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U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #29, 98-03-05

U.S. State Department: Daily Press Briefings Directory - Previous Article - Next Article

From: The Department of State Foreign Affairs Network (DOSFAN) at <http://www.state.gov>


952

U.S. Department of State
Daily Press Briefing

I N D E X

Thursday, March 5, 1998

Briefer: James B. Foley

ANNOUNCEMENTS
1		SLOVAKIA: Kidnapping of Michael Kovac, Jr.

SERBIA/MONTENEGRO 1-4,6 The option of force in reponse to Kosovo; Urge for calm 2,3,8,10 `Gelbard preview of options; Means at our disposal; 2,4,7 Contact Group - Sec. Albright and European leaders on 3/9 2,4,6,8 Unconditional dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina; Improving the political situation of Kosovo-Albanians; Role of third party in dialogue 3,7 Implementation of Dayton accords, four steps; PM Dodik; SECI initiative 4,6 Call for an independent investigation of killings in Kosovo 5 TERRORISM: Definition/ US position on terrorist activities 6 Kosovo violence impact on Balkan area; Robin Cook assesment 9 US communications with Albanian Government/Milosevic 9-10 Comparison of Bosnia and Kosovo; Degree of Danger 10 Helicopter Guns Ships 10 Continued Agression of Serbs Despite USG Protests 10 Further economic sanctions, IMF and World Bank sanctions

CUBA 11 Humanitarian aid to Cuba 12 Promotion of democracy and human rights in Cuba 12 EU dedication to promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba

RUSSIA 12 Reaction to Yevgniy Adamov, Russia's new minister of atomic energy 13 Russian -Iranian nuclear relationship

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 13 Palestinian training by the CIA 13 Reports of Israeli government holding Lebanese men 14 Role of Jordan's Hussein in MEPP

CHINA 14 Elimination of 11 ministry bodies in China 14 Economic growth in China

ILSA 14,15 Secretary's determination on Total Gazprom's sanctionability 16 Options in regard to the implementation of sanctions

SLOVAKIA 15 Official US course of action in regards to Slovakia


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING

DPB #29

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 1998, 1:05 P.M.

(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)

MR. FOLEY: Good afternoon. Welcome to the State Department. We barely have a quorum today. It's not the numbers; it's the quality of those present.

I have one announcement before we begin your questions. The March 3 decision of the Slovak Government to grant amnesty to any persons who may have planned or participated in the kidnapping of Michael Kovac, Jr., and any persons who may have violated the constitution in preparing the ballots for the May 1997 referendum on direct election of the president and entry into NATO is a further serious setback to the rule of law and constitutional government.

In the case of the of the Kovac kidnapping, the Slovak Government's action effectively precludes the resolution of a serious political crime. The amnesty for persons involved in the preparation of the referendum means that no one will be held accountable for actions which not only deprived Slovak citizens of their legal right to express their opinion, but also directly violated a ruling of the constitutional court.

These actions are not consistent with the behavior of a government that respects the rule of law. They invite further abuses of the law and the constitution by those who claim to be serving the national interest.

Barry.

QUESTION: I wondered if you could give us the US policy on whether force is an option for order to be implemented in Kosovo? Does that remain part of US policy, that it's an appropriate tool?

MR. FOLEY: First of all, the United States strongly condemns the violence in Kosovo this weekend, particularly the excessive use of force by Serbian police. This violence results from the failure of Serbian authorities to recognize the legitimate grievances of the Kosovar-Albanian population.

Our firm message to both parties is that the difficulties in Kosovo cannot be solved through the use of force. We have received credible reports of ongoing operations in Kosovo by Serb authorities. Kosovar-Albanian sources have reported the presence of tracked vehicles and artillery fire in the region. We have no recent information on casualties.

We view the situation in Kosovo as very serious, and are investigating these reports. There will be serious negative consequences for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a result of this latest outrage, beginning with the withdrawal of the positive measures Special Representative Gelbard previewed with Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade last week. So we are withdrawing those.

