, which are to promote democratic government there; to ensure that civil society is expanded; to make sure that migration is safe, legal and orderly. Those are the primary principles of our Cuba policy. This was an analytical discussion there, as I suspect she will have in the Vatican with the Pope, about how best to achieve those goals.

QUESTION: On Cuba also. The ambassador of Canada, at the Organization of American States, yesterday said that they are trying to - a group of ambassadors, they are trying to propose, in the Summit of the Americas, the re-installation of Cuba as an active member of the Organization of the American States. And they say they are going to try also at the same time, to build up a new mechanism inside of the OAS to reject the unilateral actions of the United States, like the Helms-Burton. Have you hear anything about this, or do you have any reaction to this?

MR. RUBIN: I'm unfamiliar with the proposal and therefore have no comment.

QUESTION: I wanted to beat the Iraqi dead horse one more time.

MR. RUBIN: Okay. Let's do it.

QUESTION: And I'm going to rephrase my question and take out the buzzwords "Pentagon" and "FBI." Is the State Department aware that a spy passed information about a military attack, about a U.S. military attack, to the Iraqis?

MR. RUBIN: You didn't take out all the key words. I cannot comment on that. Thank you.

QUESTION: Yes, I would now like to --

MR. RUBIN: Please.

QUESTION: Kosovo, we didn't talk about it yesterday.

MR. RUBIN: We did.

QUESTION: We did?

MR. RUBIN: I read a statement about that, yes.

QUESTION: Oh, okay. Currently, Jamie, the - Mr. Bulatovic, the defense minister of Serbia, has said - stated that Kosovo separatists are supporting - getting support from part of the international community; that's why there has been this terrorism and killing in Kosovo. Once again, where does the US stand on the implementation of - or putting in SFOR troops or does that have to be NATO troops or what?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not familiar with any proposal to send in military forces into Kosovo on the ground. Let me say this - we are appalled by the recent violent incidents in Kosovo. We continue to call on all sides to enter into an unconditional dialogue, and for authorities in Belgrade to implement immediately the education agreement on an effective basis. This would be a way to reduce tensions.

We have also called on the leaders of the Kosovar-Albanians to condemn terrorist action by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, noting that violence does not contribute to a just and durable solution to the problems there.

As the events over the weekend demonstrated, however, the vast majority of violence in Kosovo is due to actions of government authorities. We expect the Serbian police in Kosovo to act with maximum restraint, and the Yugoslav army to take no action that will further incite violence there. We have made these views clear to the authorities in Belgrade. Special Representative Robert Gelbard has communicated directly with President Milosevic, making clear the consequences that will ensue if they don't turn around. And Secretary Albright spoke today on the phone to Foreign Minister Cook and Foreign Minister Primakov about the situation. So we're seized with the subject. We have grave concerns in this area, and we're continuing to act.

QUESTION: Did Albright, when she talked with Cook and Primakov on this subject, discuss the possibility of the need for a foreign ministers', foreign secretaries' meeting, perhaps of the Contact Group or anything of that sort?

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't rule that out.

QUESTION: When would you not rule that out? Would that be not ruled out in London?

MR. RUBIN: Not ruling out is the best I can do for now.

QUESTION: Before you change the subject, did they discuss the continuation of the force in Macedonia?

MR. RUBIN: I don't know the full extent of the conversation. I know that the main topic was Kosovo, however.

QUESTION: Yes, Jamie, this is Mr. Arshad from the Daily Inquilab from Bangladesh. Turning onto Bangladesh, traditionally the United States have been championing the cause of democracy and free press around the world. It has become lately very much visible that the press has been gagged in Bangladesh, with the new democracy taking off under the leadership of Prime Minister Hasina. In fact, it has been to such an extent that my editor, of the Inquilab, and several publishers and weeklies' journalists have been prosecuted under high treason, which means they are going against a high treason notation.

Under these circumstances, and basing on the traditional notion of support for democracy and free press by the United States, what is the current stand of the US Government policy toward press freedom and democracy in South Asia, particularly in reference to the lapses in Bangladesh?

MR. RUBIN: Let me say, I'm unfamiliar with the specific circumstances of your editor's situation, and we will inquire into that. But I can say that Secretary Albright believes in the strongest possible way in the principle of freedom of the press and the practice of freedom of the press. That is our view.

QUESTION: Lately the Turkish Foreign Ministry make several dialogue calls to Greece, not only the Aegean subject, but all other subjects we disagree. But the Greek side officially refused this dialogue call directly and indirectly. We believe that the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr. Pangalos, will be in Washington late of March. Do you plan to discuss on this subject and dialogue calls with the Greeks?

MR. RUBIN: I am unfamiliar with the schedule as it is developing, but I can assure you the question of Greece-Turkey relations would come up in any such meeting.

QUESTION: In Russia, the atomic energy minister, who has been promoting nuclear supplies to Iran, has been fired. Do you have a comment on that or any other changes Mr. Yeltsin has made?