We will explore with the Contact Group Ministers on Monday in London additional coordinated measures in response to these events. We have also proposed that independent outside authorities investigate the deaths of a number of Kosovar Albanians who were killed in violence last weekend. There are credible reports that they were, in fact, executed while in the custody of Serb police.

As to your specific question, there should be no doubt about the seriousness with which we view the situation in Kosovo. We've made clear to Mr. Milosevic that we will respond to actions by FRY forces that inflame the situation. We have a broad range of options available to use. I'm not going to speculate about which ones they might be.

Beyond that, I think you saw the remarks that Special Representative Gelbard had made yesterday, talking about means that we have at our disposal. We are going to be exploring these means and these options with our friends and partners in the Contact Group on Monday. I can't foreshadow what they might be, but the consequences, I said, will be very serious.

QUESTION: Well, some interpreted his reference to appropriate tools as a reaffirmation of force as an option. Is that interpretation wrong?

MR. FOLEY: Well, there was an erroneous report that attributed to Ambassador Gelbard a specific comment in that regard, which he did not make; and the transcript of his remarks makes that clear. On the other hand, as I said, I'm not willing, from this podium, to specify what options we have under consideration.

There will be serious consequences if this situation persists -- if the government in Belgrade, on the one hand, continues to use force to deal with this problem; and if, on the other hand, the government in Belgrade continues to refuse the serious dialogue and the implementation of reforms that can reach out to the Kosovar Albanian community and convince them that they have a stake in an improved situation for themselves in the Kosovo.

QUESTION: I have two questions. So you have made a decision to withdraw those limited concessions that Gelbard had announced earlier?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, we have.

QUESTION: And are you saying that the use of military force is off the table, that that is not one of those options?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not specifically addressing that option in either a positive or negative way. I'm being very careful in choosing my words. As I said, we have a broad range of options. I cannot speculate on which options we might choose. Our choice also will depend on what may happen in the days ahead. We've called now, very publicly and very firmly, on President Milosevic to exercise restraint and to begin the kind of dialogue which we believe is necessary to resolve the differences that exist in Kosovo.

Again, we believe, as I said a minute ago, that the violence results from the failure of the Serb authorities to recognize the legitimate grievances of the Kosovar Albanian population.

QUESTION: What is it - excuse me. I just wanted to clear up one detail. Positive measures, I know about the opening of a consulate in the United States, what are the other ones?

MR. FOLEY: There were, I believe, four steps of a somewhat symbolic nature, but which, nevertheless recognized the fact that, on Belgrade's side, and in particular on the part of President Milosevic, that in the recent weeks we had seen positive contributions to the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia. President Milosevic had played a useful and positive role in the developments which led to the election of a pro-Dayton, reform-minded prime minister in the Republika Srpska - Prime Minister Dodik -- and had cooperated in other areas involving Dayton implementation as well. But as you know, we have a range of concerns with the government in Belgrade. The outer sanctions remain in place, and their lifting is contingent on FRY positive action in a range of areas, and none more important than in Kosovo.

What we have seen is a tremendous step backward. We responded initially and immediately by withdrawing the four actions, which I'll enumerate for you in a second; and we're considering other serious measures as well. The four measures that we have withdrawn include FRY participation in our Southern Europe Cooperation Initiative, so-called SECI initiative. We had offered to consider allowing an increase in personnel at the FRY observer mission in New York at the UN; allowing them to open a consulate in the United States. And also, the fourth measure involved landing rights for the Yugoslav airline in the United States. Those four --

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. FOLEY: SECI participation for Belgrade.

QUESTION: You say SECI - (inaudible) -

(Laughter.)

MR. FOLEY: SECI is an initiative that the United States Government is sponsoring to promote greater dialogue and cooperation among all the countries in the Balkans.

QUESTION: Listen, are you just being diplomatically polite - although you did use some strong words? I mean, your description - outrage is pretty strong. You don't like what the Serbian troops did - I mean, by all accounts this was a kind of atrocity, widespread atrocities. I mean, killing mothers and children and father and son together so I guess it's neater that way. I mean, does the State Department find widespread genocidal behavior or just outrageous actions by Serbian police?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I don't think that I can underestimate the degree of outrage and the degree of concern within the United States Government over the recent events in Kosovo. I believe that outrage and that concern are shared by our European partners, and we're going to be meeting with them. Secretary Albright will be participating in the Contact Group meeting in London on Monday.

So, Barry, you can parse my words, but without wanting to exaggerate, the situation is very grave. Some terrible, repressive acts have occurred. Innocent people have been killed. That's why we're calling for independent outside authorities to investigate those killings. We're considering serious further measures, particularly in the light of what may continue to happen there. We continue to urge calm on all sides. I would remind you that we have and continue to urge restraint by the Kosovar Albanian leadership, and have made clear that we do not support secession or independence of Kosovo. And of course, we condemn all terrorist actions. But we believe that the Kosovar people - Albanian-Kosovars in Kosovo have legitimate political grievances. They have a right to an enhanced status within the FRY, to greater self-administration. These are fundamental political rights and grievances which have not been addressed, and which are the ultimate source of the violence which has occurred in the last days.

QUESTION: Well, I was listening yesterday -- the word Albanian was used - I don't want to get too Talmudic or Jesuitical about this, but you recognize, the State Department, the people there as Albanians. The Kurds in Iraq, you keep referring - the State Department keeps referring to as Iraqi Kurds, but you do - the State Department does recognize Palestinian Arabs and Palestinians, having an ethnic identity. Where do the Albanians fall, sort of with the Palestinians, as an ethnic people, right, having ethnic individual - national rights?

MR. FOLEY: I believe the term that we --

QUESTION: Which you never gave the Kurds.

MR. FOLEY: -- used to apply to them is "Kosovar Albanians." As I said, we do not support the secession or independence for Kosovo, but we believe that they have rights to an autonomous status; we believe they have rights to enhanced self-administration. One of the building blocks or initial blocks of the reforms we think are necessary involve the education agreement -- the implementation of that agreement, which has lagged and lagged, which would give students in Kosovo an opportunity to study in their own language and to study subjects to their liking. That is, if you will, symbolic of what we want to see over the long run, which is the full enjoyment of the rights of the people in Kosovo, which have been long denied and repressed with the consequences we've seen in the last few days.

QUESTION: Can I ask you about this question of terrorism? Is this a terrorist group? The State Department called them a terrorist group, I believe, this week or last week, for the first time perhaps. If these people are attacking Serb police or soldiers, armed people, would that be considered terrorism? Isn't terrorism if you attack civilians and unarmed people?

MR. FOLEY: Let me make clear, we condemn violence of all kinds. I'm not going to give any kind of a blank check to different kinds of violent actions, depending on how you may or may not define them. Violence is not the answer.

There have been terrorist acts committed by this Kosovar Liberation Army, which we condemn. We think it's time for the moderate leadership in Kosovo to stand up and take its responsibilities and lead the way, providing that there is a dialogue partner in Belgrade toward sitting down and discussing, and eventually resolving these issues.

QUESTION: Can I follow up? What are those terrorist attacks? Because it's a relevant question. There is a distinction, isn't there, between attacking the institutions of power and civilians?

MR. FOLEY: I'm not making that distinction.

QUESTION: Well, then, George Washington was a terrorist.

MR. FOLEY: I'm not making that distinction.

QUESTION: I mean --

MR. FOLEY: We think that violence is not the answer. We don't, as I said, support independence or secession of Kosovo.

QUESTION: Does the State Department never support freedom fighters, independence movements? Is that always out of - off the table these days?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I wouldn't want to answer that in a broadly philosophical way. I'm concentrating on the situation in Kosovo, which is potentially explosive at the moment. Violence is not the answer. Those who --

QUESTION: Well, I've been here three years, and I haven't heard one instance where --

MR. FOLEY: Well, you're more an authority on that than I am. You've been here longer than I.

QUESTION: -- where the State Department has supported any kind of independence movement.

QUESTION: You mentioned we're calling for independent outside authorities to investigate.