MR. RUBIN: I thought I had a comment on that. Excuse me.

QUESTION: -- things in your head, Jamie.

MR. RUBIN: Well, sometimes.

QUESTION: Maybe Albright discussed that with Mr. Primakov?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not aware that that came up in her discussion with - there we go. I did have something on that.

We did not have any indication that he intended to resign in our recent contacts with him, and we had anticipated his participation in the upcoming session of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.

As far as whether this will change our cooperation in nuclear matters is concerned, given the strong presidential and vice-presidential interest in this area, and the leadership that President Clinton and Vice President Gore have shown in this area, we expect our dialogue and cooperative work on nuclear matters to continue without interruption.

QUESTION: On Mexico. The government of Mexico has just asked the State Department to provide them with the supposed draft of the secret memorandum that was made by the DEA about the certification - the way that Mexico fight the drugs in 1997. I just wonder when are you planning to give the answer to the --

MR. RUBIN: I'm unfamiliar with whether that request has been made and how we're going to respond to it, but we would always want to work in close cooperation with the Mexican Government in our fight against drugs.

QUESTION: And Senator Helms has just introduced a resolution trying to reject the certification of Mexico. Do you have any --

MR. RUBIN: Well, I'm familiar with the fact that several members of Congress have indicated their intention to introduce measures of that kind. We believe the certification process worked extremely well this year. Secretary Albright was particularly pleased with the cooperation with Attorney General Reno and General McCaffrey. I think you all saw them here in this room. We would hope and expect that after receiving all the information, understanding the rationale for all of our judgments, that Congress would not take any action to undercut these important tools we have in the fight against drugs, and not take any action that will undermine our ability to fight drugs, such as resolutions of disapproval.

QUESTION: Jamie, I think yesterday, when we were discussing Iraq and you had announced the Secretary's trip, I asked whether since she was meeting the Italians, the French, the Germans, the Brits and the Canadians, at least in part to discuss that subject, whether she also had plans to do so with the Russians. In light of your disclosure of the phone conversation today with Mr. Primakov, could you revisit the question of whether --

MR. RUBIN: This sounds like another way of getting at the meeting of foreign ministers, which I said I couldn't rule out.

QUESTION: No, I --

MR. RUBIN: So what I would say is, I wouldn't rule it out.

QUESTION: The question is - what you didn't rule out was a meeting of the Contact Group on the subject of Kosovo.

MR. RUBIN: Right, of which Foreign Minister Primakov is a member.

QUESTION: Exactly.

MR. RUBIN: Normally, if they meet as a Contact Group, they would meet privately.

QUESTION: They would have other discussions.

MR. RUBIN: But I can't rule out a Contact Group meeting, and therefore I can't rule out a bilateral discussion.

QUESTION: Are there foreign ministers or foreign ministry level officials with whom the Secretary might meet on this trip, other than the ones you've announced already?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to confirm any meetings that I didn't announce yesterday.

QUESTION: And can you say whether the subject of these - either - could you perhaps revisit the question of the conversation the Secretary had with the Russian Foreign Minister today, to see whether topics other than Kosovo were discussed, and perhaps give us a more full description of that conversation?

MR. RUBIN: I will see what I can do on that. I mean, we don't normally talk about the entire content of conversations with foreign ministers. In the context of a particular question, however, I often express topics that were discussed and give the general impression of what the U.S. side said, but it would be up to other foreign ministers to talk about what they said.

QUESTION: If you would prefer a series of specific questions on specific topics, I'll be happy to do that for you.

MR. RUBIN: I don't understand your point.

QUESTION: If you'd like me to ask about whether topic A was discussed, and then whether topic B was discussed, and topic C was discussed, happy to do that.

MR. RUBIN: Well, fortunately, this will be the last briefing of this week.

QUESTION: Which is why I'm asking that question today. It would be nice to have --

MR. RUBIN: So it would be hard for you to follow through on your threat. Let me say this --

QUESTION: I beg to differ. Let's go - let's start. Can you tell us whether the Secretary --

MR. RUBIN: I have no comment.

QUESTION: -- and the foreign minister discussed the subject --

MR. RUBIN: I have no comment.

QUESTION: - of Iran in that --

MR. RUBIN: I have no comment.

QUESTION: You have no comment on that?

MR. RUBIN: Right.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on whether they discussed --

MR. RUBIN: Ralph, you're not really making much progress here. I'm trying to keep the jocular atmosphere in the briefing room going, and what I'm trying to tell you is that if we have anything more to tell you about private phone conversations, we'll decide when and where to do that.

QUESTION: These were private conversations?

MR. RUBIN: Between a foreign minister and a foreign minister, yes, those are called private. They weren't miked into the briefing room; right.

QUESTION: I don't know whether they were or not. I wasn't here to determine whether they were or not.

MR. RUBIN: I think we've exhausted this. Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)


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