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: This recent flare-up in Kosovo, you'd like to have an investigation specifically on these riots on the weekend?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, because there have been reports of deaths of innocent civilians in Kosovo that we think need to be investigated.

QUESTION: Who might do that investigation? Any ideas?

MR. FOLEY: I don't think we put forward formally a group, and I don't think we necessarily have a favored group. We believe that some independent outside organization, whether it's the International Committee for the Red Cross or some such group, would be able to go in and make an independent assessment of what has happened.

QUESTION: Could I just get back to the military option issue? Gelbard was asked specifically about the "Christmas warning," and he said US policy has not changed. Can you just - is that the case? I mean, that warning issued in 1992 still stands today?

MR. FOLEY: We've not commented on press reports on that subject, and I'm not going to be able to do that today. As I said, we have a broad range of options. I'm not going to specify either in terms of ruling in or ruling out particular options. And I certainly can't comment on that particular subject.

QUESTION: Robin Cook, who was in Belgrade, I believe yesterday --

MR. FOLEY: Yes - or today.

QUESTION: -- echoed the international fears that bloodshed might become uncontrollable and spread beyond Kosovo, to quote this article. He told reporters it was urgent to redouble diplomatic pressures on Belgrade, to recognize that the international community cannot sand by while they impose repressive police measures. Does the US agree with Mr. Cook's assessment of the danger to Balkan area of this police battle that's going on?

MR. FOLEY: I think it's not secret that we've always believed that Kosovo has implications beyond Kosovo, beyond the FRY region-wide. That's why the situation there is so critical, and that's why we are going to be meeting in the Contact Group on this basis, to deal with this issue. We think, indeed, that violence in Kosovo can have an impact beyond Kosovo, and it is critical that the international community come together, as they will on Monday, and make it crystal clear to Mr. Milosevic that he's got to call the dogs of repression back and must sit down and negotiate with the Kosovar Albanians - the moderate leadership there - on the kinds of reforms that will be necessary to diffuse the situation.

QUESTION: Do you think - is it your - you talk a little bit about operations that were going on there, Serbian operations. What do you see as the nature of those operations? And do you see sort of a systematic effort by Milosevic to destabilize Kosovo?

MR. FOLEY: I would hesitate to try to put myself in his mind, to characterize his actions. He has --

QUESTION: I want to know your interpretation of his actions.

MR. FOLEY: He has shown a record over the last decade as a tactician of some ability, but not usually demonstrated an ability to think long-term, to think about the long-term interests of his people in the region; although we have recognized positive steps on Dayton implementation when he has taken those.

But again, I'm not in a position to read his mind. What the United States is trying to do, and what we will do with our partners in the Contact Group, is signal to him the serious costs of allowing this situation to fester. Whether it involves a conscious long-range design or mere tactical maneuvers, the fact of the matter is that the repression that is taking place is totally unacceptable to the international community and will have the most severe consequences.

QUESTION: I'm not asking you to read his mind. I'm asking what you see, how you analyze the situation. What kinds of operations do you see the Serbians undertaking? We see violence; we see incidents of violence. But what do you see particularly? And do you think - does it add up to the United States as a systematic effort to undermine Kosovar Albanians in a way that Belgrade has not done before this?

MR. FOLEY: I think that we're not in a position to make that determination. Certainly, the actions of the last week and the last days are very worrisome and very troublesome, and perhaps point in that direction. What we are trying to do is to grab Mr. Milosevic's attention right now, while there is time to pull back and consider the very serious consequences to him and his country pursuing in the direction that you described, if such is the intention or the result of the repression that is occurring there.

QUESTION: Can you see a broader - possibility for a broader regional conflict --

MR. FOLEY: Well, I answered that question when Bill asked it. We see potential negative fallout beyond Kosovo in what is happening there. I think that's why you're seeing the international community coming together very quickly in the wake of this violence, to meet and discuss steps to make sure that that sort of development does not occur.

I think, Betsy, you had a question also.

QUESTION: It was the same thing.

MR. FOLEY: Yes, Carole.

QUESTION: On the other issue of the unconditional dialogue that you've called for, in your view should there be a third party at the table? Would the United States or Europe play that role? If there were to be a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina?

MR. FOLEY: Well, you may know, under Vatican auspices, the Sant'Egidio Foundation, I believe, has been promoting reforms and reconciliation, in particular, I believe, in connection with the education agreement. I believe Secretary Albright will be meeting with the foundation leaders in Rome and will be discussing their role.

I think, as far as the United States is concerned, what is important is not so much who is doing the mediating as the fact that the two sides are coming together and sitting down at the table and discussing differences, and discussing the implementation of the real reforms that will address the root cause of the violence and address the just grievances of the Kosovar Albanian people.

QUESTION: Jim, you just used virtually the same language that the UN resolution on Iraq uses, which Albright told the Appropriations Subcommittee yesterday is simply a code word for military force. If this continues, it will have the most serious -- severe consequences - "severe consequences."

MR. FOLEY: Well, I've been very careful, and we've been discussing this --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - code word for force?

MR. FOLEY: I've been very careful - we've been discussing this for 15 or 20 minutes --

QUESTION: Yes, and you haven't said force yet.

MR. FOLEY: -- not to specify what the options are that are available. I would refer you to Ambassador Gelbard's remarks yesterday as illustrative when he talked about the very sorry state of the Serb economy today, which is heading south and which can be made to head further south if the Belgrade authorities persist in this direction.

QUESTION: As you look back, did the US get too - was the US a little bit early in being nice to Milosevic, with these little carrots?

MR. FOLEY: I don't think so. The fact is that Dayton implementation in Bosnia is critical; it's an American foreign policy objective of the highest order. And if Mr. Milosevic has taken, as he has, positive steps to help in the implementation of Dayton, it is normal that we would seek to encourage further steps in that direction.

What I explained, though, Barry, at the outset is that we have a wider agenda than Bosnia with Mr. Milosevic - especially concerning the outer wall of sanctions. I think there's nothing wrong with responding positively to positive steps. But the Kosovo situation, at the moment, transcends other considerations, I must say.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- about Pristina and about Belgrade, but the Albanian Government has also made some statements about it. Do you have any communications about this with the government of Albania?

MR. FOLEY: I'm sure through our embassy in Albania and their embassy here, we've had communications. I'm not aware specifically of recent communications, but I'd be surprised if there were none.

QUESTION: I'm going to draw a rather sharp comparison, in order to get you to talk about timing. The Serbs were allowed to go on shelling Sarajevo for a matter of years before troops were actually sent in to stop them. Is there a greater sense of urgency here now - a greater sense that the West will have to respond very quickly in order to prevent this brushfire from spreading? What's your sense of how long the Serbs have before the West will respond in a way that will prevent this from continuing?

MR. FOLEY: Well, first of all, I think you should wait until the Contact Group meets in London on Monday. I think the international community will be responding at that moment quickly and forcefully.

Second, it's very hard to compare the two situations, because, as you know, the international community was in fact seized of the Bosnian issue - perhaps not in a way that would have satisfied our concerns at the time. There was a UN peacekeeping mission, which - well it's history. I won't review it at this moment. But I think they were entirely different situations. But I can't really understate the importance to the United States Government today of what is happening in Kosovo, and our view that very serious measures are under consideration in response to the very serious situation occurring there.

QUESTION: Would you regard the potential dangers of this situation as even greater, perhaps, than Bosnia, for strategic reasons, because of where Kosovo is and who its neighbors are?

MR. FOLEY: I would not want to speculate about what the possible implications are. I merely stated that it's long been our view that the Kosovo situation can have an impact beyond Kosovo. But to try to spell out different scenarios would be to raise alarm bells that I don't care to raise at this moment from this podium. What we are telling Mr. Milosevic is to stop the violence now.

QUESTION: Can I ask you about another area?

QUESTION: I just one other question. When did you last speak to Milosevic?

MR. FOLEY: I believe that earlier this week Ambassador Gelbard may have spoken with him. I can't confirm that specifically. But we have been in communication with him, if not by telephone, at least indirectly, I believe as late as last evening.

QUESTION: Does the State Department have a position on humanitarian food relief for the Cuban people, as suggested by --

MR. FOLEY: Are we finished with --

QUESTION: I don't - maybe --

MR. FOLEY: I'm not protesting if we are.

QUESTION: No, no. I'm sorry.

QUESTION: I've got a couple quick questions on Kosovo.

MR. FOLEY: Yes.

QUESTION: There are reports today that they've used helicopter gun ships against Albanian -- I think Albanian villagers. Do you have any confirmation of that?

MR. FOLEY: I would have said that, believe me, if that had come to my attention before I came out here. As I said, we've seen other worrisome indications of military movements and deployments as of this morning, but I was not aware of that coming in.

QUESTION: But you've been protesting these deployments and threats of violence and the early violence now for several days, and it doesn't appear to have slowed down the Serbs.

MR. FOLEY: I think it's indisputable that, at least as of now, Mr. Milosevic has not gotten the message.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. FOLEY: And we're going to try to increase the volume and the content of that message in the days to come.

QUESTION: Now, you don't want to talk about military force, but you say that the economy is a place where you could squeeze him some more. There's already a wall of sanctions in place. What more can you possibly do than cut him off from IMF and World Bank funding and from all the sanctions that are already in place?

MR. FOLEY: Well, you're asking in a clever way to draw me out on the kinds of options that I have steadfastly refused to be drawn out on over the last 20 or 25 minutes. I can't do that for you today.

QUESTION: Can I try a clever question on Cuba?

MR. FOLEY: Sure. Barry, you only have clever questions.

QUESTION: I thought that was a rather simple question. Does the State Department have a view of the suggestion by some staffers on Capitol Hill that Cuban people should be assisted in humanitarian food shipments?

MR. FOLEY: We have just received the report, read about it in the newspapers, as have you, this morning. So we've not had an opportunity to review it. So at this time we don't have any comment on details of the report or on the proposed legislation.

We would note, however, that facilitating humanitarian assistance to Cuba has been an important element of US Government policy ever since the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992. The US has become the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Cuba since 1992. According to Department of Commerce statistics, we have licensed over $2 billion in humanitarian donations, including $228 million in medical goods. We've given you that information previously.

We are aware of various proposals facilitating additional humanitarian assistance to Cuba, including two legislative bills currently pending before Congress that provide embargo exemptions for the sale and transport of food and medical exports to Cuba. We're also aware that the Cuban- American National Foundation, endorsed by Senator Helms, is proposing the authorization of the delivery of humanitarian donations and US Government food aid to the neediest Cuban people.

The United States Government continues to believe that maintaining pressure on the Cuban Government through our embargo is fundamental to encouraging systemic democratic change. At the same time, strengthening Cuban civil society through increased information flows and humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people is a key factor in our ongoing efforts to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba.

The long and the short of it is that we've just seen the report this morning - not entirely surprised by it, because details had been adumbrated in previous weeks and there is other legislation currently before the Congress that also is under review within the Administration. So I can't tell you where we're going to come out on it; but we believe we have a very good record, even now, in terms of authorizing humanitarian donations to Cuba. We're certainly going to study these proposals coming out of Congress.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) -- very critical on the implementation of the Helms- Burton law, not only on Title IV that has - Title III that has been suspended, but also on the part about visas. Is the State Department not pursuing these --

MR. FOLEY: Well, although we have not had an opportunity to read the report and evaluate it, even having seen the press reports, we can state that we disagree with that assertion. We believe, as Ambassador Eizenstat has stated here from this podium on different occasions, that through his significant efforts, the EU has indeed taken important steps to promote democracy and human rights in Cuba.

Because of the President's multilateral initiative, launched in 1996 under Ambassador Eizenstat's direction, Castro is under more international pressure to change than ever before. This historic initiative has changed the terms of the debate about Cuba. When the President announced his decision in January of 1998 to again suspend Title III, he pledged the right to file suit in order to "make maximum use of Title III to increase pressure on the Cuban regime by working with our allies to accelerate change in Cuba."

At that time, the President pointed out that a number of important steps taken by US allies, including the European Union's common position on Cuba, the Ibero-American summit leaders called for democratic change in Cuba, and new attention to the human rights situation in Cuba from European NGOs was pertinent. I would also note, for example, that the European Union has formed a working group on human rights among the embassies of its member states in Havana to coordinate EU human rights efforts in Cuba. Our Interests Section in Cuba has worked with our partner European embassies there on human rights issues.

So we would take issue with that conclusion. We believe that really there's been a major turning point - a sea change, if you will - in the attitude of the European Union towards the need to promote actively democratization and human rights in Cuba.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - says that other things were done, but it's been dying out - practically - it's only Spain and the Czech Republic practically are still doing it, and especially critical of France and Germany.

MR. FOLEY: That's not our information, but I can assure you that we're going to continue to work with our allies on how we can promote our common objective of promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba.

QUESTION: Do you have any observations about the man who was named successor to Viktor Mikhailov at MINATOM?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, I do. You're talking about Yevgniy Adamov, who's been just named Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy.

The United States has worked closely, of course, with the Ministry of Atomic Energy in the past. Our relations with the ministry have been quite constructive on a number of issues, including material protection, control and accounting, plutonium disposition and other areas. Given strong interest on the part of President Clinton and Vice President Gore in this area, we expect our dialogue and cooperative work on nuclear matters to continue without interruption under the new minister. We've always had a frank and open dialogue with the Ministry, and we expect that to continue under its new minister.

QUESTION: Do you expect any - if I just sort of took your words as they're stated, it sounds like you don't expect any change, which wouldn't necessarily be good for US-Russia policy, since you don't like a lot of the things that they're doing now. So, I mean, do you see any reason to believe that he will be any less aggressive than Mikhailov in marketing Russian nuclear technology to Iran, for instance?

MR. FOLEY: I think that's too early to tell. He's just been named. Certainly, the Russian Government is not lacking understanding of our very strong views about this issue, and is working with us now on this issue. We don't see eye-to-eye on each and every issue in every case, but I believe that we do have much improved cooperation with the Russian Government now on the issue of illicit transfers to Iran and the need to combat those.

So this is an ongoing effort, and I wouldn't be in a position to predict how the new minister may or may not affect those efforts. But we believe that the direction comes from the top, from President Yeltsin and from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, who will be here next week to meet with Vice President Gore in the context of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. Certainly, that will be an opportunity for the two leaders to discuss this issue and where we're going on it.

QUESTION: And one slightly different issue -- do you have any comment on the Times story today about the Palestinians and the CIA training?

MR. FOLEY: What I can tell you is that the US is working closely with Palestinians in several areas, including efforts to improve the performance and the professionalism of the Palestinian law enforcement authorities. But I cannot, obviously, comment on intelligence matters or reports or allegations, as such.

QUESTION: Jim, a general area -- have you seen the decision by the Israeli Supreme Court that the Israeli Government has a constitutional right to hold some number of Lebanese men, basically as trading material, in future hostage --

MR. FOLEY: We've seen the press reports, but we're studying the ruling. I can't comment on it. We're going to be raising it with the government of Israel, but I have nothing of a formal nature to say about that today.

QUESTION: You're going to raise it. You're going to ask --

QUESTION: You were not aware of that before?

MR. FOLEY: We're going to be discussing it with the government of Israel.

QUESTION: You were not aware of that before?

MR. FOLEY: I was aware of the press reports this morning, but, no, I was not aware of the issue, as such. Maybe others in the building were, but I wasn't personally.

QUESTION: You say you're raising it, do you mean to verify that there is such a thing?

MR. FOLEY: Yes, because we've just seen the press reports; right.

QUESTION: Chinese Premier Li Peng announced to eliminate 11 ministry bodies. What's your observation? Do you welcome this reform or --

MR. FOLEY: I've not seen that report. I couldn't possibly comment on it until we've had a chance to verify --

QUESTION: Also, Premier Li Peng, he estimated 8 percent growth, economic growth, this year. Do you think this observation - this prospect is realistic?

MR. FOLEY: Well, the last thing anyone who knows me could accuse me of is any kind of expertise in economic affairs. So I would not personally venture to comment on that. Obviously, the Chinese Government is undertaking a very serious economic reform program, and we support that program. But I have no official reaction, though, to those prognostications about future Chinese economic growth.

QUESTION: King Hussein of Jordan was in the United Emirates this week, and he discussed his diplomatic role in the recent Iraq-UN crisis. According to one Arab press report, he discussed he was working on behalf of the United States and President Clinton. I was wondering if you might be able to comment on King Hussein's specific role in that mediation effort during the crisis.

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not aware that there is a mediation effort, as such. I think there were press reports indicating something of that nature that we discussed with the Jordanian Government, and have been assured that there's not a specific initiative in that regard. But of course, King Hussein is an eminent leader in the Middle East, and we support his positive contributions to the Middle East peace process and to the interest of peace and stability generally in the region.

QUESTION: Is the Secretary getting any closer to being able to decide whether or not the Total and Gazprom deal is sanctionable under ILSA?

MR. FOLEY: My understanding - of course, the law is the law and she's going to apply it. Under the law, she has to make a determination on sanctionability. She will do so. My understanding is that decision will be made soon. I don't have a specific date for you.

QUESTION: Jim, could I go back to your first announcement about Slovakia? Other than warning the Slovak Government, is the United States and its allies prepared to do anything about what this appears to be - which is a severe backsliding from democratic institutions?

MR. FOLEY: Well, as you know, our relations with the Slovak Government have - with Slovakia, generally, have been impeded and hampered by certain gaps and failures on the part of Mr. Meciar to institute real democratization and meaningful economic reforms in the face of better performance on the part of virtually all of his neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War. We have been impeded in our ability to provide the kind of help and assistance to Slovakia that we provided elsewhere in the region on that basis.

I'm not aware of any further measures or impediments that are under review as a result of this, but I think it is significant that I have made this statement from the podium to express just how seriously the US Government officially take this action.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) - program to Slovakia?

MR. FOLEY: I'd have to check that for you, Jim.

QUESTION: Thanks a lot.

QUESTION: Can I just - I really wanted to ask about ILSA. I want to understand what it is that the Secretary is deciding. Is she just deciding whether or not the companies - Total and Gazprom - are sanctionable; whether this deal is large enough and meets the terms of the - that in theory, there could be sanctions? And is that all she's deciding? Or are there, for example, other considerations? Because when you read the law, it sounds like -- it's a bit blurred, frankly, in my opinion.

But it sounds like it might be possible to determine, for example, that since the Russian Government is cooperating on the question of missile engine technology to Iran - cutting back the flow of that - that that might allow somehow a determination that Gazprom shouldn't be sanctioned. In the law, it interrelates the nation with the company quite a bit in a rather foggy way. I'm not clear what it is she's got to decide.

MR. FOLEY: This is a very serious issue, as you know. I don't have the law in front of me at the podium, so I'm going to give you an answer as I understand it, but pledge to get back to you if I need to refine it after having consulted the document, the legislation itself.

My understanding is that it is the Secretary's duty to make a determination on sanctionability - is the activity sanctionable or not, under the law, under the terms of the law? In making that decision, then, she must choose among a menu of options if she determines that the action is sanctionable. And there are options which I can get you --

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. FOLEY: -- that flow from a determination of sanctionability.

QUESTION: First there's the determination of sanctionability, then there's the 90 days, and then all these other questions.

MR. FOLEY: Well, there are different options. I'm risking commission of an error by describing what those options are, but I believe that they include immediate imposition of sanctions; they include a national - an immediate national interest waiver; and I believe the third option is a 90- day period in which there can be consultations with the government involved when sanctionability has been determined. Those are provisions provided under the law.

Thank you very much.

(The briefing concluded at 1:50P.M.)


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